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1 Introduction
Fiscal transparency is probably the most important notion in accounting in both private and
public sectors. Accounting is supposed to provide various stakeholders with a transparent and
reliable picture of the firms’ and governments’ financial situation. For the public sector, this is
at least the theory supported by the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board
(IPSASB) when it presses governments to report their financial performance and position in
a true and fair view.1
Nonetheless, accounts may be manipulated through creative accounting, which refers to
“a process whereby accountants use their knowledge of accounting rules to manipulate the fig-
ures reported in the accounts of a business” (Amat et al. 1999). At the same time, Baralexis
(2004) asserts that the main characteristic of creative accounting is the discretionary nature
of those operations. Indeed, in the author’s point of view, “creative accounting is the process
of intentionally exploiting or violating the GAAP or the law to present financial statements
according to one’s interests”.2 Although both definitions account for the private sector, the
same can be said for the public sector. That way, if accounts are effectively manipulated
through creative accounting, the objective of fiscal transparency is no longer achieved. Sub-
sequently, it becomes more difficult for stakeholders to take efficient decisions. Without any
doubt, consequences ensuing from such manipulations may be highly damaging. Notably,
the current European Monetary Union crisis demonstrates the danger of such practices.
However, in spite of such incontestable evidence, we support that, in certain circum-
stances, creative accounting can have beneficial effects on the governments’ financial perfor-
mance. In any case, this is the first element we investigate in this research. Throughout this
research, we aim to quantify the impact of creative accounting on the level of public deficits.
1The IPSAS (International Public Sector Accounting Standards) norms are recommendations, published by the
IPSAS Board, intended for the presentation of accounts in the public sector. They are based on the IFRS (International
Financial Reporting Standards) and on the IAS (International Accounting Standards). The IPSAS norms apply to
every public entity (central government, subnational level of government and municipality), with the exception of
public firms that principally have a commercial activity.
2The GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) refer to the standard framework of guidelines for financial
accounting used in any given jurisdiction. That way, GAAP are a codification of how firms have to prepare and present
their financial statement (incomes, expenses, assets and liabilities). In a large part of jurisdictions, GAAP ensue from
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) developed by the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB).
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The second element we investigate is the various determinants of creative accounting, paying
particular attention to the extent to which finance ministers matter to this issue. To answer
both research questions, we concentrate on the 26 Swiss cantons and the 116 finance ministers
in position over the period 1980 - 2012.
In most Swiss cantons, the individual cantonal legislation usually requires the statement
of financial performance to be balanced (or almost balanced). In other words, the total
operating expenses, which are the total costs of the publicly provided services, have to be
integrally covered by the operating revenues. This means that Swiss cantons have to report
surpluses during booms in order to offset past or future public deficits. Swiss cantons are thus
implicitly recommended to run a structural surplus to avoid the risk of reporting a deficit
during economic downturns. Additionally, knowing that finance ministers have personal
interests in sound public finance, they are expected to be all the more liable to embrace
such a budgetary policy. Since they are assessed by voters on their capacity to ensure
fiscal soundness (i.e. avoid public deficits and thus growing indebtedness), it is essential for
finance ministers to save surpluses over time. However, in practice, it is relatively hard for
governments and thus for finance ministers to justify a surplus. Indeed, it would indicate that
taxes paid by citizens were too high compared to the usual public services they received from
the government. Conversely, it would signify that governments failed to provide adequate
public services compared to the tax revenues they received. Claims from citizens or political
parties (spending ministers or deputies) aiming to reduce taxes or to increase public spending
may then appear from such situations. Such an evidence has notably been revealed on March
2005 by La Gruyère, a local newspaper of the canton of Fribourg. Commenting the financial
results of the year 2004, the newspaper wrote “As soon as published, the surplus of the canton
of Fribourg, for the year 2004, aroused envy. At first, the Social Democratic Party (PS) tries
to grasp the godsend and claims for tax reductions for middle-class families yet in 2006 [...]”.3
In order to avoid those claims, finance ministers may have strong incentives to artificially
reduce the surplus reported in the statement of financial performance as opposed to pre-
senting a true and fair representation. On top of allowing the use of additional depreciation
3Source: La Gruyère (22.05.2005) Le bénéfice attise les envies
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charges, cantonal legislation also gives the possibility to finance ministers to play with special
funds in order to disguise reported figures. However, accounting has to be used to present
the financial situation as it is in reality and its use should not deviate from this objective.
Accounting should not be employed to transform reality in order to ultimately satisfy partic-
ular interests. But additional depreciation charges and special funds are used exactly in this
way. They are purely and simply budgetary tools used by finance ministers with the sole pur-
pose of misleading financial information users. For that reason, we will consider additional
depreciation charges and special funds as creative accounting throughout this research.
However, although they are untrue and unfair and thus degrade the representation of re-
ality, additional depreciation charges and special funds are legal in Swiss cantons. That way,
as cantonal public accounts are validated in the light of cantonal legislation, their utilization
is not forbidden. Finance ministers therefore have all the latitude they want to shape the
reported balance of the statement of financial performance according to their personal inter-
ests. Concretely, they are legally authorized to publish the picture that best suits their own
objectives. Moreover, due to their legality, additional depreciation charges and special funds
are even reported in public accounts. Cunningly, the finance minister even displays them
and communicates that, after additional depreciation charges and the setting aside of special
funds, the surplus is, for instance, about 1 million CHF. As proof, dedicating an article to
the annual reported accounts of Fribourg, Le Temps, a national newspaper, read in 2009
that “for the seventh consecutive year, the canton gathers a surplus, which officially came
up to only 29.6 millions CHF. But without provisions, mandatory or not, and additional
depreciation charges, the real amount would rather be about 180 millions CHF”.4 Compar-
atively, the online 20 Minutes journal, ran the title “The canton of Valais is finally ready
to cope with the coming crisis. It carried out reserves and additional depreciation charges
in 2008. [...]. In spite of these measures, balances in 2008 remain positive and highlight an
excess of revenues of 0.5 million CHF”.5 Moreover, finance ministers may even confess they
discretionarily use additional depreciation charges and special funds regarding the financial
situation. Investigating reported amounts of reserves, provisions and additional depreciation
4Source: Le Temps (03.04.2012) Septième compte positive de suite pour Fribourg
5Source: 20 Minutes (06.04.2009) Le Valais financièrement prêt à affronter la crise
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charges, La Gruyère wrote that the finance minister of Fribourg “ends up adminiting that
about ten million would not have been used the way they were in case of a deficit”.6
By budgeting additional depreciation charges or uncommon allocations to special funds,
finance ministers increase operating expenses, which justify maintaining higher tax rates
than necessary. In turn, these high tax rates generate additional cash-flow that allows the
constitution of reserves and/or the repayment of debt. Both accruals would thus be used
in the sole purpose to maintain fiscal pressure on citizens and to avoid political claims for
higher public spending. As a consequence, by restraining the level of operating expenses
and by simultaneously guaranteeing higher operating revenues, creative accounting should
improve the future governments’ financial performance. The first research question of this
essay therefore investigates the relationship between creative accounting and the balances of
the statement of financial performance.
Then, due to their discretionary characteristics, additional depreciation charges are basi-
cally considered as a budgetary policy tool controlled by finance ministers. Similar evidence is
also given in regards to special funds. Although the resort to such practices is supposed to be
first tightly linked to the economic situation, it also appears reasonable to argue that finance
ministers could impose their own trademarks on the use of creative accounting. Depending
on their personal characteristics, we cannot rule out that the resort to such accounting tricks
could vary between finance ministers. The second research question tackled in this essay is
therefore devoted to the determinants of creative accounting operations in Swiss cantons.
More specifically, in addition to testing the influence of the cantonal financial situation, we
assess whether the finance ministers’ political ideology, experience, as well as educational
background account for their decision to resort to creative accounting.
Different approaches are performed in order to answer both research questions. Firstly,
a qualitative analysis is carried out in order to provide preliminary evidence regarding our
subject of interest. The qualitative analysis relies on the participation of nine experts of
Swiss public finance and of the twenty-six cantonal finance administrations.
Secondly, regarding the impact of creative accounting on the governments’ financial per-
6Source: La Gruyère (22.05.2005) Le bénéfice attise les envies
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formance, two different estimation strategies are used. The first strategy consists in a single
equation model where the balance of the statement of financial performance (surplus or
deficit) is the dependent variable. In order to take some particularities of our data set into
account and to ensure the robustness of our results, five different estimators are employed
to run this first model. They are the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the Linear Regres-
sion with first order autocorrelation (REGAR) developed by Baltagi and Wu (1999), the
Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) developed by Beck and Katz (1995), the Two Stage
Least Square (2SLS) and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) notably presented by
Arellano and Bover (1995). Then, the second model to be tested is a simultaneous equa-
tions model where the level of operating revenues and the level of operating expenses are
estimated simultaneously. Several reasons explain why we adopt this estimation strategy.
Among all of our reasons, we have to bear in mind that the balance of the statement of
financial performance is by definition the difference between the operating revenues and the
operating expenses. The simultaneous equations model allows us to assess the impact of
particular determinants of the governments’ financial performance through their respective
influence on either revenues, expenses or eventually both. This methodology provides a
better comprehension and more detailed information as to the mechanisms determining the
level of public balances. Moreover, as it is hypothesized, we argue that creative accounting
operations influence both operating revenues and operating expenses. The advantage and
also the justification of this second approach is to disentangle the respective effects of cre-
ative accounting operations on revenues and expenses. In order to run this second model,
we perform the Three State Least Square (3SLS) estimator developed by Zellner and Theil
(1962).
Thirdly, two different estimation strategies are also considered in order to investigate the
influence of the finance ministers’ personal characteristics in the use of creative accounting.
The first one, which relies on linear regressions, aims to determine the level of creative
accounting operations reported in cantonal statements. To do so, we employ four different
econometric estimators that are the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the Linear Regression
with first order autocorrelation (REGAR), the Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) and
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the Tobit estimator. Next, the second estimation strategy devoted to the determinants of
creative accounting is based on logistic regressions. In that case, through the use of logit and
probit estimators, we aim to investigate the probability of Swiss cantons resorting to creative
accounting operations.
This research comprises several scientific and practical implications. The first implication
concerns the explanation of the governments’ financial performance. In general, this study
could be used to inform authorities about the phenomena influencing public deficits and con-
sequently the level of debt. By highlighting factors affecting the level of operating revenues
and operating expenses and therefore the balance of the statement of financial performance,
results obtained through both estimation strategies should allow to formulate recommenda-
tions about measures to be adopted in order to curb public deficits. We thus expect that
these results will provide insightful and reliable information, that could be used by cantonal
governments in order to improve their financial situation.
The second implication concerns the budgetary policies implemented in Swiss cantons.
Indeed, this research may also be considered as an assessment of budgetary policy embraced
by cantonal governments over the last three decades as results ensuing from this analysis
will determine whether additional depreciation charges and operations on special funds have
had the expected effects on the governments’ financial performance. Since the introduction
of the first harmonized accounting guidelines for cantons and municipalities (HAM1), Swiss
cantons have been widely encouraged to play with additional depreciation charges in order to
repay debt. Moreover, strong evidence has shown that special funds have been used, at least
partially, to serve the same purpose. However, as yet, whereas no proof has been provided
as to the influence of such accounting practices on the level of public debt, Swiss cantons
have largely based their budgetary strategy on those practices. Consequently, through our
results, we will demonstrate whether such accounting tricks have had the expected influence
on the governments’ financial performance. Therefore this study will be a means to endorse
or to blame the budgetary strategy embraced by Swiss cantons.
A third implication, in addition to validating or invalidating cantonal budgetary strategies,
this will be the first time that the phenomenon of creative accounting is tackled when studying
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Swiss cantons. Moreover, it will also be the first time that this phenomenon is quantified.
By measuring the amounts reported as additional depreciation charges and as special funds
in the statement of financial performance, we will provide an accurate estimation of the
phenomenon in Swiss cantons for the first time. Simultaneously, as we have amounts to be
assimilated to creative accounting as well as the reported balances of the statement of financial
performance, we will measure the corrected balances. In other words, we will highlight what
the governments’ financial performance would have been if Swiss cantons had not resorted
to creative accounting during the investigated period.
The fourth implication is scientific and concerns the measurements of creative accounting.
By concentrating on amounts reported in the cantons’ statements of financial performance, we
will deal with criticisms notably formulated by Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Dechow and
Dichev (2002). While most of the researchers (e.g. Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991)
generally use more or less sophisticated econometric methodologies to statistically separate
the discretionary and non-discretionary part of accruals in order to measure the phenomenon
of creative accounting, Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue
that those sophisticated estimations do not represent a fair view of the reality. According to
these authors, such methodologies do not provide a good measurement of creative accounting.
Consequently, measuring directly in the statement of financial performance the amounts of
additional depreciation charges and special funds that are discretionary manipulated in Swiss
cantons allows us to avoid these criticisms.
The fifth justification concerns the essence of creative accounting. While in most of the
literature devoted to the public sector it is demonstrated that creative accounting is used to
artificially conceal public deficits without having any structural incidence on the governments’
net equity, we provide strong evidence that the opposite may occur. Indeed, in this essay,
we sustain and investigate that reporting a surplus in the statement of financial performance
may also lead to creative accounting by public authorities. As explained above, creative
accounting is used in Swiss cantons in order to prevent the dissolution of surpluses. The
constitution of cookie-jar reserves through the resort to creative accounting is expected to
structurally improve the cantonal fiscal soundness over time. That way, whereas creative
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accounting may usually be seen as a corrective action, in our particular case, we assert that
its use is preventive. Since this vision of creative accounting has never been discussed before,
it constitutes an important research innovation.
The sixth implication relies on the second research question. By investigating the determi-
nants of creative accounting, we will simultaneously deepen the quasi-nonexistent literature
related to finance ministers. Whereas it is commonly recognized that finance ministers have
to be distinguished from spending ministers as they play a particular role in government,
only few empirical evidence has been provided so far. Therefore, even though our study pays
attention to a particular case in a particular context, namely the extent to which finance
ministers matter in the use of additional depreciation charges and special funds in Swiss can-
tons, it will give food for thought regarding the importance of those ministers in government.
Simultaneously, we will indirectly demonstrate who the finance ministers are who matter for
the governments’ financial performance since we hypothesize that creative accounting struc-
turally affects public balances. This latter element is not insignificant in regard to the lack
of scientific evidence provided by the literature.
Finally, in addition to representing an interesting context of investigation for the creative
accounting phenomenon, Swiss cantons are a relevant panel to study in the field of public
finance. Due to their number, the twenty-six Swiss cantons offer an extraordinary diversity
as to the analysis of public sector financial management. This diversity mainly relies on
federalism, which provides the Swiss cantons with a large degree of financial and budgetary
autonomy. Furthermore, the differences between cantons may also be sensed through their
size; whether it is in terms of financial size or in terms of population. That way, while
studying Swiss cantons offers all the advantages of international comparisons regarding the
richness of the data, it also avoids drawbacks inherent to such comparisons. Indeed, Swiss
cantons are easily comparable since they share the same institutional framework given that
they are members of the same confederation. They use the same accounting handbook and
currency. And at the same time, the information needed to conduct such empirical research
is gathered in a small number of databases, which is not always true at an international
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level.7
Regarding the structure of this essay, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we provide an exhaustive account of existing literature devoted to creative
accounting. In order to better comprehend the phenomenon, we devote our attention to both
private and public sectors. To that purpose, we define what creative accounting is and explain
why and how it is practiced by both private firms and public entities. Simultaneously, we put
empirical contributions as well as normative and positive theories relative to public deficits
in perspective. Then, the literature review closes by providing evidence of the role played by
finance ministers, in particular through their personal characteristics, in a government.
In Section 3, we reach the heart of the problem by depicting the context in which creative
accounting occurs in Swiss cantons. Concretely, we present actors associated to the bud-
geting process and aim at highlighting various stakes surrounding accounting and financial
information.
After having formulated preliminary considerations regarding the budget process, we pro-
vide in Section 4 a discussion relative to the influence of creative accounting on the govern-
ments’ financial performance. At the same time, we tackle as precisely as possible the extent
to which cantonal finance ministers matter for the use of creative accounting as precisely as
possible. In addition to offering a general discussion regarding both research questions, we
also formulate the hypothesis to be tested through the empirical analysis.
Then, the current research being particularly technical from a pure accounting point of
view, we believe it is necessary to dedicate a whole section to the main accounting elements
surrounding this research. That way, in Section 5, we give a detailed description of the
accounting guidelines employed in Swiss cantons since the early 1980s. In particular, we
highlight why the HAM1 does not offer a true and fair view of the governments’ financial
situation and thus how it differs from the IPSAS norms. This notably demonstrates why
additional depreciation charges and operations on special funds have to be assimilated to
creative accounting.
7In Switzerland, the information needed to perform such research is mainly available through the Swiss Federal
Statistic Office (SFSO), the Federal Finance Administration (FFA), the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO)
and the Conference of Cantonal Finance Ministers (CDF). Nevertheless, when the needed information is not centralized
at national level, it may be obtained through the cantonal finance administrations.
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Section 6 relies on diverse descriptive statistics in order to provide a detailed overview of
the quantitative importance of creative accounting in Swiss cantons. While we first present
the amounts reported as additional depreciation charges and special funds, we then propose a
corrected version of the balances of the statement of financial performance. This offers an in-
sight regarding the impact of creative accounting on the governments’ financial performance.
Additionally, we have to underline that finance ministers are for a large part responsible for
the use of accounting gimmicks in Swiss cantons. To do so, we crossreference the data rel-
ative to additional depreciation charges and special funds with those relative to the finance
ministers. In other words, we report the amounts of creative accounting with regard to the
finance ministers’ political ideology, experience as well as educational background.
Afterward, we report qualitative information ensuing from a survey conducted through
interviews with nine experts in the field of local public finance and by questionnaires answered
by the 26 cantonal administrations of finance. The object of Section 7 is primarily to validate
our hypothesis and to bring elements of response. Moreover, this survey is expected to provide
food for thought regarding the discussion of the explanation of public deficits and creative
accounting operations in Swiss cantons.
For their part, Sections 8 and 9 both deal with empirical analysis. Whereas in Section
8 the goal is to measure the impact of additional depreciation charges and special funds on
governments’ financial performance, the goal of Section 9 is to tackle the determinants of these
creative accounting operations. As for their content, both sections are identically structured.
For each empirical analysis, the set of variables used as well as the different estimation
strategies are presented. Following the methodological part, a detailed presentation of the
results is presented to the reader. Both sections are concluded with a summary and a
discussion about the results.
Finally, Section 10 is devoted to the conclusion. In this last section, we remind ourselves
the objectives and stakes of this research. Then, the main results are briefly summarized
before being put into perspective.
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2 Literature review
In the current section, we first offer a detailed overview of the literature devoted to creative
accounting in both private and public sectors with the objective to answer three questions:
What? Why? How?8 In other words, we gather definitions and explain the incentives
firms and governments may have in embracing such accounting practices. And at the same
time, without claiming to be exhaustive, we report accounting tricks commonly used and
assimilated to creative accounting. A large part of the current section is then dedicated to
the normative and positive theories of public deficits. Finally, we terminate by investigating
the role played by politicians and especially finance ministers in the management of public
policies; the underlying idea being to provide relevant clues regarding their influence in the
use of creative accounting. As a whole, the purpose of this section is to give the broadest
picture of the existing literature paying attention to our fields of interest in order to highlight
the knowledge gap and ultimately to justify our research questions.
2.1 Creative accounting in the private sector
It is probably when Enron Corporation collapsed, in the 90’s, that the terms of creative
accounting, earnings management or yet window-dressing became publicly known. Behind
those terms are hidden a lot of definitions. But the broadest picture is certainly provided by
Healy and Wahlen (1999) who read that “earnings management occurs when managers use
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”. Other
authors have also formulated their own definition, as Schipper (1989) who considers earnings
management as “the strategic exercise of managerial discretion in influencing the earnings
figure reported to external audiences”. Amat et al. (1999) meanwhile have defined earnings
8Today, accounting principles governing the public sector are strongly inspired by those of the private sector.
Indeed, IPSAS norms are an almost thoroughly transposition of the IFRS, which rely on accrual accounting instead
of cash accounting. Whereas accrual accounting was expected to improve transparency, it simultaneously gave more
freedom to accountants in order manipulate firms financial statements. That way, in addition to share the same tools,
private and public sectors henceforth share the same illness: the creative accounting. Consequently, the literature
devoted to this phenomenon being older and larger for the private sector, it appears all the more relevant to take this
literature into account in order to understand the importance and the stakes of such a practice in the public sector.
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management as “a process whereby accountants use their knowledge of accounting rules to
manipulate the figures reported in the accounts of a business”. And Gowthorpe and Amat
(2005) to add that “creative accounting refers to the fact that financial statements are manip-
ulated by financial managers”. Earnings management would therefore have to be considered
as a process consisting in disguising reported figures through accounting gimmicks. Nonethe-
less, Naser and Pendlebury (1992) goes further in arguing that “creative accounting is the
transformation of financial accounting figures from what they actually are to what prepar-
ers desire by taking advantage of the existing rules and/or ignoring some or all of them”.
And adding that “creative accounting is a process of modifying the operating results, away
from (revealing) the actual picture and towards the desirable results”. In the light of the for-
mer assertion, it appears reasonably arguable that managers would enjoy personal benefits
in modifying reported figures. Indeed, already in 1989, Schipper underlines that “earnings
management is a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the
intent of obtaining some private gains”. Then, Gowthorpe and Amat (2005) highlight of
the key elements of creative accounting when they touch upon the legal framework in which
it occurs by formulating that creative accounting is“the use of accounting to mislead rather
than help the intended users by deliberately taking advantage of areas where there are ambi-
guities”. In addition, as Healy and Wahlen (1999) do, hints are also given by authors that
creative accounting would be used since managers would not share similar interests with
various stakeholders. Ambiguities regarding the perimeter delimiting creative accounting to
fraud have also been discussed by Dechow et al. (2010) who emphasize that “earnings man-
agement [represents] earnings manipulations that are both within and outside the bounds of
GAAP”. Previously Baralexis (2004) also confirmed that “creative accounting is the process
of intentionally exploiting or violating the GAAP or the law to present financial statements
according to one’s interests”. And to Boškin (2005), who cites an accountant, to precise
that “GAAP are flexible and leave much space for subjectivity in the evaluation, which leaves
a broad maneuvering space for manipulations, fraud and bias”. As a proof, Bitner (2005)
reports that the custom is “if GAAP reporting doesn’t put the firm in the proper light, find a
reporting method that does!”. Nonetheless, Merchant and Rockness (1994) warn that earnings
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management “provides no true economic advantage to the organization and may, in fact, in
the long-term, be detrimental”.
Creative accounting and earnings managements would therefore be discretionary account-
ing manipulations taking place within or outside the GAAP and aiming at achieving personal
interests by deceiving stakeholders. Nonetheless, no consensus have appeared to be reach so
far regarding the boundaries delimiting the phenomenon of creative accounting. For David-
son et al. (1987), earnings management is “a process of taking deliberate steps within the con-
straints of [GAAP]”. Although he agrees with the former definition, Brown (1999) precises
that “management reporting actions that are taken outside the bounds of GAAP [...] consti-
tute fraud” and so cannot be considered as earnings management. And conversely, Beneish
(1999), for his part, considers earnings management as “an instance in which a company’s
managers violate GAAP”. Thus, earnings management operations should be considered as
fraudulent. Finally, Stolowy and Breton (2004) satisfy themselves with mentioning that “ac-
counts manipulation is not fraud. It is a matter of interpretation which leads to a financial
position and results that are not a fair representation of the reality”. The discussion deal-
ing with the delimitation between accounting manipulations and fraud not being closed, it
would seem we are most often in a gray area where there are no specific standards and where
concepts need to be interpreted to provide policy guidance (Shah 1998). This highlights the
discretionary nature of creative accounting, which is at the center of the debate.
Moreover, behind these accounting manipulations are hidden different objectives. Whereas
it is generally sustained that the resort to creative accounting allows to disguise reported fig-
ures, Copeland (1968) precises that creative accounting may aim at maximizing, minimizing
or smoothing reported earnings. Consequently, there are several kinds of earnings manage-
ment. Among these practices, the two most dealt with in literature are income smoothing
and big bath accounting.
When paying attention to income smoothing, Schipper (1989) and also Stolowy and Bre-
ton (2004) indicate that it is a particular form of creative accounting that aims to reduce the
volatility of reported earnings. Copeland (1968) specifies that income smoothing moderates
year to year fluctuations in reported incomes by shifting earnings from peak years to less
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successful periods. Barnea et al. (1976) and Beattie et al. (1994) then respectively report
that firms smooth in order to achieve “some level of earnings that is currently considered to
be normal for the firm” or “towards an expected level of reported earnings”. Firms and their
managers would therefore have incentives to manage earnings and so to smooth incomes over
time. Suh (1990) underlines that income smoothing is an attempt to fool the various stake-
holders by presenting them with more stable earnings over time. Doing this would provide
various advantages. First of all, presenting smoothed and increasing earnings over the years
would allow the market to easily predict the future of the firm (Beattie et al. 1994). The firm
would thus be perceived as less risky by the markets (Herrmann and Inoue 1996; Hillier and
McCrae 1998) and would ultimately endure lower borrowing costs (Hepworth 1953; Zucca and
Campbell 1992). Secondly, Moses (1987) provides evidence that American firms enjoy higher
share value when they achieve forecasts. Thirdly, managers and shareholders could also enjoy
some private gains from smoothed reported incomes. Indeed, as revealed by several authors
(Beidleman 1973; Moses 1987; Beattie et al. 1994; Hillier and McCrae 1998) smoothed earn-
ings would allow managers and shareholders to respectively receive more constant bonuses
and dividends when those elements evolve in line with reported earnings. Finally, smoothing
earnings could allow firms to avoid some political costs. For instance, Craig and Walsh (2006)
but also Moses (1987) mention that companies may face wage claims from employees if they
report unusually high profits. Firms may also risk losing public subsidies, facing higher taxes
or falling into the scrutiny of regulators by reporting higher profits (Craig and Walsh 2006;
Herrmann and Inoue 1996).
A wide range of accounting devices are at the manager disposal in order to smooth re-
ported figures of private companies. The resort to extraordinary items reclassification is an
efficient way to do so (Ronen and Sadan 1975; Godfrey and Jones 2002; Barnea et al. 1976;
Beattie et al. 1994). Consisting in recording extraordinary items above the line during good
years in order to reduce reported earnings, managers may register current items below the line
in order to report higher earnings during hard financial times. Craig andWalsh (2006) demon-
strate that larger Australian firms are more prompt to resort to income smoothing through
the use of extraordinary items. Herrmann and Inoue (1996) have shown that Japanese firms
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smooth earnings through changes in depreciation methods. Firms also have the possibility
to record additional depreciation charges, to play with the depreciation rate or to perform
large asset write-downs (Hillier and McCrae 1998; Hepworth 1953; Craig and Walsh 2006;
Zucca and Campbell 1992). Lybaert et al. (2005) reveal that Belgian companies, between
1997 and 2002, tended to smooth earnings by increasing or decreasing provisions. Moreover,
it has been demonstrated by Walsh et al. (1991) and also Beneish (1999) that Australian and
American companies played with inventory valuation to dampen the fluctuations of earnings
over time. Cookie-jar reserves have also been revealed as an efficient device allowing man-
agers to offset lower incomes (Bernstein 1970; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Indeed, such funds
allow firms to establish reserves in a thriving economy that will be used in bad economic
times. More generally, Moses (1987) mentions that firms may use all accounting charges in
general, namely accruals, to achieve this goal. And Moore (1973) to add that “future income
would be relieved of those charges”, which facilitates the reporting of increased earnings in the
following years. Then, Barnea et al. (1976), and more recently Lybaert et al. (2005), point
out that playing with the time to perform certain transactions or with an event’s occurrence
and recognition could be a tool at the firms disposal. Finally, Walsh et al. (1991) precise
that creative accounting may be performed through the combination of all these elements.
Although a large range of literature be devoted to income smoothing, detailed attention
has also been given to big bath accounting. First of all and according to Walsh et al. (1991),
big bath accounting refers to a specific “managerial stratagem”. More precisely, big bath
accounting may be viewed as a concept consisting in discretionarily aggravating deficits, in a
particular year, when results are already bad in order to report a bigger deficit (Stolowy and
Breton 2004; Lybaert et al. 2005). Interestingly enough, Moore (1973) shows in his contribu-
tion that such events specifically occurred in US companies during changes in management.
Such practices would allow to attribute poor results to the former direction according to
Stolowy and Breton (2004). Furthermore, as firms may enjoy economic advantages (e.g.
borrowing at lower costs on capital markets) if they report constant increasing earnings over
time, they might be tempted to undertake a big bath (Zucca and Campbell 1992). Indeed,
taking the bath allows companies to have “a reduction in the benchmark for future’s earn-
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ings” (Kinney and Trezevant 1997). It therefore becomes easier to present a rapid increase in
earnings. Zucca and Campbell (1992) also argue that it is a good way to inform “the markets
that bad times are behind” and to once again enjoy some economic advantages. Authors then
reveal that big bath accounting principally occurs through asset write-downs. Such oper-
ations consist in decreasing the book value of an asset when this value is higher than the
market value. It is considered as earnings management because managers are suspected of
choosing the year to perform it at their own discretion. Finally, authors highlight that tools
used to undertake a big bath are the same as those used to smooth earnings; i.e. the accruals
that are easily manipulable since they do not generate cash-flows.
2.2 Creative accounting in the public sector
Creative accounting is not only a private sector practice. Indeed, evidence has been pro-
vided that creative accounting is also a common phenomenon in the public sector. Notably,
definitions embracing a public sector perspective have been more recently formulate. For
instance, Koen and van den Noord (2005) stipulate that “creative accounting refers to the
more or less unorthodox treatment of operations involving the general government”, and add
that it “may reflect opportunistic accounting”. In the light of this definition, governments
seem, as in the private sector, to use discretion in order to manipulate, to not say violate,
accounting rules. Then, Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama (2006) consider creative accounting as
“fiscal operations improving budgetary figures but having no structural incidence on govern-
ment finance”. In other words, Easterly (2001) says that “creative accounting may be viewed
as fiscal adjustments that lower the budget deficit or public debt but leave government net
worth unchanged”. Moreover, Milesi-Ferretti (2004) specifies that creative accounting does
“not increase the government net worth even if [it] improve[s] fiscal balance!”.
Over the past forty years, most countries have experienced large public deficits and im-
portant debt accumulation. And in most cases, subnational levels of governments have suf-
fered the same phenomenon. In such circumstances and in order to avoid taking unpopular
decisions and facing the risk of not being re-elected, governments may be tempted to use
16
some fiscal gimmicks instead of resolving their structural financial problems. Petersen (2003)
demonstrates that U.S. states and localities that are facing fiscal distress resort to creative
accounting in order to hide deficits. Nonetheless, U.S. states are not alone in facing such a
situation. Large amounts of evidence support that European Union (EU) countries resorted
to accounting manipulations, notably during the run-up for the European Monetary Union
(EMU) integration. The reason is that countries had to respect two objectives in order to
get into the EMU, the so-called Maastricht criteria. First, the annual government deficit
must not exceed 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Second, the gross debt must not
exceed 60% of GDP.
Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama (2006) and also Balassone et al. (2007) highlight that EU
countries artificially reduced their deficits and indebtedness in order to achieve Maastricht
criteria, without increasing their net worth.9 By using a balance sheet approach, Milesi-
Ferretti and Moriyama (2006) reveal that the change in public debt was strongly positively
correlated with the change in government assets. In other words, between 1992 and 1997,
EU countries decreased the level of their debt thanks to a reduction of public assets. Authors
have then found that this relation disappeared after 1997, i.e. after the EU countries got into
the EMU. Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) draw the same conclusion. Furthermore, Balassone
et al. (2007) take an interest in showing that EU countries probably manipulated their deficits
since they highlight that the reported balance were not reflected in the change in debt during
the run-up for EMU integration. In spite of the simplicity of their model, they argue that a
mere comparison of deficit and changes in debt can help the early detection of inconsisten-
cies in fiscal data. Moreover, Prammer (2009) explains that some EU countries performed
privatizations and outsourcing in order to reduce public debt. The author questions whether
or not such practices, aiming at recording expenditure off the books, constitutes creative
accounting. Indeed, the answer may depend on the interpretation of the European System
of Accounts (ESA 95). During the same period, Montesinos and Vela (2000) or Benito et al.
(2008) pay particular attention to the use of creative accounting in Spain. During the run-up
for the EMU integration, Spain principally used Private Financing of Infrastructure and Pub-
9Some authors argue that this notion should be preferred to both EMU criteria as it reflects the financial health
of a country. And also, they argue that this notion is less malleable.
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lic Private Partnership in order to maintain the level of capital expenditure whilst achieving
the Maastricht criteria. Results also highlight that Spain had recourse to fiscal gimmicks
such as the German Method, deferred payments, extension of concession term limits or de-
centralization of public debt.10 Without qualifying those methods as illegal, authors wonder
whether they are strictly legal. Indeed, according to their point of view, it is the lack of clear
accounting standards on how to report those means that allowed governments to do this.
Again, as in the private sector, we are in a gray area where there are no specific standards
and where concepts need to be (discretionarily) interpreted to provide policy guidance (Shah
1998).
From the foregoing, we might assume that it is the political cost of not getting into the
EMU that led countries to use creative accounting. Nevertheless, it has been expressed by
some authors that fiscal rules may partly explain the occurrence of accounting manipulations
aiming at disguising reported balances. For instance, Milesi-Ferretti (2004) notes that “the
incentives to use nonstructural fiscal measures - often described as creative accounting - may
increase in the presence of fiscal rules”. Particularly in Europe, as pointed out by Buti et al.
(2007), creative accounting appeared with the introduction of the Stabilization and Growth
Pact (SGP), which includes the Maastricht criteria.
Initially, fiscal rules were introduced in the public sector at both national and subna-
tional levels of governments in order to restrain deficits and debt (Bohn and Inman 1996;
Feld and Kirchgässner 2008; Bodmer 2012). Nonetheless, various evidence tends reveal that
fiscal rules would not be an effective way of improving the government’s financial position
over time. For instance, Fatás and Mihov (2006), who pay special attention to U.S. states,
show that fiscal policy would be more pro-cyclical in the presence of budget constraints.
Such a fiscal policy would lead to higher deficits and indebtedness as governments would
not accumulate reserves during times of economic growth, which would help them offset the
effects of downturns. Moreover, Kopits and Craig (1998) warns that states may have the
incentive to use creative accounting practices to circumvent these kinds of rules. Evidence
10The German method is a method consisting in paying building and interest costs of an infrastructure to the
bidder only when the work is accomplished. Therefore, during the building period, the government does not bear
neither budgetary expenses or borrowing costs, which allows it to achieve EMU criteria more easily (Benito et al.
2008).
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of this concern is given by Von Hagen (1991), who reads that U.S. states achieved budget
constraint targets with the aid of accounting manipulations. Indeed, his results highlight
that fiscal restraints induced U.S. states’ governments to implement off-budget activities, in
particular. And, at the same time, Drazen (2002) suggests that the more binding a rule is,
the more it would give incentive to resort to creative accounting practices. Then, although
Luechinger and Schaltegger (2011) demonstrate that fiscal rules significantly allowed Swiss
cantons to restrain the occurence of public deficits, they conclude by mentioning that they
cannot rule out that, at least partially, deficits have been reduced through creative account-
ing operations or window-dressing measures. Finally, Milesi-Ferretti (2004) summarizes as
follows: if governments satisfy fiscal rules by using cosmetics, it implies that, in reality, there
is a deficit. Fiscal rules would thus be ineffective to put deficit and debt under pressure.
However, on another hand, the author points out that “the existence of a margin for creative
accounting also implies that the budget retains some ability to respond to cyclical shocks even
in the presence of a numerical budget rule”.
Again, although Canova and Pappa (2006) agree on the fact that U.S. states use creative
accounting to reach fiscal targets, they also assume that those states have other legal devices
to do so. Wagner and Sobel (2006) note that, during the 1980s, there was a rush of states
adopting budget stabilization funds, commonly known as rainy day funds. In their research,
authors bring out that the adoption of such funds coincides with the introduction of the Tax
and Expenditure Limit laws (TELs), the U.S. states’ fiscal constraints. It therefore appears,
as hinted by authors, that rainy day funds would have been adopted in order to always have
the capacity to reach objectives stated by fiscal rules.
As described by Grizzle (2010), rainy day funds are reserves in which “money is saved
when state finances are healthy for use during economic downturns”. In other words, Gonza-
lez and Paqueo (2003) mention that “rainy day funds allow states to smooth public spending
over time by saving during booms and using the balance to cover revenue shortfalls during
recessions”. Rainy day funds would thus have the advantage of facilitating the governments’
implementation of counter-cyclical budget policies “without having to alter [their] long-run
revenue and expenditure policy” (Navin and Navin (1994)). To summarize, rainy day funds
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allow governments to alleviate volatility of public spending and revenue. Nonetheless, the
balances of rainy day funds are rarely sufficient to offset revenue shortfalls. That way, policy-
makers have two possibilities. Either they may proceed to increase taxes in order to maintain
the level of public spending constant over time, or they may proceed to public spending cuts
in order to obtain public spending equivalent to the sum of tax revenues and rainy day funds
and so, finally, to reach a balanced budget. Evidence has been provided that rainy day funds
allow U.S local governments to smooth fiscal balances (Gonzalez and Paqueo 2003; Wagner
and Sobel 2006; Grizzle 2010). Moreover, and logically enough, Hendrick (2006) reveals that
U.S municipalities that have higher rainy day funds better face economic downturns. Then,
Grizzle (2010) specifies that smoothing incomes also allows governments to be perceived as
less risky by capital markets. That way, as in the private sector, showing more stable fiscal
balances would allow states to borrow at a lower cost. However, the effectiveness of rainy
day funds would largely depend on their rules of deposit and withdrawal. Indeed, Sobel and
Holcombe (1996) demonstrate for instance that rainy day funds are more effective to cope
with fiscal rules when they have more stringent saving rules. Nevertheless, Pattison (2012)
warns that even rainy day funds are put under pressure by politicians and citizens when they
attain a relatively large size.
As previously indicated, states may have to respect budget constraints (e.g. balanced
budget rules). The economic theory also suggests that countries should perform a counter-
cyclical budgetary policy. To do this, governments should therefore accumulate savings during
good years in order to offset the impact of economic downturns. Besides, this point of view
is supported by Alesina (2000) who pleads that governments should keep tax rates constant
in order to maximize the social welfare.11 That way, if tax rates are constant, temporary
deficits are expected to occur during recessions or periods of exceptionally high spending.
Conversely, surplus should be the rule during economic expansions.
Nevertheless, this is rarely how things happen. During bad years, states always resort to
tax increases or spending cuts to dampen the importance of deficits. Therefore, some fringes
of the population may bear some loss of welfare because of those tax increases and spending
11This argument was first assumed by Lucas and Stokey (1983).
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cuts. Anthony (1985) then expresses that even if deficits are badly perceived, surpluses are not
better viewed by politicians and citizens. Whereas a deficit indicates that the state does not
live within its means, a surplus highlights that citizens payed too much in taxes or obtained
too little public services. Therefore, in a case of a surplus, it may be reasonably expected that
politicians and citizens claim for tax cuts or public spending increases. However, surpluses
are indispensable if states want to achieve their macro-economic objectives. Moreover, Posner
and Gordon (2001) argue that surpluses should be used to repay debt. By lowering interest
costs in the future, debt reduction enhances future budget flexibility since a larger amount
of public spending may be devoted to public policies. In other words, paying off public debt
allows to offset the loss of welfare suffered by citizens during economic downturns (Alesina
2000).
For all these reasons, we may assume that states, local governments or municipalities
may also have incentives to use creative accounting in order to hide surpluses. Anthony
(1985) shows that the objective of U.S municipalities is to report a small surplus. A mayor
of a Swedish municipality cited by Knutsson et al. (2008) also mention that his “strategy
has always been to hide surplus money into depreciation and long-term financial investments,
such as pensions. Otherwise some politicians can be tempted to use the surplus in day-to-day
production. My intention is to prevent, or limit, the possibilities for expansion in different
services and at the same time strengthen the long-term financial situation”. Ballantine et al.
(2007) also supply evidence that English non-profit hospitals try to reach a financial break-
even, that is to avoid losses and surpluses. Pilcher (2011), who pays attention to local
governments of the state of New South Wales (NSW) in Australia between 2003 and 2006
also indicates that they have incentives to smooth fiscal balances over time. According to the
author, playing with depreciation charges appears to be particularly efficient to achieve such
an objective. More precisely, Pilcher and Van Der Zahn (2010) suggest that local governments
of NSW use unexpected depreciation to decrease financial performances. Then, Stalebrink
(2007) also advances that Swedish municipalities could use capital depreciation to manage
21
reported financial performances.12 In his view, Swedish municipalities would increase capital
depreciation during good economic periods and would do the opposite to dampen deficits.
Moreover, those authors underline that such operations are possible in states or local
governments having introduced accrual accounting instead of cash based accounting. Several
authors debate the introduction of accrual accounting (e.g. see Carlin 2005; Ellwood and
Newberry 2007; Falkman and Tagesson 2008) and agree that such accounting standard may
provide some advantages to the public sector. Firstly, accrual accounting should increase the
transparency inside the administration, which should increase the managers’ accountability.
Secondly, the raise of internal transparency should improve organizational performance and
resource allocation. And thirdly, accrual accounting allows to better identify the full costs of
public activities, which should lead to higher performances. A better knowledge of full costs
allows for an increase in competition inside the administration but also outside with external
competitors. Nevertheless, since accruals do not reflect cash-flows, authors also consider that
accrual accounting may reduce accounts’ transparency and that it would also help politicians
to manipulate reported figures. As a consequence, it would seem that the same means used
in the private sector provide the same issues in the public sector.
2.3 Theories of public deficits and other fiscal outcomes
Considering the public sector’s share in GDP, the 20th century was marked by the growth
of the State in the economy. Thus a fringe of the literature has been devoted to the de-
scription and explanation of this phenomenon (Tarschys 1975; Larkey et al. 1981; Holsey and
Borcherding 1997). Since the 1970s, most OECD countries suffer from public deficits, which
lead to a large increase of their indebtedness (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000). Consequently,
interest costs now account for a large part of the state budget, which may lead to some
issues in terms of budgetary management (Martin 2008). Indeed, amounts allocated to the
interest costs repayment are not allocated to public policies; it is thus a loss of elbow room in
12At the same time, the author indicates that Swedish municipalities resort to large asset write-offs when deficits are
expected to occur. Thus, his findings reveal that the public sector also has incentives to perform big bath accounting.
We may therefore assume that the reasons are the same.
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the use of public spending. Furthermore, because of higher indebtedness, states seem more
risky in the eyes of financial markets. Thus, as suggested by Baldacci and Kumar (2010),
states will probably have to shoulder higher borrowing costs, which will further aggravate
the previous phenomenon. Because of their nature, these problems have caught the interest
of many economists concerning the situation of public finance.
The willingness to solve the problems of public deficits and public debt first encouraged
normative contributions. Those contributions principally debate two opposing economic
perspectives: the classical perspective versus the Keynesian perspective. Whereas the former
perspective supports that public management should promote a budget balancing policy
(Lucas and Sargent 1981), the latter argues that budgetary policies should limit the impact
of the cyclical economic fluctuations (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1988). Simultaneously to the
normative theories, a large amount of literature investigate the determinants of public deficits
and public debt. They are the positive theories. Those positive contributions are principally
focused on economic, political, institutional and structural determinants of public deficits.
The next two sections are devoted to detailing both theories.
2.3.1 Normative theories of public deficits13
Before debating the positive theories of public deficits, we present the three main norma-
tive theories treating the role of the budgetary policies. Indeed, both theories are tightly
linked since positive theories may depend on the normative ones. The normative theories we
present in this subsection are the so-called golden rule of public finance (classical theory),
the regulatory state (Keynesian theory) and finally the rational expectations theory.
The golden rule of public finance
The concept of golden rule arises from the classical theory of economics. According to this
school of thought, the market is the only device which efficiently provides goods and services
and maximizes social welfare. That way, the role of the state should be highly limited. In
other words, the state would only have to ensure economic environment stability (Majone
13The theories we discuss in this subsection are extensively presented by Daﬄon (1998), Novaresi (2001) and Martin
(2008).
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1994). In addition to the role attributed to the State, classical economists argue that the
user pays principle should be respected.
In order to limit the size of the state, classical economists, notably James Buchanan,
advocate that the government should levy the least possible taxes so as to avoid superflu-
ous public spending. Then, in order to govern public finance in respect to the user pays
principle, the classical economists formulated the golden rule. This rule imposes that op-
erating expenses have to be integrally financed by operating revenues. That way, only the
investment expenditure (sometimes called capital expenditure) may be, partially or totally,
financed through public debt. For classical economists, as operating expenses benefit only
the present generation, those operating expenses have to be integrally financed by means
of the current financial resources. Conversely, as investment expenditure will benefit future
generations, they will bear the costs of the infrastructure through the debt repayment.14 In
doing so, the beneficiaries circle matches the payers circles; the user pays principle is therefore
respected. Then, in addition to comply with the inter-generational equity, the golden rule
should reduce the fiscal illusion. Indeed, since citizens integrally pay for what they consume,
they should be aware of the full costs of public goods and services. In such a case, taxes
would thus represent the price of the public services. That way, citizens would ask for a
quantity of public services corresponding to the social optimum and not above it.
The Regulatory State
The Keynesian school of thought argues that aggregate demand does not always match
with the aggregate supply in a situation of full employment of the production factors (la-
bor and capital). Public economies may reach equilibrium where production factors are
underemployed. Such situations generate an augmentation of the rate of unemployment.
Conversely, situations of overheated economies may occur when production factors are over-
employed. In that case, inflation will reduce aggregate demand. The phases of under and
over-employment of the production factors therefore highlight that the aggregate demand
14At the origin, classical economists (Adam Smith or David Ricardo, for instance) advised a budgetary policy
similar to the one of the private sector. This budgetary policy advocated that public spending, independently to their
nature, do not have to exceed public revenues. In other words, the classical economists in the 19th century argued
that public deficits have to be strictly banned. That way, by prohibiting deficits, governments would avoid suffering
from the cost of the debt, which reduces the financial elbowroom in the use of public budgets.
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tends to fluctuate around a potential output, which is the long-term growth trend. Economic
fluctuations around this long-term growth trend thus refer to the business cycle. Finally, the
output gap is represented by the difference between the effective production and the potential
production.
In his theory, Keynes demonstrates that the market does not always allow full employment
to be achieved. In light of the harmful consequences of the underemployment (increase of
the unemployment rate) and the over-employment of the production factors (rise of the
inflation), governments may have incentives to intervene in the market. Such an intervention
through the government budget aims to reach an equilibrium between the aggregate supply
and demand. The state may hence resolve a situation of over-employment by increasing taxes
or by decreasing public spending. A situation of underemployment may then be resolved by
resorting to the opposite measures. In other words, the Keynesian theory recommends states
to embrace a counter-cyclical budgetary policy.
Furthermore, the automatic stabilizers influence the business cycle. The automatic sta-
bilizers are defined as revenues (e.g. tax revenues) and expense (e.g. spending on social
security) that respectively automatically change in concert and conversely to the business
cycle. They thus contribute to maintain the equilibrium between the aggregate supply and
demand. Moreover, the influence of the automatic stabilizers may also be seen on public
finance. Indeed, in a situation of economic growth the state will enjoy higher fiscal bal-
ances, while the fiscal balances are expected to be lower during downturns. Consequently,
to embrace a counter-cyclical budgetary policy, the state will have to save during economic
growth periods in order to be able to offset the effects of economic downturns. To conclude,
according to the Keynesian theory, the budget should not be seen as an end in itself but as
a device allowing for a balanced economy (Orsoni 1978).
The Rational Expectations Theory
During the 70s a new school of thought, which debated the role played by the state budget,
was born; it was the rational expectations theory. This new theory opposes the Keynesian
one since it assumes that budgetary policies cannot be used for the purpose of economic
recovery. Taxes and public spending should not be used to stimulate or curb the economic
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activity during downturns or booms. According to this school of thought, it would be better,
only in exceptional situations, to borrow today and to pay off debt over a long period of time
through a small increase in the tax rate rather than by proceeding to an occasional and large
raise of the fiscal burden. That way, the tax burden surplus should be minimized. Indeed,
as supported by Alesina (2000), the tax rate should be as constant as possible over time in
order to maximize social welfare. In this context, they recommend using indebtedness in
order to smooth the tax burden over time and hence to tend toward a social optimum.
2.3.2 Positive theories of public deficits
A large amount of scientific literature deals with the explanation of public deficits. While
some research aims at directly determining public deficits, another part pays attention to
other related aspects. Among those aspects, the literature principally focuses on the public
sector share in GDP, public revenue and spending and the determinants of indebtedness.
First of all, researchers started to focus their attention on the economic determinants
of public deficits. Those researchers notably studied the influence of economic growth
on public deficits. As commonly known, automatic stabilizers increase tax revenues and
decrease public spending during an economic growth period. A higher surplus (or a lower
deficit) should thus result from such a situation. Conversely, during a recession, economic
stabilizers tend to decrease tax revenues and increase public spending, which would lead to
larger deficits. Nevertheless, as suggested by Martin and Soguel (2004), governments would
perform pro-cyclical budgetary policies that would tend to alleviate the effects of economic
stabilizers. In other words, governments would be tempted to use additional revenue collected
during booms in order to increase public spending. If this were to be true, the economic
stabilizers effects are expected to be overturned, which would lead to smaller surpluses or
larger deficits.
Some variables directly affected by the business cycle have an additional impact on public
deficits. Among others, those variables include the unemployment rate. Since it affects
public revenue as well as public spending, the unemployment rate is a major factor to be
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taken into account when studying the determinants of fiscal balances. Indeed, because of the
higher unemployment rate, social spending are higher in order to support the unemployed
population. Then, as the tax base is diminished, tax revenues collected by the state will be
lowered.
The question of debt also has to be handled when scrutinizing public deficits. Whereas
these deficits are the origin of public debt, the latter also acts on the former. Indeed, gov-
ernments will have to bear the cost of the debt, characterized by interest payments. Since
interest payments are positively correlated with the debt level, the higher the debt level, the
more interest payments will weigh down the fiscal balance. This situation may thus lead to
some problems in terms of budgetary management (Martin 2008). Indeed, amounts allocated
to the interest repayment are not allocated to public policies; it is thus a loss of elbow room
in the use of public spending. Furthermore, because of deficits and the higher indebtedness
level, the states appear more risky to the financial markets. That way, Laubach (2009) and
Baldacci and Kumar (2010) demonstrate that states have to bear higher borrowing costs,
which will further aggravate public deficits. This rollover effect of debt accumulation is known
as the snowball effect of the public debt (Martner and Tromben 2012).
The political ideology of the parliament and the government also constitute a factor
which may deeply influence public finance. Hibbs (1987) reveals that, as a rule, states with
left-wing authorities are expected to implement more social public policies or public poli-
cies aiming at fighting against unemployment than right-wing authorities. As these public
policies are often relatively costly, the author assumes that public spending will be higher in
countries governed by left-wing authorities. Nonetheless, he underlines that public deficits
will not necessarily be higher in those countries. Indeed, as left-wing authorities are expected
to raise higher taxes than right-wing ones, the final effect on public deficits is undetermined.
Later, Blais et al. (1993), who scrutinize 15 liberal democracies over a period of 28 years,
demonstrate that parties on the left of the political spectrum do spend slightly more than
parties on the right. That way, their findings highlight that “parties do make a difference, but
a small one”. Then, focusing on 16 OECD countries between 1955 and 1989, Cusack (1997)
reaches similar evidence. Tellier (2006) also demonstrates that, in Canadian provinces, the
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governments’ ideology has an influence on public expenditure. Indeed, her results show that
left-wing parties significantly spend more than center and right-wing parties. Then, Hi-
bbs’s assumptions appear to be confirmed since Allers et al. (2001) demonstrate that Dutch
municipalities with “a council dominated by left-wing parties have a higher tax burden”. Nev-
ertheless, although these researchers highlight that left-wing governments tend to spend more
than right-wing ones, other authors alleviate the importance of the governments’ ideology for
the public sector financial management. In this regard, Seitz (2000) who uses data on Ger-
man Länder brings out that regional differences in public spending policy are only marginally
determined by the ideological composition of the government. Similar findings are revealed
by Galli and Rossi (2002) and Potrafke (2011) when they show that the composition of the
government’s budgets is not driven by the governmental ideology. Moreover, in spite of the
expected spending behavior of the left-wing governments, none of the previous cited studies
reveal whether left-wing parties accumulate larger deficits than right-wing ones. Besides,
Imbeau (2004), who focuses his study on the explanation of fiscal balances, does not find any
significant differences in terms of public deficits between jurisdictions governed by left-wing
or right-wing authorities either. To the best of our knowledge, only Alt and Lassen (2006),
who undertake extensive research on 19 OECD countries, find evidence that “right-wing gov-
ernments (for strategic reasons) tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments”.
The political fragmentation of the government, as the political ideology coherence
of a government measured by the number of political parties in a cabinet, may be an issue in
the explanation of public deficits. Roubini and Sachs (1989) assume that the disagreement
between political parties in the decision making process would be another cause of public
deficits. Indeed, it is increasingly difficult to reach an agreement when the number of stake-
holders increases. That way, the greater the conflict between stakeholders, the more difficult
it will be to enact deficit reducing measures. This assumption is consistent with the model
of Valesco (2000), since he predicts that spending and deficits increase with the number of
stakeholders associated in the decision-making process. Several studies have investigated the
impact of government fragmentation on public deficits, and the results ensuing from them
are quite contrasted. While Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) and Ashworth and Heyndels
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(2005), who respectively pay attention to OECD countries and Flemish municipalities, find
evidence that the number of political parties in a coalition tends to significantly increase
public spending, some other authors (Volkerink and De Haan 2001; Elgie and McMenamin
2008) do not reach the same conclusion.
Then, instead of concentrating on the number of political parties associated with the
decision-making process, other researchers assess the importance of government size on pub-
lic deficits. Always following the assumption of Valesco (2000), those studies aim at assessing
whether or not larger cabinets generate higher deficits. That way, a larger number of spend-
ing ministers in a government would be associated with higher public spending and deficits.15
This assumption is more widely defended in the literature than the previous one since several
researchers focusing on OECD countries demonstrate that the number of spending minis-
ters is positively correlated with the level of public deficits (Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999;
Volkerink and De Haan 2001; Elgie and McMenamin 2008). Nonetheless, Ricciuti (2004)
who also pays attention to OECD countries over the period 1975-1995, finds relatively poor
evidence that government size influences fiscal outcomes. Therefore, as suggested by Elgie
and McMenamin (2008), “the importance of political fragmentation could vary according to
the institutionalization of the political systems”. Furthermore, Schaltegger and Feld (2009),
who investigate Swiss cantons, also find evidence that a larger government generates signifi-
cantly higher public spending. Ashworth and Heyndels (2005) also highlight that, in Flemish
municipalities, during downturns, “expenditure are cut back more in municipalities with fewer
ministers”.
The solidarity between the executive and the legislative powers, which may
be measured as the proportion of government parties represented in the parliament, may
be another aspect influencing public deficits. As suggested by Roubini and Sachs (1989),
if there is no concordance between them, they will probably face difficulties in reaching
agreements. The authors believe that this situation would result in excessive overall spending,
and that deficits would therefore be higher. Studying a panel of 22 OECD countries, Volkerink
and De Haan (2001) confirm this assumption by demonstrating that governments having a
15This problem is known as the common-pool resource problem.
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majority in parliament have lower deficits.
Moreover, by their own behavior around electoral periods, politicians may influence fiscal
outcomes; it is the so-called political business cycle. According to Nordhaus (1975),
politicians do not work for the population’s general interest but are self-interested. The main
objective of politicians would be to ensure their reelection. When an election approaches,
politicians seek to obtain the citizens favor by increasing public spending and decreasing
the tax burden. Such operations would deteriorate fiscal balances. Several studies tend to
confirm this assumption. First, by focusing on a panel of 24 developing countries, Schuknecht
(2000) affirms that governments tend to perform expansionary fiscal policies during election
years. To achieve this objective, governments resort more largely to public spending increases
in spite of tax decreases. Furthermore, as revealed by Kneebone and McKenzie (2001),
opportunistic behavior is also perceptible in Canadian provinces. Indeed, their study shows
that governments are inclined to increase visible public spending (e.g. schools, roads or
hockey rinks) around electoral periods. The political business cycle also seems to be an issue
at the municipal level, since Veiga and Veiga (2007) report that Portuguese municipalities
tend to increase highly visible public spending during pre-electoral periods. Finally, Shi
and Svensson (2002) found clear evidence of a political budget cycle in both developed and
developing countries. Nonetheless, their findings highlight that the political budget cycle
may depend on the government’s probability to remain in power and also on the share of
informed voters in the electorate.16
In addition to the political determinants, a portion of the literature devoted to public
deficits and indebtedness focuses on institutional factors. The study of the fiscal rules or
budget constraints is one of them. Indeed, at the national or subnational level of government
or sometimes even at the municipal level, some countries have introduced budget constraints
in order to ensure sustainable fiscal policies. Moreover, these budget constraints may have
different forms since they are attached to government deficits, taxes, expenditure or debt.
However, as previously discussed, the effect of such budget rules is unclear. Indeed, there
16Instead of focusing on the parliament and government political composition as a whole, a new strand of literature
also discusses the particular role played by finance ministers on the budgetary figures. Detailed evidence is presented
in subsection 2.4.
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is little evidence about their effectiveness on the government’s fiscal soundness. For some
authors, including Fatás and Mihov (2006), who scrutinize U.S. states, it is evident that fiscal
rules lead to higher deficits. Contrastingly, Hallerberg et al. (2007a) have a more nuanced
point of view since they argue that the effectiveness of budget rules will depend on the type
of government and, hence, the political environment and constitutional characteristics, such
as the electoral system. Conversely, Feld and Kirchgässner (2008) provide evidence that
budget constraints allowed to reduce public deficits in Swiss cantons. Nonetheless, although
Luechinger and Schaltegger (2011) reach the same conclusions, they argue that one must
not rule out that deficits have been reduced, at least partially, through creative accounting
operations. Some other authors, in European countries as well as in the U.S. states, put the
emphasis on this perverse aspect surrounding fiscal rules.
Furthermore, Switzerland, which is a direct democracy, has two particular institutional
tools aiming to restrain public spending and therefore public deficits: the fiscal referendum
and the right of initiative. The fiscal referendum may be described as an institutional tool,
which aims to put public spending under pressure. This expected effect may occur in two
ways. Firstly, it can allow citizens to express themselves concerning spending that are put
to the vote. Since citizens are perceived as more fiscally conservative than elected politicians
(Peltzman 1992), it is expected that citizens will use fiscal referendums to avoid new public
spending.17 Secondly, fiscal referendums are launched only when a new spending exceeds
a predetermined financial threshold. That way, the government will self-regulate and will
pay attention to new spending if they do not want their project subjected to the popular
vote. Nevertheless, the government may avoid this constraint by resorting to loopholes.
Assuming a public project exceeds the financial threshold and subsequently is put to the
ballot, the government may split this project into several sub-projects so as to avoid the
financial constraint. More particularly, it must be underlined that there are two kinds of fiscal
referendums: the mandatory and the optional. While the mandatory one is automatically
launched if a public spending exceeds the financial threshold, the optional one is not. Indeed,
17Studying the results of referendums is a good device to assess whether or not politicians respect the median voter
theorem. If this were to be true, citizens would not reject a project subjected to the ballot since politicians would
provide them with exactly what they want.
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with an optional referendum, voters can call for a referendum on a new public spending by
collecting signatures from a predetermined number of citizens. So far, empirical studies
devoted to this instrument tend to demonstrate that referendums have beneficial impacts on
budget figures (Martin 2008; Feld and Matsusaka 2003).
The right of initiative is the second institutional tool that citizens can use to influence
cantonal public finance, since it allows citizens to propose new laws or modifications of the
constitution. Nevertheless, it seems to be particularly difficult to predict the way in which
this institutional tool will affect budget figures. On the one hand, as suggested by Feld
and Matsusaka (2003), the right of initiative provides a way for citizens to cancel spending
programs that fall short of the referendum spending threshold. In this respect, the right of
initiative would have a positive effect on cantonal fiscal soundness. However, on the other
hand, one must consider the probability that new laws and modifications of the constitu-
tion tend to worsen public deficits. The final effect of the popular initiative is therefore
unforeseeable.
Some authors (e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1996) also devote their attention to the budgeting
process, i.e. the different steps through which the budget is developed. More particularly,
the recent literature opposes the bottom-up and the top-down budget process. Kim and Park
(2006) demonstrate that OECD countries that use a top-down budget process, which is based
on a government fixed funding envelope attributed to each ministry, are better at restrain-
ing public spending and deficits than countries that resort to bottom-up budget processes.
Indeed, in a traditional bottom-up budget process, spending ministries dispose of an informa-
tion asymmetry allowing them to formulate requirements that tend to be higher than their
real budgetary needs, generating higher public spending and deficits. Nonetheless, Feld and
Kirchgassner (1999) come to another conclusion as they find that, in Swiss municipalities,
“the bottom-up procedure incorporating direct democracy elements seems to be more promising
for reducing public debt than a top-down procedure”. Furthermore, Lauth (1978) indicates
that implementing Zero-Base budgeting instead of the incremental budget process allowed
for a reduction of financial inefficiencies in the U.S. states. The incremental budget process
is often considered as inefficient since it simply consists in proportionally increasing public
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revenues and public spending of the precedent year in order to establish the current figures
(Wildavsky 1986). That way, the public spending would increase year after year without any
economic justification.
Finally, another strand of literature is devoted to more specific items. For instance,
Martin (2008) expresses some assumptions in regard to the population age. He assumes
that an elderly population tends to increase deficits since tax revenues decrease and social
spending increases. He has also formulated the same assumption for a young population.
According to his point a view, in the presence of a young population, the educational spending
are higher and the tax revenues are smaller than in the presence of an active population.
Also considering demography, Feld and Kirchgässner (2008) for instance, suggest that urban
localities would suffer higher deficits since their inhabitants claim for larger public services
such as public cultural goods.
2.4 Finance ministers in the public sector financial management
It is notably by starting to pay a meticulous attention to the literature devoted to government
fragmentation that strong evidence is given regarding the importance of the finance
minister in a cabinet. As defined by Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), “fragmentation arises
when several agents or groups participate in the fiscal decision-making process, each with its
own interests and constituency to satisfy, and each with some weight in the final decision. To
participate in the majority, each group demands a share in the budget; as all groups do this,
the end results is a high level of expenditure or a large deficit”. The latter phenomenon ensuing
from the government fragmentation is commonly known as the common pool problem and
has largely been discussed in the literature.18 Then, as argued by the authors, “fragmentation
of the fiscal policy decision-making process is closely related to the notion of internalization
of the costs of fiscal policy”.
That way, in order to curb the spending ministers’ appetite for higher public spending,
18For more detailed information about the common pool problem, see among others Von Hagen and Harden
(1995), Alesina and Perotti (1999) and Valesco (2000). Moreover, Borge (2005) provides first evidence about the
finance minister’s capacity to mitigate or even cancel the common pool problem.
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it is widely recognized that finance ministers may play a key role in that matter. Indeed, if
the finance minister determines at first the total size of the financial means at the spending
ministers’ disposal, theoretically he is in a better position to better internalize the costs
of aggregate public spending. In such a situation, spending ministers would only have the
opportunity to bargain over the budget distribution (Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999). In
other words, if the country’s financial responsibility is borne by the finance minister, it
means that a situation in which every spending minister develops his own spending plan
is avoided. Nevertheless, it is only in particular circumstances, i.e. in particular budget
process and/or institutional framework, that finance ministers have the power to alleviate
the so-called common pool problem.
Among these particular circumstances, Hagen (1992) argues that budgetary procedures
lead to greater fiscal discipline if they give a strong prerogative to the prime minister or
the finance minister, if they limit universalism, reciprocity, and parliamentary amendments,
and if they facilitate strict execution of the budget law. Regarding the key role carried out
by finance ministers, Woo (2003) also stipulates that “a budgeting process that allows the
prime minister or finance minister to have a dominant position over the spending ministers,
and limits the amendment power of parliament is conducive to fiscal discipline”. Some au-
thors have investigated the finance minister’s power in a government and his capacity
to influence the spending ministers’ behavior. At first, Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) argue
that “a strong finance minister is able to centralize the budget process when there are few
or no important ideological differences within the coalition”. Moreover, Feld and Schaltegger
(2010) also highlights the importance of a strong finance minister in order to resolve the
common pool problem. From their point of view, a finance minister may be considered as
strong depending on his capacity to remain in office on the long run. In other words, the
longer the finance minister remains in office, the stronger he is. Indeed, “a finance minister
who succeeds in remaining a long time in office usually enjoys a political powerful position
towards the parliament, the administration and the interest groups”. Consistently with the
former assertion, more experienced finance ministers evidently enjoy a strategic advantage
with respect to spending ministers who have shorter tenure.
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While it is debated that, under particular conditions, finance ministers should be willing
to resolve the common pool problem, it is still needed to point out their personal interests
or motivations in performing this task. Stein (1998) provides food for thought when he
argues that “finance ministers, who typically respond to the general interests rather than to
geographical or sectoral interests, should reduce the extent to which fiscal decisions are subject
to the common problem”. That way, in the light of the last argument, finance ministers would
have different incentives in comparison with other stakeholders associated in the budget
process. Relying on a literature specifically devoted to the understanding of finance ministers’
role in the public sector financial management (Hallerberg and Von Hagen (1997); Moessinger
(2012); Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014)), their common features may be summed up as
follows:
First of all, the finance minister is the central player within the budget process since he
is responsible for the annual budget preparation and execution. Secondly, in contrast to
spending ministers, the finance minister is less in charge for particular projects or particular
groups in society. We may therefore presume that it mitigates his personal incentive to fight
for higher funds. As he takes over the responsibility for the whole budget and its development,
his incentives to ensure sustainable fiscal soundness should be the highest among the cabinet
members. In other words, he is expected to tame his collegues’ spending appetite as much
as possible in order to avoid or at least alleviate public deficits. Indeed, the budget deficits
level is usually the main indicator used in order to assess the finance minister’s effectiveness.
Thus, it may reasonably be argued that “his prestige and hence his personal benefits depend
on the effectiveness of his ministry” (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1997). As a consequence,
his political success is tightly linked with a sound fiscal policy and only this policy will raise
his prestige, and, thereby, his reelection chances.
However, despite the general considerations surrounding the particular role taken on by
the finance ministers in cabinets, only minimal evidence has been provided so far as to their
influence on fiscal outcomes. First, researchers aiming at filling this gap focused on power
detained by finance ministers. In that way, using data on 57 developed countries from 1970
to 1990, Woo (2003) assumes that a budget process that allows the prime minister or the
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finance minister to have a dominant position over the spending ministers, and limits the
amendment power of parliament is conducive to fiscal discipline. In his research, the author
uses an index of centralization (around the finance minister) for the budget preparation steps
and shows that the more centralized the budgetary authority is in the finance ministry, the
smaller the deficits are. Afterwards, it has been shown by Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006)
that a strong finance minister can best address the common pool problem. This is notably in
line with the works accomplished by Feld and Schaltegger (2010) who test whether political
stability impacts fiscal policy by running a time series analysis relying on the Swiss federal
government between 1849 and 2007. Measuring the political stability as the number of years
that a federal finance minister remains in office, they provide strong evidence that the more
experienced a finance minister is, the better the fiscal soundness. Moreover, as suggested
by Alesina and Ardagna (2010), their results reveal that higher public surpluses are reached
thanks to lower public spending.
Then, other contributions have attempted to provide strong empirical evidence that fi-
nance ministers may be able to resolve problems ensuing from the government’s frag-
mentation. Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) tend to reach this objective when they question
whether a strong finance minister leads to lower sovereign risk premia. Using an index estab-
lished by Hallerberg et al. (2007b) to depict the particularities of a strong finance minister,
the regression results demonstrate that stronger finance ministers are assimilated with lower
spreads. At the same time, Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2011) shows that coalition govern-
ments issue significantly more debt than single party governments. As their data suggest,
this result crucially hinges on the position or strength of the finance minister within coalition
governments. They find that coalition governments with a finance minister who shares the
same political ideology as the prime minister are – in terms of borrowing – not significantly
different from single party governments.
Furthermore, it would appear that finance ministers’ educational background and
professional experience would matter for the direction of fiscal policies. For instance,
using data relative to professional training of more than 1500 policy makers, which includes
the finance ministers, in 29 emerging countries between 1977 and 1999, Chwieroth (2007)
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investigates whether policy makers educations matters for the liberalization of controls over
international capital movements. Relying on the assumption that individuals trained in ne-
oliberal universities are socialized and should be more disposed to adopt neoliberal ideas,
author shows that neoliberal finance ministers matter for policy choices, i.e. have effectively
a pronounced effect on neoliberal policies adoption. Then, first evidence has been provided
by Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014) that the finance ministers’ professional experience prior
to their nomination affect public debt. Moessinger (2012) also undertakes research provid-
ing further information on the issue since he simultaneously tackles the influence of both
educational and professional background on fiscal outcomes. Focusing on European coun-
tries between 1980 and 2007, the author highlights that the finance minister’s experience
and education affect the accumulation of public debt. The political experience is notably
decisive since the more experience a finance minister has gained in former positions, the
lower the public deficit is. Interestingly, results have revealed that finance ministers with an
educational background in law tend to reduce the level of debt.
Finally, a couple of scientific contributions have been devoted to the influence of finance
ministers’ personal characteristics on particular fiscal outcomes. For instance, in a first
research using a panel data relative to the 26 Swiss cantons over the period 1980 - 2007 and
to the 99 finance ministers in position during the considered period, Chatagny and Soguel
(2012a) question whether the finance ministers’ political ideology affects the accuracy
of tax revenue forecasts. At the same time, they go one step further by investigating whether
the effects of finance ministers’ political ideology depends on how they are ideologically
aligned with spending ministers. Again, authors suggest the governments’ fragmentation is
at the heart of political strategies. It is indeed assumed by authors that finance ministers
would not be tempted to underestimate tax revenue projections if they share their colleagues’
political ideology. Furthermore, it is expected that right-wing finance ministers perform
more conservative estimations, i.e. they would tend to underestimate tax revenues to a
larger extent than left-wing ones. Their results reach the conclusions that “tax revenue
projections are manipulated for ideological reasons” since it is demonstrated that right-wing
finance ministers effectively more largely underestimate tax revenue forecasts. Moreover, the
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greater the ideological gap between ministers, the greater the tax revenue budgeting error.
More recently, Chatagny (2013) carried out a new analysis designed to tackle whether fiscal
rules could alter the findings mentioned above. While his results highlight the existence of a
significant relationship between the finance ministers’ political ideology and the tax revenue
underestimation, it is argued that stringent fiscal rules seem to compel finance ministers to
resort to accurate projections.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature mentioned above is the only one especially
devoted to the role played by finance ministers in governments. Moreover, there does not
appear to be other empirical contributions measuring the impact of finance ministers, and
especially their personal characteristics, on diverse fiscal outcomes.
Nevertheless, without having focused their attention on finance ministers, some academic
contributions have considered the role played by particular politicians in the public policies
management. In this respect, some authors have first questioned whether the political lead-
ers’ gender could influence political and economic outcomes, since men and women would
have different policy preferences. Using a database on 265 Village Councils in West Bengal
and Rajasthan (India), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) wonder whether the provision of
public goods differs depending on the political leaders’ gender. Further to their investigation,
authors demonstrate that leaders invest more largely in public goods that directly match to
the expectations and needs of their own gender. Similarly, Ferreira and Gyourko (2014)
scrutinize the budget composition of U.S. municipalities with regards to the mayor’s gender.
Conversely to the previous research, results show that female mayors do not conduct different
policies than male mayors.
As often assumed, politicians’ behavior would not be innate but rather acquired through-
out their life and experiences. Consequently, special attention has been paid to the head of
government’s (president or prime minister) educational and professional back-
ground. Zhang and Congleton (2010) offer a first insight into this when they show that
“both career paths and education have significant effects on a president’s economic policy
judgment”. Other authors have also tackled the relationship between personal characteristics
and different political and economic outcomes. For instance, Somogyi (2010) performed an
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in-depth analysis covering 64 countries over the period 1970 - 2002 in which he investigates
the impact of political leaders’ profession, education and political leaning on public finance.
In the light of his results, it emerges that former managers or professional politicians with a
degree in law statistically run larger deficits than other politicians. Nevertheless, the author
cannot assert the existence of a partisan behavior on public finance. In other words, in this
particular case, fiscal soundness would not be affected by the politician’s political ideology.
These results are strongly in line with those of Mikosch and Somogyi (2009) who show that
political leaders in 22 OECD countries having professional experience in the economic field
generate higher deficits than the average. Furthermore, although it is assumed that political
leaders’ behavior is mainly determined by their educational and professional experiences,
Hayo and Neumeier (2011) reveal that the socioeconomic status of the prime minister
of German local governments also helps to explain the fiscal performance. Prime ministers
having poorer socioeconomic backgrounds generally engender higher levels of public spend-
ing and debt financing. Finally, the influence of political leaders’ education and professional
background has been extended to other fields of research. It is in this way that Dreher et al.
(2009) and Somogyi (2010) explore whether the head of government’s personal characteris-
tics matter for reforms implementation. Interestingly enough, the same conclusions may be
drawn from both studies, namely, that reforms are more likely during the tenure of former
entrepreneurs belonging to a left-wing party. Nevertheless, no significant relationship may
be depicted concerning the influence of the politicians’ education.
With regard to our field of interest, some connections may also be drawn with the lit-
erature devoted to the importance of central bankers’ personal characteristics in the
direction of the monetary policy. They are Chappell Jr et al. (1995) who first provided evi-
dence that the central bankers’ professional experience may matter for monetary outcomes.
Studying the Federal Open Marker Committee members, authors demonstrate that experi-
ence at the Federal Reserve Board is correlated with stronger preferences for monetary ease.
Using a panel data relative to 20 countries over 50 years, Adolph (2003) also reveals that cen-
tral bankers’ career counts for monetary policy. That way, central bankers with a background
in the financial sector tend to have more conservative behavior with respect to inflation com-
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pared to central bankers of whom have a more bureaucratic experience. Similarly, it has
been highlighted that Monetary Policy Committee members of the Bank of England tend to
vote for interest rate increase when inflation is expected to increase. Nevertheless, members’
differences in voting would be mainly explained by previous career background (Riboni and
Ruge-Murcia 2008). Whereas most of the existing research deals with the importance of
central bankers’ professional experience, Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) go one step further
by providing new evidence about the influence of central bankers’ education on monetary
policy. The main conclusion ensuing from their research stresses that former students in law
significantly prefer higher inflation rates than former students in economics do. Nevertheless,
these results have to be interpreted in the light of the central bankers’ career path. Finally,
Farvaque et al. (2009) integrate the central bankers’ gender in their model when exploring
the determinants of inflation and reach the conclusion that women would be more risk averse
than men.
Without paying attention to politicians, several laboratory experiments have been con-
ducted in order to assess the influence of citizens’ educational background on their
behavior. It was notably done by Garrett and Lange (1991) who implemented a research re-
lying on the belief that the study of economic sciences influences students’ view. The authors’
research consists in performing an analysis during which students had to decide whether to
maximize a company’s profits by laying off half of its workforce or to make lower profits by
firing less employees. In the light of their results, it was concluded that students in economics
have a much stronger tendency to maximize profits than other students. These results are
besides consistent with those reached 25 years later by Rubinstein (2006). Thereafter, a cou-
ple of other experimental studies have aimed at determining whether people’s educational
background could mold their behavior and personal characteristics. A first overview is given
by Frank et al. (2000) who question the relationship existing between a person’s education
and his behavior in economic decision making. As brought out by Frey and Meier (2003),
students in the field of economics are generally more selfish and less cooperative than students
of other faculties. Similar evidence has also been provided more recently by Frey and Meier
(2003). However, authors do not reach any agreement whether the level of selfishness of
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students is due to self-selection or to indoctrination. As a consequence, conversely to Carter
and Irons (1991), it cannot be asserted that “economists are born, not made!”. Nevertheless,
the selfishness of students in economics could partly explain why Marwell and Ames (1981)
reach the conclusion that economics graduate students tend to free ride to a larger extent
than other students in regards to their investment in public goods.
Simultaneously to studies devoted to citizens’ educational background, academicians have
carried out experiments aiming at evaluating the relationship between people’s personal char-
acteristics and diverse political and economic outcomes. Citizens’ gender has notably been
the object of a particular scrutiny. For instance, examining survey data collected in Detroit
and Toronto in 1988, Warner (1991) exhibits that, for women in both cities and for men from
Toronto, having female children increases the support for feminism. Using data relying on
U.S. households, Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) examine whether there are gender differ-
ences in financial risk taking. Although results maintain that women are more risk averse
than men, authors warn that risk aversion also depends on person’s age, race and number
of children. Among all personal characteristics, it would also appear that religion could, at
least partially, lead people’s behavior. Thus, in the light of a research performed by Sapienza
et al. (2006), it ensues that different religious affiliations and ethnicity are associated with
different preferences for income redistribution.
To conclude, and logically enough, comparable investigations have been carried out in the
private sector. That way, despite considering political leaders, there are firms’ top man-
agers who have also been the center of attention of scientific contributions. Again,managers’
educational background and professional experiences have been largely dissected by
scholars since these characteristics may have a strong influence on diverse corporate outcomes.
It is in that way that Bertrand and Schoar (2003) read that “managers are often perceived
as having their own style when making investment, financing and other strategic decisions,
thereby imprinting their personal marks on the company they manage”. Without any doubt,
we may assume the same is true regarding the finance minister’s importance in the public
affairs direction. It is therefore all the more relevant to consider the literature devoted to
the private sector managers’ personal characteristics. Among this literature, Bertrand and
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Schoar (2003) provide first evidence as to the importance of managers’ age and training.
They notably reveal that older CEOs seem to be more conservative in their decision-making
and that CEOs having a MBA appear to follow more aggressive strategies. Analyzing dataset
based on 592 supervisory board members of 29 German public and private banks during the
European financial crisis, Hau and Thum (2009) argue that banks supervised by members
having low financial experiences had lower financial performance during the 2007/2008 finan-
cial crisis. In addition to this the firms managers’ gender has also been subjected to a
specific analysis. For instance, Carter et al. (2003), who examine Fortune 1000 firms, high-
light a significant positive relationship between the board diversity and the value of the firm.
In other words, the larger the representation of women in the board of directors is, the higher
the firm’s value is. On the evidence of some other studies, the impact of managers’ gender
could also be felt on corporate strategies. Thus, risk aversion would notably be explained by
gender differences (Powell and Ansic 1997) and investment behaviors by mutual funds would
differ depending on the manager’s gender (Atkinson et al. 2003). Finally, more sophisticated
research has aimed at cross referencing several personal characteristics in order to provide
richer conclusions. For instance, Johnson and Powell (1994) highlight that managers’ gender
can impact decision-making but only under certain circumstances. They also argue that
educational background would erase gender differences with regard to decision quality and
risk aversion. Moreover, it has been more recently defended by Jensen and Zajac (2004) that
managers’ strategic choices vary regarding the position they occupy (CEO or executive and
non-executive director), even if they share the same functional background experience.
2.5 Knowledge gap
As it has just been highlighted, a large part of the literature devoted to creative accounting
aims at providing definitions of the notion and/or at measuring the phenomenon through
more or less sophisticated methods. In both private and public sectors, it is mainly agreed
that creative accounting is used to hide bad news, i.e. to show better financial performances
than they are in the reality. This is even more true in the public sector since most of the
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literature provides strong evidence that the resort to creative accounting is greater when
governments have to cope with stringent fiscal rules prohibiting deficits. However, only a few
attention has been paid to governments using accounting tricks in order to conceal surpluses;
though it is reasonable to assume that such gimmicks could be embraced by governments.
Our research therefore aims first at filling this gap.
Furthermore, it is almost exclusively asserted in the literature that accounting tricks
have “no structural incidence on government finance” (Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama 2006).
Although we partly share this point of view, we also withdraw from it in our research.
Indeed, we sustain that when creative accounting is used for preventive purposes, i.e. in
order to accumulate cookie-jar reserves by saving surpluses through unorthodox measures,
such gimmicks may engender positive structural incidences on fiscal soundness. Concrete
proof is thus still absent in the literature that creative accounting may have positive and
structural influence on the governments’ financial performance.
Then, no resounding evidence is provided regarding the determinants of creative account-
ing. While it is relevant to consider that the use of such practices mainly occurs because of
economic (i.e. the occurrence of a deficit or a surplus) or institutional constraints (i.e. more
or less stringent fiscal rules), we may also reasonably assume that politicians’ personality
may have a fundamental role in this issue. Indeed, a pretty non-existent but growing litera-
ture more and more brings out that policy makers matter in the direction of public policies.
Consequently, by investigating whether the resort to creative accounting differs depending
on the finance ministers’ personal characteristics, we partly fill the last two knowledge gaps.
Finally, although finance ministers are key actors in the budget process and are assumed
to influence public deficits and indebtedness, only few evidence has been provided so far.
Consequently, by explaining creative accounting (which is expected to structurally impact
public deficits) through the finance ministers’ personal characteristics, possibilities are also
given to indirectly highlight finance ministers’ personal characteristics that allow to struc-
turally improve governments’ financial performance. Indeed, it is through the policies they
implement that finance ministers may structurally change the curb of public deficits over
time. The current research should therefore provide glimpses as to the influence played by
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finance ministers on the governments’ financial performance.
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3 General context of creative accounting in Swiss cantons
In this section, a general presentation of creative accounting in the specific case of Swiss
cantons is proposed. First of all, we introduce actors interested in financial information and
their particular need of it. An insight is then provided as to the financial legislation shaping
the way public finance is or should be managed in Swiss cantons. Finally, particular attention
is paid to the role played by finance ministers and internal auditors.
3.1 Actors interested in accounting and financial information
Figure 1 below presents actors associated to the budgeting process or at least interested in
financial information ensuing from it. Considering the finance minister is at the center of the
political game investigated in this research, he is the first actor presented in Figure 1. Around
him a multitude of stakeholders gravitate. In Figure 1, we report, on the horizontal axis,
the extent to which actors are away from finance ministers. In this research, it is assumed
that this distance if negatively correlated with knowledge in accounting, as depicted on the
vertical axis. Only auditors occupy a particular position. They are situated above other
actors since they are expected to have the greatest knowledge in accounting. Furthermore,
they are ranged from finance ministers to deputies as they scrutinize the State apparatus as
a whole.
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Figure 1: Actors interested in financial information
Source: Own presentation
As mentioned in the introduction, the finance minister is considered as the key ac-
tor as he supervises the creation and the provision of financial information. As he heads
the ministry of finance, he is in charge of managing cantons’ public finance throughout the
year and his role is to communicate the governments’ financial situation after the report-
ing process. Communicating the cantonal financial situation is essential because it informs
stakeholders how public money has been used throughout the year. For spending minis-
ters and deputies, knowing their cantons’ financial results is crucial as their public policies
depend on the resources that are at their disposal. It is thus partly in light of these financial
results that spending ministers and deputies will formulate their budgetary requests for the
subsequent year. For citizens, such financial information is also fundamental as it reveals
whether they received the appropriate level of public services compared to the taxes they
paid. Or, on the contrary, whether the difference is to their advantage (in case of a deficit) or
to their disadvantage (in case of a surplus). However, to get the desired information, citizens
strongly rely on the media. Although figures reported by the finance ministers are publicly
available, their technical nature discourages not to say prevents most citizens looking at pub-
lic accounts. Therefore, it is through the news provided by journalists, who have attended
press conferences or have written articles based on press releases, that citizens mostly get
information relative to the cantonal financial situation. Finally, assuming a role of general
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interest, auditors scrutinize financial figures reported by the finance ministers. Concretely,
their main task consists in avoiding financial data suffering any irregularities regarding can-
tonal financial laws. In other words, they have to ensure that stakeholders can deal with
reliable financial information.
3.2 Representation and communication of financial information
As mentioned, financial information reported by finance ministers is crucial as it is used by
spending ministers and deputies to formulate their budgetary requests for the subsequent
year. For exemple, in a case of a surplus, claims for higher public services or lower taxes
may arise from these stakeholders (Tellier 2006). To some extent, media and citizens may
also be expected to formulate similar requests. Nevertheless, in order to make up their
own minds and thus formulate their requests, stakeholders need to rely on a true and fair
representation of the governments’ financial situation. In other words, they need reliable
financial information telling the reality precisely as it is.
But, on the other side of the spectrum, finance ministers do not necessarily share the
same interests. Finance ministers’ main objective being to ensure fiscal soundness, they are
expected to fight against requests for higher public spending or lower tax revenues. As a
consequence, to avoid those claims, finance ministers could be willing to report the reality
that suits their own interests. For example, finance ministers may have strong incentives to
hide the surplus reported in the statement of financial performance.
In light of what has just been explained, it may be reasonably argued that finance ministers
can communicate financial information in two different manners. Indeed, as depicted in
Figure 2 below, finance ministers might have the willingness to provide either a true and fair
financial information representing reality or a political information suiting their own interest.
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Figure 2: Ways of communicating financial information for finance ministers
Source: Own presentation
The tradeoff between these two manners of reporting and thus communicating financial
information also prevailed when the harmonized accrual accounting model for Swiss cantons
(HAM1) was designed in the late 1970s.19 Indeed, tension arose between two points of view as
reported in Figure 3 below. The technical wish was that the accounting model should embrace
an economic vision of accounting and press for true and fair financial reporting. That way,
when truly and fairly communicated, the reported governments’ financial situation represents
the reality precisely as it was. This way of reporting public figures, which is the essence
of accounting, is notably promoted by IPSAS norms. But the HAM1 and thus cantonal
legislation also embrace a more political vision of accounting, offering the possibility to use
accounting in a more conservative manner. Concretely, this political and conservative vision
of accounting allows to influence the reported governments’ financial situation by resorting
to additional depreciation charges and special funds. In such circumstances, although this
way of presenting public accounts is legal, the reported governments’ financial situation is
no longer true and fair. However, when manipulations performed on public accounts infringe
cantonal legal framework, the communication of the governments’ financial situation is untrue
and unfair in addition to being fraudulent.
19This tradeoff is still perceptible in cantonal financial laws, which also allow the use of additional depreciation
charges and special funds. Indeed, the accounting model only having the status of recommendations, it had to be
transposed in each cantonal legislation to have legal force. As a result, Swiss cantons took the opportunity to tailor the
HAM1 to their own needs when transposing the recommendations to their own legislation governing public finance.
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Figure 3: Presentation of reported figures according to the HAM1 and cantonal financial laws
Source: CDF (2008), Stolowy and Breton (2004), IFAC (2002), CDF (1981) and own adaptations
That way, whether we only concentrate on the essence of accounting and indirectly on
the vision of accounting defended by IPSAS norms, every operation tending to violate the
true and fair representation of the governments’ financial situation should be considered as
creative accounting (see Figure 4 below). However, in the light of the HAM1 and of most
cantonal financial laws that also allow a more political and conservative vision of accounting,
additional depreciation charges and special funds are simply considered as political tools. In
other words, according to the HAM1 and cantonal financial laws, these operations are not
creative accounting.
49
Figure 4: Nature of additional depreciation charges and special funds
Source: Bergmann (2009), CDF (2008), IFAC (2002), CDF (1981) and own adaptations
3.3 Information asymmetry, an advantage at the finance ministers’ disposal
Compared to spending ministers, deputies, media and citizens, finance ministers have a
specific expertise in accounting that makes it quite easy for them to enjoy information asym-
metry. The finance minister heads the ministry of finance and is “typically responsible for
managing the annual budget process. This gives him a considerable informational and strate-
gic advantage over the other cabinet members, which he can use to pursue his [own] political
agenda” (Von Hagen 2010). This argument is also sustained by Bergmann (2009) who reads
that finance ministers “obviously have the largest amount of information”. Moreover, as noted
by Zimmerman (1977) or Giroux (1989), their knowledge and expertise on accounting pro-
vides them with strong advantages regarding the information provided in financial reports. In
other words, finance ministers profit from information asymmetry in the budget process that
allows them to draw on accounting tricks to disguise the reported balance of the statement
of financial performance in accordance to their own target. Not understanding financial in-
formation reported in public accounts because of a lack in accounting knowledge, politicians,
citizens and media only concentrate on the bottom-line, i.e. the reported balance.
3.4 Auditors as a barrier against information asymmetry
A priori, spending ministers, deputies, citizens and media should not have to question the
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reported balances since they have been validated by internal auditors. Indeed, internal audits
have been implemented in order to resolve or at least alleviate the information asymmetry
between finance ministers and other stakeholders (Bergmann 2009). However, even if in-
ternational accounting standards stipulate that reported figures have to express a true and
fair representation of reality, auditors have to assess public accounts in the light of cantonal
financial laws. As there are legal possibilities for finance ministers to play with additional
depreciation charges and special funds to shape the reported balances, it is impossible for
internal auditors to denounce such practices, while they misrepresent the real picture of the
governments’ financial situation.
This explains why stakeholders only devote their attention to the bottom-line. Lacking
competences in accounting, stakeholders implicitly rely on the auditors’ expertise to formulate
their requests. However, since auditors have to scrutinize public accounts in the light of
cantonal financial laws, they do not criticize additional depreciation charges and special
funds and approve reported figures. Stakeholders are thus not encouraged to look above the
line as public accounts have been approved.20 As a consequence, it could not be easier for
finance ministers to depict the image of the governments’ financial performance that best
suits their own interests.
20Moreover, due to their lack of accounting knowledge, stakeholders do not understand the concept of depreciation.
That way, they do not feel the difference between ordinary and additional depreciation charges. As a consequence, they
are not in a position to understand that additional depreciation charges violate the true and fair view of governments’
financial situation. Therefore they do not notice that the picture communicated by the finance ministers does not
strictly depict the reality.
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4 Hypothesis
In this section, the attention is devoted to hypothesis that will be tested in the different
empirical analysis. But first of all, we introduce some preliminary considerations by reporting
a timeline covering the budgeting process to the financial reporting. This should help to
provide a better comprehension of the framework in which the practice of creative accounting
is implemented. Especially in this first subsection, we discuss the reasons that may incite
Swiss cantonal governments and especially cantonal finance ministers to resort to creative
accounting. Secondly, based on this discussion, we formulate the hypothesis regarding the
expected impacts of such practices on the governments’ financial performance. Thirdly, in
the last subsection, we investigate the determinants of creative accounting. More specifically,
we tackle whether finance ministers’ personal characteristics matter for the use of accounting
gimmicks. Again, an hypothesis is formulated for each personal trait as to their respective
influence on the resort to such accounting practices.
4.1 Preliminary considerations
A usual fiscal year in Swiss cantons may be subdivided in three distinct stages, which are
partially superimposed on each other over time. These three different stages constituting a
fiscal year may be graphically summed up as follows:
Stage 1: The budgeting process
The budgeting process is a succession of technical, administrative and political steps
through which the subsequent annual budget law is conceived (Rubin 2000). It is generally
developed between September and December of the year t-1 , as represented in Figure 5 below.
The budgeting process starts with a technical procedure aiming at forecasting the amount
of tax revenues that will be available for the subsequent fiscal year (year t). Simultaneously,
spending ministers provide their requests, that are the anticipated spending for the coming
fiscal year, to the ministry of finance. Then, after having collected the tax revenue forecast
as well as the requests of credits, the ministry of finance (strongly under the leadership of the
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finance minister) designs a budget proposal (i.e. the available amounts of public services that
could be provided by each ministry). This budget proposal is generally put under pressure
and is subject to harsh negotiations between the ministry of finance and the other ministries.
Indeed, whereas each spending minister tries to monopolize financial resources as much as
possible, the finance minister arbitrates these requests in order to balance the anticipated
spending with the tax revenue forecast. Finally, after this bargaining phase, the budget
proposal is submitted to the cantonal parliament in order to enact budget law of the year
t .21
Figure 5: Graphical representation of a fiscal year in Swiss cantons
Source: own graphical representation
Stage 2: The budget execution
During the fiscal year t , the annual budget law serves as a guide for the public policies
implementation. Nevertheless, for a multitude of reasons, the direction of the budget law
might sometimes deviate from the forecasts. Most of the time, it may be due to spending
ministers or deputies who, during the course of the year, are tempted to apply for supplemen-
tary credits to the parliament. Notably such applications for supplementary credits mostly
21The budgeting process presented here refers to the traditional bottom-up approach. However, since early 90s
this initial approach has sometimes been replaced by the top-down approach in some jurisdictions. Through this new
approach the ministry of finance is at the first stage of the budgeting process since it sets the overall public spending
ceiling for each line ministry (Kim and Park 2006). The top-down budgeting process is innovative as it allows line
ministries to enjoy more flexibility in the use of financial means (Summermatter 2013). Indeed, detailed resource
allocation decisions to individual appropriations are made by line ministries within the spending ceiling (Kim and
Park 2006).
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arise between March and December of the year t , namely after the reporting of the statement
of financial performance of the year t-1 . And such claims are all the more likely when the
reported balance of the statement of financial performance of the year t-1 boasts an excess
of tax revenues over operating expenses. The period during which this wheeler-dealing may
appear is represented by the gray area in the figure above.
Stage 3: The financial reporting
The third and final stage, occuring between January and March of the year t , consists
in the financial reporting through which notably the balance of the statement of financial
performance of the year t-1 is determined. The financial reporting is a crucial stage since
it provides useful information about how the public money has been used and therefore
also provides information regarding the budgetary decision-making process of the subsequent
year, i.e. investment capacity, need for borrowing, etc. One must therefore bear in mind that
the financial reporting is a highly strategic stage. That way, in order to ensure the quality of
the decision making process, policy makers strongly need true and fair financial information.
Due to its strategic stakes, the financial reporting is without any doubt subjected to politi-
cal attention. Consequently, in order to influence the political debate (for their own interests),
it may be reasonably asserted that cantonal finance ministers would have strong incentives
to manipulate the reported balance of the statement of financial performance “towards the
desirable results” (Naser and Pendlebury 1992). For instance, while a government compelled
by a stringent fiscal rule would certainly look to dissimulate a deficit through the resort to
closing operations, the inverse may reasonably occur whether a surplus is expected. In such
a situation, we presume that finance ministers manipulate downward the reported balance of
the statement of financial performance in order to avoid political claims for supplementary
credits or lower tax burden. In other words, by concealing the reported surplus of the year
t-1 , finance ministers put public spending as well as the tax burden under pressure between
April and December of the year t as graphically demonstrated above. Ultimately, amounts
referring to creative accounting operations and reported in year t-1 reasonably appear to
influence the level of public spending and revenues of the year t .
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4.2 Impact of creative accounting on governments’ financial performance
The use of creative accounting in Swiss cantons is strongly tied to the fiscal policy recom-
mended by the harmonized accounting model for Swiss cantons and municipalities (HAM1)
and implemented in most cantonal financial laws. The 4th article of the law concerning the
cantons’ finance contained in the HAM1 mentions that the statement of financial performance
must remain (almost) balanced in the medium-term (CDF 1981: 72). The total operating
expenses therefore have to be entirely covered by the total operating revenues. This therefore
means that Swiss cantons have to report surpluses during booms in order to compensate past
or future deficits. Swiss cantons are thus implicitly recommended to run a structural surplus
to avoid the risk of reporting deficits during economic downturns. In other words, by using
surpluses to offset past deficits, it would avoid governments deteriorating the net equity.
Nevertheless, it is extremely risky for governments to feature a surplus. Indeed, when
a surplus occurs, it actually means that the fiscal pressure was too strong compared to the
public services usually provided. Or on the contrary, it means that the provided public
services were too weak compared to the State’s tax revenues. Because of this, political
pressures (coming from the spending ministers, the deputies, the citizens or even from the
media) aiming at reducing surpluses can appear. Whereas left-wing political parties might
want to increase public spending, right-wing parties would be more willing to decrease fiscal
pressure (Tellier 2006). Both cases would result in the dissolution of surpluses. In turn, if
such claims were imposed, it would lower the cash flow from operating activities and the
possibility to pay off debt. Swiss cantons would therefore face the risk of not being able to
ensure a structural surplus in the long run.
Consequently, a finance minister who must legally balance the statement of financial
performance or who commit himself to reducing the debt may attempt to restrict these
requests in order to maximize the cash flow. Enjoying an information asymmetry relying on
better accounting knowledge (Zimmerman 1977; Giroux 1989), finance ministers may have
incentives to resort to creative accounting to restrict requests that do not suit their personal
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interests. 22
Notably, possibility is given to finance ministers to play with additional depreciation
charges in order to manipulate reported figures towards their own interests. Additional de-
preciation charges are indeed used by finance ministers for the sole purpose of artificially
deteriorating the balance reported in the statement of financial performance. Indeed, such
accruals increase operating expenses reported in year t-1. That way, by reporting a balanced
statement of financial performance, it allows to undercut political claims for higher public
spending or tax cuts between March and December of the year t . It therefore prompts the
maintenance of high tax rates and to put public spending under pressure in the future (at
least in year t , as graphically demonstrated in the previous subsection). In turn, these high
tax rates generate additional cash-flows that allow debt repayment. Aside from additional
depreciation, in some cantons, the legislation provides the possibility to play with special
funds, that resemble cookie-jar reserves. An allocation to a cookie-jar reserve does not imply
disbursement although it increases reported operating expenses. Therefore, such allocation
hides surpluses reported in the statement of financial performance in year t-1 just as addi-
tional depreciation charges do; while withdrawal from cookie-jar reserves has the opposite
impact.23
Our main hypothesize (H1) regarding the influence of creative accounting operations on
governments’ financial performance is thus as follows: By concealing reported surpluses,
creative accounting operations like additional depreciation or allocation to spe-
cial funds allow to avoid claims for tax cuts or public spending increases during
the subsequent year. In other words, such accounting operations restrain the
level of operating expenses and press for a higher tax burden. Creative account-
ing operations should therefore improve the real future balance of the statement
of financial performance, i.e. increasing even more the real future surplus or
22Moreover, we may reasonably assume that the greater the information asymmetry, the more incentives the finance
ministers will have to resort to creative accounting since other stakeholders lack the necessary information to monitor
their action. Indeed, Richardson (2000) demonstrates that “the greater information asymmetry between management
and its shareholders, the more likely the firm is to manage accruals and earnings”. There is thus no reason that public
managers behave differently than managers performing in the private sector.
23In the next section, we discuss in detail the notions of additional depreciation charges and special funds. Espe-
cially, we pay a particular attention to demonstrate they are not true and fair and therefore are creative accounting
operations used in the sole purpose of manipulating the reported balance of the statement of financial performance.
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limiting the real future deficit.
4.3 Finance ministers’ personal characteristics as determinants of creative ac-
counting
One must first keep in mind that the finance minister has to be differentiated from spending
ministers since he is the only one who has a personal interest in sound public finance. Indeed,
his prestige and hence his personal benefits (i.e. his reelection chances) mainly rely on his
capacity to reach such a target (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1997). In other words, the level
of public deficits and indebtedness, partly ensuing from creative accounting operations, are
observed by voters and are used by these latter to assess the incumbent finance minister’s
performance. That way, the more efficient a finance minister is, the higher his chances
are of being reelected.24 That way, due to their divergent interests, finance ministers may
have strong incentives to resort to creative accounting in order to alleviate the spending
ministers’ appetite for higher public spending and thus ensuring sound public finance.25
This argument is notably supported by Jiraporn et al. (2008) who read that, in the private
sector, “misalignment of managers’ and shareholders’ incentives could induce managers to use
the flexibility provided by the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to manage
income opportunistically, thereby creating distortions in the reported earnings”.
In the context of more or less unorthodox accounting practices, it does not appear realistic
that the incumbent finance minister will highlight creative accounting operations as a signal
to voters to express his competence and therefore to enhance his reelection probability. Quite
the contrary. Although such practices are legal in the light of cantonal legislation (at least
additional depreciation charges and special funds), they could be questioned by citizens
notably since they are in opposition with international accounting standards. Moreover, it
cannot be ruled out either that citizens have greater preferences for higher public services
24This point of view is consistent with words maintained by Daﬄon and Rossi (1999) who read that “for a politician
seeking reelection the probability of staying in office may heavily depend on his or her budgetary responsibility”.
25Conversely, the reelection chances of the spending ministers and the deputies strongly rely on the financial means
they have to implement public policies. That way, if they are also deprieved of funds in the short run, their field of
action is automatically reduced and at the same time their reelection chances. This therefore highlights that finance
ministers and other stakeholders of the budget process share divergent and discordant interests.
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consumption (or lower taxes) in the short and medium term. As such accounting gimmicks
deprive them of higher public services (or lower taxes), we may reasonably expect that citizens
would reject these practices if they were aware about it. This would therefore certainly lead
to lower confidence in the finance minister’s behavior and to lower reelection chances.
However, it does not seem realistic that citizens look at additional depreciation charges
and cookie-jar reserves to assess the finance minister’s competences. It is indeed highly
unlikely that the median voter (as well as the media, to some extent) has sufficient accounting
expertise to detect these accounting tricks. And even if it were the case, it would also
require a strong technical knowledge regarding the concept of “true and fair view” of public
accounts to consider these accruals as creative accounting. Almost the same argument may be
maintained regarding the finance minister’s strategic behavior vis-à-vis the spending ministers
and the deputies. Indeed, as previously depicted, the finance minister enjoys an information
asymmetry in the budget process that allows him to manipulate the information reported in
public figures.26
In light of the above, we may reasonably argue that for finance ministers, the cost of
resorting to creative accounting (i.e. the probability to be caught by stakeholders of the
budget process or citizens) is lower than the cost of not being reelected. For that reason,
incumbent finance ministers will resort without any doubt to such practices in order to ensure
fiscal soundness and ultimately their position.
Nevertheless, in such a context, everything being equal, it is first of all the probability
to report a surplus in the statement of financial performance (see stage 3 in Figure 5) that
determines whether or not finance ministers resort to creative accounting. Knowing that
the main accounting gimmick at the finance ministers’ disposal is asymmetric, i.e. may
only be used to artificially increase operating expenses, the occurrence of such a practice
is unlikely when a deficit is expected. At the same time, there is strong reason to believe
that finance ministers may (only) have incentives to artificially lower reported surpluses
since it is expressly recommended by the accounting guideline (HAM1) and most of the
26Somehow, we may assert there is a principal agent relationship between the finance ministers and the deputies
as well as the citizens (Brouard 2010). That way, if there is a serious agency conflict (i.e. stakeholders’ interests
are drastically opposed), we may reasonably assume that finance ministers will resort even more actively to creative
accounting operations (Jiraporn et al. 2008).
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cantonal financial laws. Moreover, it appears realistic to assume that a finance minister will
make every effort to avoid any tax decrease or public spending increase because of the so-
called irreversible ratchet effect. That way, in line with the discussion mentioned above, we
formulate the second testing hypothesis (H2) as follows: This is the probability to report
a positive balance of the statement of financial performance that will ascertain
the necessity to resort to creative accounting. Moreover, the greater the surplus
before reporting, the larger the resort to creative accounting will be.
The use of accounting gimmicks by finance ministers is thus expected to mainly depend
on the government’s financial performance, i.e. the probability to report a surplus and also
the size of this surplus. Moreover as also already mentioned, finance ministers, independently
to their characteristic traits, have the common objective to ensure fiscal soundness if they
want to increase their reelection chances. It may hence reasonably be expected that finance
ministers, as well as their respective personal characteristics have no incidence on the way to
manage public finance. In other words, it would be the position and the tasks to be fulfilled
that would lead the finance ministers’ behavior. As a consequence, all of them should embrace
the same strategy as for their use of creative accounting.
Nonetheless, this approach may also be contested since there is a growing evidence that
particular public policies are deeply spread through the decision-makers’ influence (president,
prime minister, finance minister, central bankers, etc.). We may thus first wonder whether
finance minister’s political ideology matters. We may indeed expect that the political ide-
ology is seen by citizens as a proxy for the politicians’ competence. This is particularly
true in coalition governments where left-wing ministers are generally in charge of social af-
fairs, environment and culture whereas right-wing ministers are mainly responsible for the
ministries of economy or finance. Consequently, we may reasonably assume that left-wing
finance ministers could be seen as less competent (i.e. less able to avoid public deficits)
than right-wing ones since they have to take charge of a ministry which is not in their usual
bosom. It therefore appears all the more essential for left-wing finance ministers to reach
fiscal soundness since they presumably suffer a lack of confidence from citizens. That way,
probably conscious of this lack of confidence, left-wing finance ministers could have stronger
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incentives to resort to creative accounting in order to report a better financial performance.
This would constitute a reassuring signal sent to electors in order to ensure their reelections.
In accordance with the recent findings of Chatagny (2013) who pays attention to the tax
revenue budgeting errors, the hypothesis regarding the impact of the finance minister’s po-
litical ideology on the use of creative accounting (H3) is as follows: In order to make sure
they will achieve fiscal soundness, left-wing finance ministers would resort more
actively to creative accounting (i.e. would accumulate more money through the
use of additional depreciation charges and special funds) than right-wing ones.27
The political experience may also be, without any doubt, a key determinant of the finance
minister’s behavior and of his way of managing public finance. The literature has besides
demonstrated that policians’ experience may influence fiscal outcomes (e.g. Feld and Schal-
tegger 2010). Regarding our field of interest, more experienced finance ministers are expected
to be more comfortable with accounting practices and more aware about all the gimmicks at
their disposal to manipulate public figures. Moreover, a more experienced finance minister
should be more aware of political snares and therefore should have higher capacities to cope
with them. Such a political experience should therefore allows finance ministers to increase
the information asymmetry existing between themselves on the one side and the spending
ministers (as well as other stakeholders) on the other side. The hypothesis impact of political
experience on the use of creative accounting (H4) may be formulated as follows: Finance
ministers with a greater tenure are expected to possess deeper knowledge than
inexperienced ones, what should provide them greater capacities to resort to cre-
ative accounting. More experienced finance ministers are therefore expected to
be associated with higher amounts of creative accounting.
Finally, attention is paid to finance ministers’ educational background. According to our
point of view, it is reasonably arguable to consider that education may affect the people’s
identity. Consequently, the finance minister’s behavior would be, at least partially, led by his
27This hypothesis is also in line with the results of Hendrick (2006) who demonstrates that more left-wing gov-
ernments are in general more risk averse and therefore accumulate more reserves in order to be able to cope with
unexpected events.
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own beliefs and convictions accumulated through his training.28 In this study, although we
control for several sort of training, we expect that trained economists are more reluctant to
report public deficits than other finance ministers. That way, they would be more willing to
make everything possible to avoid such situations. Furthermore, trained economists are sup-
posed to have a stronger expertise in accounting what should provide them greater abilities
to manipulate reported figures. Better knowledge in accounting also supposed a greater infor-
mation asymmetry between the finance minister and the spending ministers. The hypothesis
surrounding the expected effect of the finance minister’s educational background (H5) may
thus be formulated in this manner: An education in economics should strengthen the
finance ministers’s aversion for public deficits and improve his knowledge in ac-
counting. Finance ministers having a university degree in economics are thus
expected to be associated with higher amounts of creative accounting.
28For instance, Chwieroth (2007), Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014) and also Moessinger (2012) provide evidence
as to the influence of policians’ education background on diverse fiscal outcomes.
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5 Main Accounting Elements
In the current section, we offer a discussion about the Harmonized Accounting Model for
Swiss cantons and municipalities. Mainly, we present the cantonal chart of accounts, as
well as the similarities and differences with IPSAS since both are accrual-based accounting
models. Finally, after having provided a new definition of creative accounting, we present
both accruals we consider as being the two main accounting tricks used by Swiss cantons in
detail.
5.1 Introduction
For a long time, several public accounting systems coexisted in Switzerland at the cantonal
level. Thus, it is, among other things, the need of harmonization at the end of the 1970’s that
pushed the Conference of Cantonal Finance Ministers (CDF) to express a recommendation
for the Swiss cantons and municipalities.29 This recommendation is expressed through a
public accounting handbook (CDF 1981) and is now known by the abbreviation HAM1 for
Harmonized Accounting Model of the first generation. This appellation reflects reality as
the financial statements of Swiss cantons and municipalities went through a movement of
harmonization for the first time. Nevertheless, the HAM1 is only a recommendation. The
Conference of Cantonal Finance Ministers does not have the power to impose its decisions
on Swiss cantons. The implementation of the HAM1 is consequently very laborious. Every
canton has to introduce the recommendations of the CDF into its own financial laws in
order for those recommendations to have legal force. On the one hand, the introduction is
not always faithful to the recommendations. Thus, some disparities may exist between Swiss
cantons relative to certain norms. And on the other hand, the HAM1 implementation largely
depends on the political agenda of each canton and municipality. For these reasons, one must
wait until the end of the 1990s for every canton to apply the HAM1 in one form or another.
The HAM1 provides a presentation of the public accounting handbook that contains a long
list of norms, principles and objectives. Then, the HAM1 also presents a chart of accounts
29Each Swiss canton has, among the members of the cabinet, a “minister”, a “state councilor” or an “executive
councilor” in charge of finance. That way, the 26 members of cabinets in charge of finance gather at this conference
in order to coordinate cantonal requests and defend their interests towards the Federal State.
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and a model-law for cantonal finance. Among the principles discussed in the accounting
handbook, the following may be considered fundamental. As we previously mentioned, one
of the main objectives of the HAM1 for Swiss cantons was to harmonize the framework of
cantonal and municipal finance. This willingness to harmonize should allow observers to
perform precise comparisons across cantons. At the same time, the HAM1 should allow for
better control, management and decision support for financial analysts, and it could be used
as a tool for forecasting (CDF 1981: 6).
5.2 HAM1, the Swiss accrual-based accounting model
One of the most fundamental changes supplied by the New Accounting Model was the im-
plementation of accrual accounting instead of cash-basis accounting. Accrual accounting has
been preferred because it is supposed to increase transparency inside the administration.
Transparency is a fundamental issue since it should increase the managers’ accountability
and improve the decision-making process, which in turn should help a better organizational
performance and resource allocation. Furthermore, accrual accounting allows to identify the
full costs of public activities more accurately. This should allow Swiss cantons to pave the
way for the user pays principle inside as well as outside the public administration (CDF
1981: 79). Thus the HAM1 should develop a cost-based way of thinking in the administra-
tion, notably through the use of internal service charges.30 Hence, one must keep in mind
that the HAM1 is strongly inspired by an economic approach of public finance. Besides, it
is a key element of accrual accounting. To some extents, this economic approach of public
finance surrounding the HAM1 tightly converges the true and fair view of the financial status
currently recommended by the IPSAS norms.
Simultaneously, the HAM1 and IPSAS mostly share a similar presentation of financial
statements. Indeed, it is mostly the name of the different statements used within the HAM1
rather than the content of these that is unusual. The main particularity of the HAM1 relies
30The internal service charges allow recording of the exchange of goods and services within an administration. The
equivalent of the service is credited as revenue in the department providing the service; it is credited as an expense
in the department receiving the service. Such internal service charges entries are purely and only book entries. The
internal service provision neither generates nor drains cash.
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on the crucial distinction between the statement of financial performance and the statement
of investments.31 This distinction comes from the fact that some public spending are only
used for one year; they are operating expenses. Conversely, some other public spending are
used over several years to purchase the infrastructures providing public services; they are
investment (or capital) expenditure. Thence arises the question of how to finance these two
types of public spending. Should they be financed in the same way or not? To respect the user
pays principle, both types of public spending must have two distinct funding sources. Indeed,
future generations will also enjoy the usefulness of the investment expenditure. This means
they will also have to bear the cost of these investment expenditure, by taking on depreciation
charges and the costs of debt. One might therefore consider the statement of investments
as a sort of balance sheet account since the investment expenditure are registered as assets.
On the other hand, the statement of investments registers subsidies that principally refer to
revenues coming from the Federal government. Moreover, we have to underline that assets
are split into two categories: the administrative assets and the non-administrative assets. In
short, administrative assets are those used and indispensable to accomplish public policies.
Conversely, non-administrative assets are not used to accomplish public policies. Indeed,
governments use them in order to produce additional revenues. The HAM1 recommends
using the criteria of alienability to distinguish both categories of assets. Consequently, if a
canton can sell one of its assets without altering the implementation of its public policies, the
asset must be considered as a non-administrative asset. Finally, the statement of financial
performance refers to all operating expenses (wages, supplies and consumables used, interest
costs, etc.) and operating revenues (tax revenues, royalties and concessions, financial income,
etc.) of Swiss cantons.
Figure 6 shows how Swiss cantons have to close annual accounts according to the HAM1.
31Both notions are translated from French by the Federal Finance Administration (FFA) and presented in the
New Accounting Model (NAM) for the Swiss Confederation (FFA 2008). In the rest of the section, we mainly use
the IPSAS terminologies. However, for the Swiss particularities, we sometimes resort to the definitions provided by
Bergmann (2009) when they are not available in the NAM.
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Figure 6: Graphical presentation of the Harmonized Accounting Model
Source: CDF (1981), FFA (2008), Bergmann (2009) and own adjustments.
First of all, governments have to close the statement of investments. The balance, called
the net investment, corresponds to the difference between the investment expenditure and the
subsidies coming from the Federal government. It indicates the part of the investments that
Swiss cantons have to bear with their own financial means. The closing of the statement of
financial performance highlights the cash-flow from operating activities. The cash-flow from
operating activities is defined as the sum of the balance of financial performance (surplus or
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deficit) and the depreciation charges of the administrative assets.32 This amount refers to
the financial means at the cantons’ disposal to finance the net investment. If the cash-flow
from operating activities is smaller than the net investment, the canton has to borrow on
the capital markets in order to finance the difference. This step corresponds to the closing
of the statement of financing. Finally, we can gather previous operations into the statement
of financial position (i.e. commonly known as the balance sheet). As we can see, investment
expenditure increase public assets, whereas the subsidies and the depreciation charges (of
the administrative assets) are recorded as a reduction of the investment expenditure. Then,
borrowing increases the liabilities while the balance of the statement of financial performance
(in a case of a surplus) increases the net equity.
Here, Figure 6 schematizes the case of a canton achieving a surplus of the statement
of financial performance and a deficit in the statement of investments (i.e. a positive net
investment). In that case, the canton only finances a part of the net investment through debt.
Finally, the positive balance reported in the statement of financial performance increases the
net equity and borrowing increases liabilities.
5.3 Towards a new definition of creative accounting
Unlike IPSAS norms, the HAM1 does not only settle for an accounting model but also
provides rules for policy guidance. The simultaneous inclusion of the accounting model and
of these rules for policy guidance is hardly compatible in the Swiss context. Indeed, two
mutually exclusive visions of public finance fight each other in the HAM1. On the one
hand, the economic vision focuses on the true and fair view of financial figures and therefore
embraces the IPSAS philosophy and, on the other hand, a more political vision focuses on
fiscal policy tends to violate the IPSAS philosophy. The political vision mostly lies in the
valuation of public assets. Regarding this issue, the HAM1 does not reflect a true and fair
view. Instead of considering the lifespan of public assets in order to fix depreciation rates,
the HAM1 recommends Swiss cantons resort to a relatively short depreciation duration.
According to Bergmann (2009), two thirds of the value of a building are depreciated within
32The way Swiss cantons measure the cash-flow from operating activities is tightly similar to the indirect method
proposed by the IPSAS norms (i.e. IPSAS recommendation 2 - cash-flow statements.)
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the first ten years or about 90% within twenty years, which is certainly more than the
recommendations formulated by the IPSAS board (IFAC 2002).33
As already mentionned above, the balance of the statement of financial performance
(SPER-balance) is a crucial element for Swiss public accounting. Indeed, it determines the
change in cantonal net equity. While a surplus increases the net equity or decreases the
indebtedness, a deficit decreases the net equity or increases the indebtedness. As the SPER-
balance determines the change in debt, the political debate (from the budget preparation
to the reporting process) is principally focused on this balance. At the same time, politi-
cians are all the more focused on the SPER-balance since the media also concentrates on it.
Consequently, finance ministers may have strong incentives to put the statement of financial
performance under pressure in order to restrain operating expenses and therefore the indebt-
edness. This is obviously the objective behind the high depreciation rates recommended by
the HAM1 and by most of the cantonal financial laws. Indeed, while depreciation charges are
not available for discretionary political decisions, surpluses are in the hands of politicians.
That way, while reporting relatively high amounts of ordinary depreciation charges does not
alter both the cash-flow from operating activities and the investment capacity, it prevents tax
cuts and/or operating expenses increases. Conversely, lower ordinary depreciation charges
could possibly reduce available cash-flow for future investments. In other words, resorting to
relatively high amounts of ordinary depreciation charges ensures both investment capacity,
as well as a structural surplus over time.
Nevertheless, if high ordinary depreciation rates are not sufficient to avoid political debates
about the reported balance of the statement of financial performance, finance ministers still
have opportunities to discretionarily play with more or less unorthodox accounting operations
in order to manipulate reported public figures. Among these operations, some of them may
be assimilated to creative accounting. In this research, without leaving behind the legal
perspective of the accounting behind, we embrace the economic vision of public finance
supported by the IPSAS norms and tackle the economic reality of accounting operations
33Then, in addition to violating the true and fair view of governments’ financial position, such high depreciation
rates also cause intergenerational problems regarding the financing of public infrastructures. Indeed, instead of
spreading the costs of public assets over time in order to respect the “user pays” principle, it is the generation who
decides to invest that finances the largest part of the asset.
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performed by finance ministers. That way, in order to justify and defend our choice as to
the operations we consider as accounting gimmicks, we propose a new definition of creative
accounting, which is expressed as follows:
In jurisdictions having implemented accrual accounting standards, creative accounting
notably refers to discretionarily used accruals, that have no economic reality and therefore
that violate the true and fair view of public figures with the sole purpose of misleading
stakeholders of the public policy-making process.
When looking at the HAM1, it emerges that at least two main accounting operations suit
the above mentioned definition and therefore can be suspected to be used by finance ministers
in order to manipulate the reported balance of the statement of financial performance. These
operations, that are both accruals, are the additional depreciation charges and the operations
on special funds. As already mentioned, accruals do not generate cash-flow nor cash-drains
and are thus more easily manipulable. For that reason, since accruals offer more flexibility
than other book entries, it is not surprising that finance ministers mainly play with them in
order to disguise public figures. Moreover, the existence of creative accounting (or at least
the fact that some accounting practices are in opposition to IPSAS norms) is mainly due to
the fact that people who produce the accounting information in Swiss cantons are mostly
the same that prepare accounting standards (i.e. the HAM1); they are the finance ministers.
Furthermore, since there is almost no counter-power, finance ministers have all the leeway
they need to shape accounting standards according to their own interests. Therefore, there
is probably a legitimacy problem (or at least a governance problem) regarding the authority
developing accounting standards in Swiss cantons.
In addition to be commonly known as famous accounting tricks used in Swiss cantons, we
focus on additional depreciation charges and operations on special funds since information
is easily available. Indeed, a particular accounting entry is devoted to both accruals in
the statement of financial performance. That way, it could not be easier to find additional
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depreciation charges and special funds amounts.34 In other words, while theoretical reasons
persuaded us to pay particular attention to both accruals, the availability of the data also
reinforces our opinion. Moreover, as additional depreciation charges and operations on special
funds are fully discretionary, amounts reported in the statement of financial performance
may directly be considered as creative accounting. It therefore avoids us using more or less
sophisticated econometric methodologies to disentangle the discretionary part of accounting
operations.35 Finally, more detailed information regarding both accounting tricks is given in
the next two subsections.
5.4 Additional depreciation charges
Additional depreciation charges in light of the HAM1
Comparatively to ordinary depreciation charges, additional depreciation charges are also de-
preciation charges of administrative assets.36 This proves that the political and fiscal vision
promoted by the HAM1 strongly relies on and is achieved through the valuation of public
assets. Nevertheless, unlike the ordinary depreciation charges that have to be reported each
year because of the wear and obsolescence of public infrastructures, the accounting handbook
for Swiss cantons reads that additional depreciation can be budgeted during economic expan-
sions in order to pay off debt (CDF 1981: 13). However, there is no economic justification for
reporting depreciation charges according to the business cycle, i.e. the obsolescence of public
assets does not increase during economic expansion.37 It is also stipulated that additional
depreciation charges do not have to be used to finance new investments. This means that
even though additional depreciation charges allow for increased cash-flow from operating ac-
34For instance, as debated in the last subsection below, provisions are also known as being largely used by finance
ministers in order to manipulate reported public figures. However, conversely to additional depreciation charges
and operations on special funds, information regarding those provisions is not easily available since no particular
accounting entry is devoted to this accrual in the statement of financial performance.
35For detailed explanations regarding sophisticated econometric methodologies, we recommend paying attention
to Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) and Jones (1991).
36The additional depreciation charges represent a different accounting entry to the ordinary depreciation charges,
although they are both depreciation charges of administrative assets. According to the chart of accounts included in
the HAM1, the ordinary depreciation charges of administrative assets’ accounting number is 331. Then, the accounting
number for the additional ones is 332. For more details, Appendix A presents the chart of Swiss cantons’ accounts.
37In other words, even though ordinary depreciation charges do not fully follow the true and fair lifespan of
public assets, their use is constant over time. Consequently, this is the discretionary characteristics of the additional
depreciation charges that persuade us to consider these latter as a pure and simple creative accounting operation.
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tivities, this cash-flow cannot be used to acquire new assets. In fact, the HAM1 emphasizes
the importance of not accumulating new assets in a period of favorable conjuncture in order
to maintain greater cash-flow from operating activities than the net investment. Indeed, it
is by generating a surplus in the statement of financing, that a canton provides itself with
the financial means to repay debt.
Additional depreciation charges in light of cantonal financial legislation
However, as previously mentioned, the HAM1 is simply a proposal and it has to be transposed
into cantonal financial laws in order to have legal force. Noticeable gaps may thus appear
between the recommendations formulated in the HAM1 and their transcriptions in cantonal
financial laws. This is the case for additional depreciation charges, as reported in Table 1
below. This table reports the type of legal rule surrounding the use of additional depreciation
charges in each canton. In the light of the 26 cantonal financial laws, rules dealing with
additional depreciation charges may be classified in three distinct categories. Whereas the
first and the second category of laws indicate that the resort to additional depreciation
is “possible” or “mandatory” respectively, the third category refers to cantonal legislation
including “no indication” regarding the use of additional depreciation charges.
Table 1: Regulation of additional depreciation charges in cantonal legislation
Possible Mandatory No indication
BL; FR; GL; NW; OW; SH; SZ;
TI; UR; ZG BE; SO; VS
AG; AI; AR; BS; GE; GR; JU;
LU; NE; SG; TG; VD; ZH
Source: Cantonal financial laws and own investigations
According to information reported in Table 1 above, the way in which additional depre-
ciation charges are ruled by cantonal financial laws seems to be relatively heterogeneous.
Out of the 26 Swiss cantons, the legislation in 13 of them has no indication as to the use of
additional depreciation charges. 10 other cantons offer the possibility to report additional
depreciation but only under particular circumstances. Indeed, as stipulated in the financial
law of the canton of Obwald (OW), “additional depreciation charges are authorized as far as
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the financial and economic situations allow it”.38 Finally, it is explicitly stipulated that the
resort to additional depreciation charges is mandatory during times of economic expansions
in only 3 cantonal financial laws. For instance, the financial law of the canton of Valais (VS)
stipulates that “additional depreciation charges on administrative assets have to be reported
as far as the financial and economic situation allows it”.39
The use of additional depreciation charges therefore appears to be relatively flexible in
Swiss cantons. Cantonal financial laws are sometimes so imprecise that enough leeway is of-
fered to interpret them according to ones own interest. Lot’s of room is given to the threshold
to which additional depreciation charges can or have to be used in Swiss cantons. There is
no accurate indication as to how to interpret “as far as the financial and economic situa-
tionallows it”. That way, in addition to not always being in line with the recommendations
formulated in the HAM1, there is every reason to believe that the use of additional depreci-
ation charges may differ among cantons with regards to the strong heterogeneity of cantonal
financial laws.
Additional depreciation charges as accounting gimmicks
Evidence is therefore provided that additional depreciation charges must be seen as a policy
tool controlled by finance ministers aiming to artificially increase operating expenses and
deteriorate the reported balance of the statement of financial performance. This is exactly
how they are described in the new Harmonized Accounting Model for cantons and munici-
palities (CDF 2008: 148).40 The additional depreciation charges would then be used in the
38Source: Finanzhaushaltsgesetz vom 11 März 2010, Art. 24; al. 2.
39Source: Loi sur la gestion et le contrôle administratifs et financiers du canton du 24 juin 1980, Art. 14, al. 4.
40The new Harmonized Accounting Model (HAM2), developed in 2008 by the Conference of the Cantonal Finance
Ministers (CDF), is the revised version of the HAM1. This new accounting handbook for Swiss cantons and munici-
palities is widely based on the IPSAS norms. In spite of everything, the tradeoff between the economic and political
visions of accounting still persisted during the making of HAM2. Just to show, some finance ministers were even
completely opposed to the inclusion of additional depreciation charges in the HAM (NLZ 2014). Finally, an alter-
native solution has been reached. In the end, the HAM2 reads that “As a compromise between the solution required
by IPSAS norms and the traditional depreciation embracing the principle of prudence, both categories of depreciation
charges are acceptable for administrative assets. Nonetheless, both categories have to be distinctively separated into
ordinary and additional depreciation charges. [...]. Additional depreciation charges as instruments of the budgetary
policy are admissible. They have to be reported as exceptional expenses in order for them not to apply any influence
on the reported balance of the statement of financial performance” (CDF 2008: 66). The latest argument therefore
clearly demonstrates that additional depreciation charges have been used as an accounting gimmick in Swiss cantons
in the scope of the recommendations formulated in the HAM1.
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sole purpose of maintaining fiscal pressure on citizens and to avoid political pressures aiming
at increasing public spending. At the same time, additional depreciation charges increase
the cash-flow from operating activities, which decreases the canton’s need to borrow and so
contains the debt increase.
It is therefore obvious that additional depreciation charges have no economic reality since
they go beyond the actual wear and tear and obsolescence of assets. Such evidence is even
reported in newspapers. Le Nouvelliste notably, when citing the finance ministers of Valais,
reads that “2011 accounts include additional depreciation charges for 118.1 millions CHF.
This refers to depreciation charges having been recorded beyond the strict necessary”.41 That
way, additional depreciation charges constitute a hidden reserve because they artificially lower
the book value of administrative assets. Moreover, they are discretionarily manipulated with-
out any regard to the lifespan of public assets. For that reasons, such additional depreciation
charges have to be considered as creative accounting since they violate the true and fair view
of public figures (i.e. they simultaneously artificially decrease the surplus reported in the
statement of financial performance, as well as the value of public assets).
Furthermore, additional depreciation charges are an asymmetric tool since they may only
be used to hide a surplus of the statement of financial performance. Indeed, hidden reserves
created through the use of additional depreciation charges cannot be dissolved in order to
offset a deficit (or the improve a surplus). As administrative assets cannot be sold because
of the principle of alienability , such hidden reserves can only increase over time (SRS 2011:
1).
The disclosure of additional depreciation charges in public accounts
Figure 7 on the following page schematizes a case where a surplus of the statement of financial
performance is hidden by increasing the amount of additional depreciation charges. At the
same time, we consider the same case as presented earlier, i.e. a case where a canton has to
borrow money in order to finance a part of the net investment. As observed in the basic case
previously presented, investment expenditure increase the amount of assets, whereas ordinary
41Source: Le Nouvelliste (03.04.2012) Des poires pour la soif ont été prévues
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depreciation charges and the subsidies come in deduction of the assets. Then, the additional
depreciation charges are also accounted negatively on the assets’ side of the statement of
financial position. Finally, the borrowing increases liabilities.
Figure 7: Graphical presentation of the HAM1 in the presence of additional depreciation charges
Source: CDF (1981), FFA (2008), Bergmann (2009) and own adjustments.
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5.5 Special funds
Special funds in the light of the HAM1
The resort to additional depreciation charges, however, is not the only tool that Swiss cantons
have at their disposal to manage the picture of the governments’ financial situation. Although
they are strictly forbidden by the HAM1 (CDF 1981: 37), cookie-jar reserves can be created,
particularly through the use of special funds. The HAM1 reads that “special funds correspond
to the total or partial allocation of specific revenues to particular tasks. Special funds are
normally only created in sectors where a causal relationship can be established between the
task to be fulfilled and the direct payments obtained by the beneficiaries (e.g. a parking fee
or tax)” (CDF 1981: 13). In addition, it would be best to “keep reserves or special funds to
a minimum, in order to preserve surpluses facing overall excess of expenses. Indeed, deficits
and debt should be covered by net equity or additional depreciation charges”. Furthermore,
“special funds may, however, be used to provide funds for future tasks so that ulterior political
decisions can be rapidly implemented” (CDF 1981: 70). Nonetheless, “when the special fund
goals no longer exist or cannot be reached, governments will then have the responsibility to
cancel them” (CDF 1981: 69).
Special funds in light of cantonal financial legislation
Noticeable gaps may also be seen between recommendations formulated in the HAM1 and
their transposition in cantonal financial laws. Moreover, as reported in Table 2 below, the
extent to which the use of special funds and funds for future tasks, as well as their financing
mode are regulated strongly differ between Swiss cantons.
Table 2: Regulation of special funds in cantonal legislation
Special funds Funds for future tasks Mode of financing
AG; AR; BE; BL; FR; GE; GL;
GR; JU; NE; NW; OW; SG; SH;
SZ; TG; TI; UR; VS; ZG
FR; NW; OW; UR; VS; ZH GE; GL; JU; NW; OW; SH; TG;UR
Source: Cantonal financial laws and own investigations
In a general manner, the question of special funds is vaguely treated by financial laws in
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Swiss cantons. Notably, in 20 Swiss cantons, without explicitly indicating whether the use of
special funds is authorized, cantonal legislation mostly settles for providing a definition. For
instance, the financial law of Fribourg (FR) states that “special funds are financial means
attributed by the law or a decree to the accomplishment of a determined public task”42 Fur-
thermore, the use of funds for future tasks is hardly ever regulated in Swiss cantons. Indeed,
only 6 financial laws deal with this issue. Finally, only 8 out of the 26 Swiss cantons have
legislated as to the mode of financing of special funds, indicating that tax revenues should
not be used to bail out special funds. For instance, the cantonal financial law of Jura (JU)
stipulates that “general tax revenues cannot be reserved for particular tasks, except for specific
parts”.43
Special funds as accounting gimmicks
It appears that special funds may be discretionarily used in order to manipulate the balance
reported in the statement of financial performance.44 Both HAM1 and cantonal legislation
seem to offer a relatively high flexibility as to the use of these funds. For instance, how
could we not question amounts allocated to special funds devoted to future tasks when
no clear criteria is defined regarding the object to be financed? What justifies a certain
amount of public money being allocated to one of those funds when the prospective future
projects that will be implemented thanks to those funds are not defined? This basic reflection
makes us doubt the fairness of special funds and therefore their economic reality. There
is strong evidence suggesting that special funds are discretionarily bailed out in the sole
purpose of hiding reported excess revenues; future projects being only a pretext to do so.
In the same way, special funds may be discretionarily bailed out according to the reported
balance of the statement of financial performance since their mode of financing is almost
unregulated in Swiss cantons. For instance, Le Nouvelliste revealed that the surplus of
2011 in the canton of Valais was partially allocated to special funds for future (unknown)
42Source: Loi du 25 novembre 1994 sur les finances de l’Etat, Art 16, al.1.
43Source: Loi sur les finances cantonales du 18 octobre 2000, Art.4, al.1.
44Nevertheless, contrary to additional depreciation charges, the use of special funds is symmetric. Indeed, while
special funds may be bailed out in order to report downward SPER-balance, special funds may also be debited in
order to provide a better picture of the financial situation.
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tasks. According to the finance ministers of the Valais, “it is money that could be used in
the coming years”.45 Moreover, at the cantonal level, no public service relies on the user
pays principle. In other words, to the best of our knowledge, there is no causal relationship
between particular tasks to be fulfilled and a direct payment obtained by the beneficiaries.
Thus, we may reasonably suspect that special funds have no economic consistency, they may
be discretionarily manipulated and that seems to not be in line with the recommendations of
the HAM1, at least partially. Therefore,we consider these accounting operations as creative
accounting.46
The disclosure of special funds in public accounts
Table 8 below presents a case of Swiss cantons deciding to allocate money to special funds.
In the case of a surplus, the amount allocated to special funds can be increased in order
to hide excess operating revenues. This operation will simultaneously increase operating
expenses, reduce the reported balance of the statement of financial performance and increase
the canton’s net equity. In that case, on the contrary to additional depreciation charges, the
amounts allocated to special funds are reported on the liabilities side of the statement of
financial position, in the equity.
5.6 Other manipulations
Although this research only focuses on additional depreciation charges and special funds, some
other accounting gimmicks could eventually be used in Swiss cantons in order to manipulate
the balance reported in the statement of financial performance. To the best of our knowledge,
even if we do not consider providing an exhaustive list, it is strongly conceivable that the
following tricks could be frequently used in Swiss cantons.
45Source: Le Nouvelliste (03.04.2012) Des poires pour la soif ont été prévues
46Our point of view is besides widely supported by most of the experts we interviewed, as exposed in section 6.
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Figure 8: Graphical presentation of the HAM1 in the presence of special funds
Source: CDF (1981), FFA (2008), Bergmann (2009) and own adjustments.
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First of all, on a comparable basis to special funds, provisions could be used to create
cookie-jar reserves. In the HAM1, it is actually sayd that “provisions are used at the end of
the year to determine the unknown amount of expenses and expenditure caused by deliveries
or services that have already been fulfilled”. Then, the accounting handbook adds that “pro-
visions related to future deliveries or services that have not already been fulfilled are described
as fictive and considered as reserves. So that comparisons between cantons are possible and
because surpluses have to be affected to the net equity, such reserves are prohibited” (CDF
1981 : 37). Moreover, the assessment of these accruals is very much open to interpretation
and leaves room for the authorities to manipulate them at their discretion. Finance ministers
are then capable of recording an artificially high amount of provisions to hide surpluses.47
That way, provisions may have no economic reality and be used in the opposite way to rules
prescribed in the accounting handbook. Consequently, in some particular cases, they may be
considered as creative accounting.
Then, as previously indicated, Barnea et al. (1976) and Beattie et al. (1994) acknowledge
that private sector organizations can play around with the classification of some account-
ing elements to apply income smoothing. In fact, when balances appear to be better than
forecasted, firms can choose to write down exceptional expenses as ordinary expenses in
their accounts. On the other hand, some ordinary accruals may be written down as ex-
traordinary ones in order to artificially enhance balances. Furthermore, Hepworth (1953)
mentions that firms can also toy with the distinction between operating expenses and in-
vestment expenditure. Even if the difference between ordinary and extraordinary items does
not exist in the HAM1, the possibility of playing with the nature of public spending is also
provided. Indeed, the harmonized accounting guidelines distinguish operating expenses from
investment expenditure. Investment expenditure is defined as “spending which must belong to
administrative assets, must induce new or enhanced value to the community and its members,
whether it be qualitative or quantitative, and must be useful over many years” (CDF 1981
: 33). On the other hand, operating expenses are only consumption spending. Neverthe-
less, in reality, cantons use monetary criteria to determine whether or not public spending
47As revealed by McNichols and Wilson (1988), the same operations are practiced in the private sector as some
firms record large amounts as provisions for credit losses in order to decrease unusually high profits.
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should be activated. Spending will therefore be recorded as investment expenditure only if
its amount is above an activation threshold previously determined by the canton. Moreover,
these activation thresholds vary widely across cantons. That way, since the monetary crite-
rion prevails, finance ministers can use their own discretion to decide to activate a particular
spending, mainly according to the economic situation. When surpluses are expected to be
high, investment expenditure could be recorded as operating expenses in order to disguise the
surplus of the statement of financial performance. Again, by hiding surpluses, a strong fiscal
burden is maintained and operating expenses are put under pressure. Moreover, recording
investment expenditure as operating expenses allows Swiss cantons to reduce their future
operating expenses. Since the investment expenditure has been recorded as an operating
expense, the canton will not bear the weight of depreciating this investment. Simultaneously,
such operations raise the total amount of hidden reserves as the administrative assets are un-
derestimated. Then, when surpluses of the statement of financial performance are expected
to be lower than forecasted, the opposite phenomenon could occur.
We can also briefly mention that Swiss cantons may play around with the recognition of
operating revenues and operating expenses in order to smooth the reported balance of the
statement of financial performance.
In conclusion, even if the recommendations formulated in the HAM1 forbid the creation of
cookie-jar reserves, many tools are available in order to achieve this particular goal. According
to various authors, creative accounting is most often used within GAAP. As mentioned by
Healy and Wahlen (1999), the accounting standards leave a lot of flexibility for the manager’s
interpretation. These managers therefore have the possibility to display results, that may
not be a perfect image of the firm, without resorting to fraudulent manipulations. It is thus
at the finance ministers’ discretion to create cookie-jar reserves using various tools, without
ever disobeying the HAM1 or the cantonal financial laws. Nevertheless, although finance
ministers do not perform illegal accounting operations, these operations have no economic
reality and violate the true and fair view of public figures. Therefore, these kind of accounting
gimmicks have to be considered as creative accounting.
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6 Quantitative importance of creative accounting in Swiss cantons
In order to measure the importance of creative accounting in Swiss cantons and to test our
two main hypothesis, we had to collect accounting information and data concerning the 26
Swiss cantons over the period 1980 - 2012. First of all, data concerning operating revenues
and operating expenses was compiled in order to calculate the balances of the statement of
financial performance (SPER-balance) for the considered period. For the same period, we
gathered the reported data concerning the additional depreciation charges, as well as the
special funds. Moreover, since we are also interested in tackling the role played by finance
ministers in the use of creative accounting operations, we also collected information relative
to the 116 finance ministers having been in position between 1980 and 2012. Specifically,
we paid particular attention to some of their personal characteristics, such as their political
ideology, their experience as finance minister and their educational background.
In this section, we first present descriptive statistics relative to creative accounting op-
erations performed in Swiss cantons. Then, we provide statistics regarding reported and
corrected SPER-balances. Since we have reported public figures and data relative to creative
accounting operations at our disposal, we can display the corrected SPER-balances, i.e. the
balance of the statement of financial performance cleaned of additional depreciation charges
and operations on special funds. Finally, we end the statistical analysis by reporting the
creative accounting operations in the light of the finance ministers’ personal characteristics.
One must first bear in mind that figures presented below are expressed in real terms per
capita. Working with real values allows us to control for inflation. As an individual deflator
for each canton does not exist, we work with the implicit Swiss GDP deflator to obtain real
values.48 Finally, since Swiss cantons are relatively heterogeneous and in order to make clear
comparisons, financial data is expressed per capita.
48Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO). Deflator 2012 = 100%.
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6.1 Quantitative importance of additional depreciation charges
In order to empirically test our hypothesis, it is needed to chose an appropriate measure
for the additional depreciation charges. In this research, our main variable of interest is
expressed as follows:
ADCR =
DepreciationR
P
where Depreciation refers to the total amount of additional depreciation charges reported
in the statement of financial performance and R notifies reported figures. Finally, P is the
canton’s population.
Table 3 reports the usual summary statistics concerning the additional depreciation
charges per capita (ADC) for each Swiss canton over the considered period. Additionally,
the column “N” indicates the number of years during which each canton applied the recom-
mended accrual-based accounting model and the column “Occurrence” reports the occurrence
of additional depreciation charges (N ≥ Occurrence). The cantons are ranked in descending
order based on the average additional depreciation charges.
23 Swiss cantons record additional depreciation charges at some point over the period.
However, the Table exhibits strong heterogeneity among these cantons. The canton of Uri
(UR) charged 572.09 CHF per capita on average compared to the canton of Zürich (ZH)
which charged an average 2.40 CHF per capita. The canton of Uri (UR) seems to be quite
an extreme case since the second canton - the canton of Zug (ZG) - only charges 292.71
CHF per capita on average. Standard deviations together with minima and maxima and the
occurrence also indicate a strong intertemporal variability. Furthermore, in order to point out
this variability over time, we present the average annual amount of additional depreciation
charges for the considered period in Table 22 of Appendix B.
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Table 3: Additional depreciation in real terms per capita (1980 - 2012)
Canton N Mean Std. dev. Min Max Occurrence
UR 29 572.09 638.74 0.00 2’827.58 18
ZG 33 292.71 192.55 0.00 767.64 30
NW 33 266.64 376.11 0.00 1’563.19 22
GR 25 185.90 480.96 0.00 2’444.80 14
AI 33 167.05 161.67 0.00 782.28 27
OW 27 160.22 198.95 0.00 718.41 17
SZ 26 138.04 100.12 17.04 374.05 26
BE 26 129.60 190.82 0.00 551.09 21
BL 32 97.95 200.98 0.00 944.16 27
VS 30 88.78 146.67 0.00 408.48 9
SH 23 74.97 139.16 0.00 574.86 11
SO 31 74.41 165.13 0.00 821.57 15
GL 33 73.20 153.19 0.00 649.92 11
TI 33 66.32 210.65 0.00 903.87 5
GE 27 65.51 340.39 0.00 1’768.71 1
LU 25 48.03 61.63 0.00 210.28 17
AR 33 44.52 204.04 0.00 1’175.75 11
VD 33 43.67 98.69 0.00 473.39 11
TG 31 28.97 104.63 0.00 564.69 12
JU 33 21.32 57.61 0.00 263.76 6
FR 17 14.72 60.71 0.00 250.30 1
AG 18 4.03 9.02 0.00 27.23 6
ZH 31 2.40 5.60 0.00 16.35 5
BS 18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
SG 16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
NE 33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Mean 102.35 165.31 0.66 733.94 12
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
6.2 Quantitative importance of special funds
Once again, in order to empirically test our hypothesis, it is needed to operationalize our
variable of interest. Here, while additional depreciation charges are asymetric, i.e. may only
be used to artificially increase operating expenses, special funds may artificially increase both
operating revenues and operating expenses. That way, we take into account net allocation
to special funds, which is measured as follows:
SFR =
ASFR −WSFR
P
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where ASF and WSF respectively refer to the total amount allocated to special funds (=
operating expenses) and withdrawn from special funds (= operating revenues) and R refers
to reported figures. Then, P is the cantonal population. The variable may therefore be
either positive (SF > 0) when ASF > WSF or negative (SF < 0) when ASF < WSF . We
consider the difference between ASF and WSF (and not the contrary) since we are interested
in knowing when a government bails out its special funds, what occurs when allocations are
bigger than withdrawals.
Table 4 reports the usual summary statistics regarding the net allocation to special funds
per capita (SF ). It follows the same structure as Table 3 with the column “Occurrence”
revealing the number of years during which the gross allocation was larger than the with-
drawal.
Every canton without exception has used special funds during the considered period.
Again, a strong heterogeneity appears both between cantons and between years. Whereas
the canton of Glarus (GL) allocated a net amount of +188.43 CHF per capita between 1980
and 2012, the canton of Zug (ZG) withdrew a net amount of -98.91 CHF per capita. Thus
ZG is among the 5 cantons that withdrew more money than they allocated to special funds.
However on average, the 26 Swiss cantons allocated more than they withdrew (30.04 CHF).
The minima also show that every canton withdrew from its special funds at some point.
The maxima values indicate that all the cantons booked some positive allocations. This is
confirmed by the occurrence of positive net allocation which varies between 93% of the years
in the canton of Valais (VS: 28/30) and 6% of the year in the canton of Jura (JU: 2/33).
Therefore the intercantonal and the intertemporal variability is strong. Anew, in order to
highlight the strong intertemporal heterogeneity in the use of special funds, we report in
Table 23 presented in Appendix C the average annual amount of the net allocation to special
funds for the considered period.
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Table 4: Net allocation to special funds in real terms per capita (1980 - 2012)
Canton N Mean Std. dev. Min Max Occurrence
GL 33 188.43 732.95 -294.34 3’728.94 10
BL 32 126.45 248.29 -152.91 1’212.20 28
BS 18 83.92 313.40 -959.85 503.20 15
FR 17 79.57 147.36 -84.49 453.67 12
VS 30 66.70 157.65 -564.28 431.34 28
OW 27 58.48 226.86 -256.91 973.21 14
GR 25 57.06 304.82 -217.16 1’352.59 11
AR 33 54.36 181.51 -135.65 920.17 20
SH 23 42.35 45.96 -52.32 130.86 18
TG 31 36.48 262.04 -64.19 1’439.55 11
GE 27 31.32 32.17 -1.91 127.10 21
NE 33 27.51 100.37 -200.87 369.51 20
TI 33 26.12 17.58 -24.02 62.84 29
AI 33 22.58 134.67 -163.88 528.14 21
VD 33 21.52 102.65 -268.48 251.66 27
SG 16 17.93 434.55 -460.86 1’468.72 6
ZH 31 15.28 98.66 -120.09 326.88 14
NW 33 13.38 58.23 -41.62 324.90 22
BE 26 11.04 85.69 -236.66 214.83 16
UR 29 2.90 186.05 -286.42 565.10 10
SZ 26 2.78 33.69 -76.27 86.75 10
LU 25 -0.99 23.48 -63.40 28.90 17
SO 31 -10.77 74.64 -190.63 119.74 19
AG 18 -20.01 830.43 -2’382.66 1’645.80 15
JU 33 -74.44 106.19 -631.91 68.09 2
ZG 33 -98.91 298.85 -568.39 680.23 14
Mean 30.04 201.49 -326.93 692.88 17
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
6.3 Reported and corrected balances of the statement of financial performance
In the current subsection, we first present the reported balance of the statement of financial
performance, which is the balance reported in public accounts and publicly available . Then,
after having depicted the reported balance, we propose an operationalization of the corrected
balance, i.e. the corrected balance cleaned of creative accounting operations. Finally, the
rest of the subsection is devoted to statistical analysis in which we confront the reported and
the corrected balance to various perspectives.
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Operationalization of the reported SPER-balance
Using computed financial data provided by Swiss cantons, we can express the reported SPER-
balance as follows:
BalanceR =
RevenueR − ExpenseR
P
where RevenueR and ExpenseR respectively refer to the reported operating revenues
and reported operating expenses and where P is the cantons’ population. The indice R
indicates we are talking about reported figures. Then, by definition, BalanceR may either
be a surplus (BalanceR > 0) when reported operating revenues are bigger than reported
operating expenses (RevenueR > ExpenseR) or a deficit (BalanceR < 0) when reported
operating revenues are lower than reported operating expenses (RevenueR < ExpenseR).
Operationalization of the corrected SPER-balance
Nevertheless, as suggested in the two previous subsections, reported SPER-balances are on
average downward biased (BalanceR → 0) since they suffer the presence of creative account-
ing operations (i.e. additional depreciation charges and operations on special funds) which
increase operating expenses. Reported SPER-balances do not therefore highlight a true and
fair view of the cantons’ financial situation. Consequently, to represent a truer and fairer
view of the cantons’ financial situation, reported SPER-balances need to be corrected.
By correcting reported SPER-balances, we aim at establishing what they would have
been if creative accounting had not been used during the considered period.49 That way, the
corrected balance of the statement of financial performance (BalanceC), namely the reported
balance of the statement of financial performance cleaned of creative accounting operations
can be expressed as follows:
49We would like to point out that the corrected SPER-balances we calculate are approximations and may not
exactly correspond to reality. For the purpose of this research, we only concentrate on two particular accruals, i.e. the
additional depreciation charges and allocations (withdrawals) to (from) special funds. It is indeed commonly known
that cantons may have more than one trick up their sleeve. For instance, the literature provides strong evidence that
cantons can toy with the nature of public spending, or artificially increase as well as decrease provisions in order to
smooth fiscal balances. One must also bear in mind that some cantons prefer manipulating ordinary depreciation
charges instead of using additional depreciation charges. Finally, since the main objective of creative accounting is to
not be detected, it is very likely that cantons still resort to other gimmicks.
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BalanceC = RevenueC − ExpenseC
BalanceC = (RevenueR −WSFR)− (ExpenseR −ADCR −ASFR)
BalanceC = BalanceR +ADCR +ASFR −WSFR
BalanceC = BalanceR +ADCR + SFR
where BalanceC is therefore the difference between the corrected revenues (RevenueC)
and the corrected expenses (ExpenseC), i.e. the reported operating revenues and expenses
cleaned of additional depreciation charges and operations on special funds.50 In other words,
the corrected SPER-balance is the sum of the reported SPER-balance (BalanceR), of the
total amount of additional depreciation charges (ADCR) and of the net allocation to special
funds (SFR).
Quantitative importance of the reported and corrected SPER-balances
Figure 9 below simultaneously displays the SPER-balance as it was reported by cantons, i.e.
the balance marred by creative accounting (BalanceR) and the corrected balance (BalanceC).51
Of course the corrected balance (BalanceC) reflects a truer and fairer view of the financial
performance. Consequently, cantons having effectively resorted to creative accounting during
the considered period have corrected balances that tend to be larger than the reported ones
(BalanceC > BalanceR). Furthermore, Figure 9 provides the average reported and corrected
balances of the 26 Swiss cantons over the considered period. In this figure, Swiss cantons are
ranked according to their corrected balance, from the lowest to the largest.
First of all, Figure 9 below reveals a strong cantonal heterogeneity in terms of reported
and corrected financial performance. Nonetheless, the average standard deviation appears
to be smaller for reported balances, suggesting that creative accounting is effectively used to
50Data relative to the variables RevenueC and ExpenseC are respectively presented in Table 24 and Table 25 in
the Appendix.
51Numbers used to display the Figure below are presented in Table 26 in Appendix F. Moreover, reported and
corrected balances are also presented under an annual basis in Table 27 in Appendix G.
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smooth reported figures. For all cantons, except for Aargau (AG) and the Jura (JU), the
mean of the reported balance is lower than the mean of the corrected balance. On average
creative accounting operations lower the surplus from +219.46 CHF per capita down to a
reported amount of +87.07 CHF per capita. Consistent with our hypothesis, this points out
the fact that Swiss cantons generally experienced a structural surplus over the period which
was partially hidden by creative accounting operations. This is at least true for cantons
presenting a positive corrected balance (BalanceC > 0) between 1980 and 2012.
Figure 9: Reported and corrected SPER-balances in real terms per capita (1980 - 2012)
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
The picture is however slightly different when paying attention to cantons, except for
the Jura (JU), presenting a negative corrected balance (BalanceC < 0) over the considered
period. Indeed, for those cantons, the reported financial situation was worse than it was
in reality (BalanceR < BalanceC). In other words, since reported deficits were on average
larger than a true and fair representation, those cantons can reasonably be suspected of
having resorted to big bath accounting. Conversely, the canton of the Jura (JU) appears
to have hardly engaged in creative accounting in order to hide deficits since its corrected
balance is negative whereas its reported one is positive.
In light of the graphical analysis presented above, the use of creative accounting seems
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to differ between cantons according to the financial situation they have to cope with. For
that reason, we provide an analysis of creative accounting below depending on whether
governments are in situations of surplus (BalanceC > 0) or in deficit (BalanceC < 0).
Quantitative importance of the reported and corrected SPER-surplus
As mentioned above, in general, the reported balances (BalanceR) moved towards the equi-
librium thanks to a surplus reduction. Figure 10 below provides clearer evidence since it
only concentrates on times during which governments used creative accounting to cope with
surpluses.52 Concretely, Figure 10 shows for each canton its reported and corrected surplus
as well as the average reported and corrected surpluses of the 26 Swiss cantons over the con-
sidered period. In this figure, Swiss cantons are ranked according to their corrected surplus,
from the lowest to the largest.
Figure 10: Reported and Corrected SPER-surpluses in real terms per capita (1980 - 2012)
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
In spite of a strong cantonal heterogeneity in terms of corrected surplus, Figure 10 above
highlights that, without any exception, Swiss cantons used to downward disguise reported
surpluses. Indeed, whereas a true and fair representation should have highlighted an average
52Numbers used to display the Figure 10 above are presented in Table 28 in Appendix H.
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surplus of +471.02 CHF per capita, reported figures have only revealed an average surplus
of +289.34 CHF per capita.
To do so, 23 out of the 26 Swiss cantons took the opportunity to report additional de-
preciation charges when operating revenues exceeded operating expenses. On average, about
126.90 CHF per capita have been accounted over the considered period. Identically, Swiss
cantons enjoyed the occurrences of surpluses to bail out cookie-jar reserves for an average
amount of 70.39 CHF per capita. However, contrarily to other cantons, the Jura (JU) and
Zug (ZG) also artificially boosted reported surpluses by significantly withdrawing money for
cookie-jar reserves during healthy financial periods. As evidence for this, both cantons re-
ported an average excess of withdrawals over allocations to special funds by about 45.01 CHF
per capita and 80.24 CHF per capita respectively in cases of corrected SPER-surpluses.53
Quantitative importance of the reported and corrected SPER-deficit
However, whilst governments having to deal with surpluses adopted the same strategy, their
respective behavior was quite different when they had to cope with public deficits. Figure 11
below shows these differences by displaying their respective reported and corrected SPER-
deficit for each canton.54 Moreover, the average reported and corrected SPER-deficits are
also presented for the whole sample and over the investigated period. Then, cantons are
classified according to their corrected SPER-deficit, from the largest deficit to the smallest.
In light of Figure 11, evidence shown that goverments having faced public deficits also
engaged in creative accounting in order to embellish the reality. Whereas the true and
fair average deficit (i.e. average corrected SPER-deficit) was about -284.30 CHF per capita,
governments reported an average deficit sensitively lowered (-259.11 CHF per capita). Among
the 26 Swiss cantons, 14 of them performed such a strategy aiming at hiding deficits. To
do so, Swiss cantons extensively withdrew money from special funds. On average, the net
allocation to special funds exhibits a negative balance of about -78.80 CHF per capita.55
Consistent with our assumption, special funds seem to have been used in Swiss cantons as
53Numbers are presented in Table 30 in Appendix J.
54Numbers used to display the Figure 11 are presented in Table 29 in Appendix I.
55Numbers are presented in Table 30 in Appendix J.
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cookie-jar reserves with the ultimate objective to smooth reported figures over time.
Figure 11: Reported and Corrected SPER-deficits in real terms per capita (1980 - 2012)
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
But at the other side of the spectrum, 12 out of the 26 cantonal governments appear to
have given the bath to reported figures in cases of deficits. Indeed, for those cantons, their
respective reported deficit was bigger than the real deficit (i.e. the corrected SPER-deficit).
Indeed, some cantons did not hesitate to perform additional depreciation charges even in
times of deficits, revealing obvious cases of big bath accounting. That way, when public
balances were in deficit, reported figures worsened in 15 cantons by about 40.45 CHF per
capita only through the resort to additional depreciation charges. In similar circumstances,
some cantonal governments also worsened reported deficits by bailing out cookie-jar reserves.
Indeed, although special funds have been used to lower reported deficit on average, an excess
of withdrawals over allocations to special funds occurred in 7 cantons during times of deficits.
Overall picture of the governments’ financial performance
In this subsection, we offer the overall picture of the reported and corrected governments’
financial performance over the considered period. Indeed, Figure 12 below plots every cor-
rected balance (BalanceC) on the horizontal axis against its corresponding reported balance
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(BalanceR), on the vertical axis. Thus, 729 observations are represented in this figure. Then,
the diagonal line separating the figure in two distinct parts refers to cases during which the
reported balance presents the true and fair governments’ financial performance (BalanceR =
BalanceC). Finally, figure 12 is split up in six areas revealing the six conceivable evolutions
of the true and fair balance (BalanceC) towards the reported one (BalanceR).
Figure 12: Reported and corrected SPER-balance in real per capita (1980-2012)
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
When looking at area I (n = 359), which includes cases of surpluses (BalanceC > 0), a
significant proportion of the observations are situated below the black diagonal line, meaning
that BalanceR < BalanceC .56 Moreover, as revealed in area II (n = 28), surpluses (BalanceC
> 0) have sometimes been so hardly cooked that deficits (BalanceR < 0) were finally reported.
56Logically enough, the figure brings out that cantons with comparatively small surpluses (e.g. 500 > BalanceC >
0) seem to embark regularly and proportionally in substantial creative accounting operations. Considering a canton
that accumulates large surpluses over the years, it will have some freedom to reduce taxes or to increase operating
expenses without deteriorating its future financial situation. On the other hand, a canton with a weak financial
situation will have less leeway. Consequently, if the surpluses are smaller and less frequent, the canton will be more
likely to hide surpluses and to bail out special funds in order to ensure a structural surplus over time.
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Then, at the other side of the spectrum, some governments also managed to report larger
surpluses (BalanceR > 0) than truthful (BalanceC > 0) as depicted in area VI (n = 68).
Regarding management of deficits (BalanceC < 0), obvious evidence of big bath account-
ing is provided in area III (n = 127) since reported deficits (BalanceR < 0) appear to be
worse than in the reality (BalanceC < 0). Even if such a strategy seems to have been used for
relatively small amounts in general, sometimes deficits have also been largely worsened. By
resorting to such a practices, Swiss cantons may reasonably be suspected of having wanted
to reduce operating expenses in the future and finally achieving better financial results over
time. Conversely, deficits (BalanceC < 0) have also been downwardly manipulated. Indeed,
as presented in area IV (n = 97), governments managed to embellish the reality by mainly
withdrawing money from special funds. Finally, even if it accounts for extreme cases, some
governments also sometimes manipulated deficits (BalanceC < 0) until reporting surpluses
(BalanceR > 0) as shown in area V (n = 33).
6.4 Finance ministers’ personal characteristics and creative accounting
As discussed in section 3, we argue that cantonal finance ministers are mostly responsible
for the resort to creative accounting during the reporting process. More particularly, we
consider that their personal characteristics strongly affect their behavior regarding the use
of accounting gimmicks.
That is why, in order to test whether finance ministers matter in the use of creative
accounting operations, we collected data regarding their personal characteristics from 1980
to 2012.
Finance ministers’ political ideology
Among all the characteristics we take into account in this research, we expect the finance
ministers’ political ideology to be one of the main drivers for the use of creative accounting
operations. Therefore, Table 5 below presents the different political parties having taken
position at the head of a cantonal ministry of finance between 1980 and 2012. For each
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political party a measure of its ideological position is attached, and is ranged on a scale going
to 0 (far left-wing party) to 10 (far right-wing party).57 Finally, the line “Ministers” reports
the number of finance ministers attached to each political party during the considered period.
Table 5: Finance ministers’ political parties and their respective political ideology
Party SP GPS CSP Misc. LDP CVP FDP BDP PLS SVP
Ideology 2.6 3.2 5 5 5.2 5.4 6.8 7.6 7.6 7.7
Ministers 11 1 2 4 1 41 36 2 4 14
Source: Ladner (2006) and own calculations
Considering independent parties (“Misc.”) as the middle of the political spectrum, Table
5 reveals that there are more right-wing political parties than left-wing ones in Swiss cantons
that have occupied the position offinance minister. Indeed, whereas 6 right-wing parties were
at the head of a ministry of finance between 1980 and 2012, only 3 left-wing parties were
represented during the same period. Moreover, in terms of finance ministers, most of them
are affiliated to right-wing parties, with the CVP and the FDP accounting for 77 out of the
116. Finally, political parties situated at both extremes of the political scale almost occupy
a comparable number of seats during the considered period.
Table 6 below displays the average amount of additional depreciation charges and special
funds recorded by each political party during the period 1980 - 2012. For each political party,
the Table shows the average amount of additional depreciation charges and special funds,
the standard deviation, the minimum and maximum values.
When paying attention to the data relative to additional depreciation charges, one must
first highlight the strong heterogeneity between the different political ideologies. This is
strongly revealed by the average standard deviation at the bottom of the table. Whereas
GPS and LDP are associated with no additional depreciation charges, independent finance
ministers (Misc.) are those who resort to this practice the most.
57From the left to the right, finance ministers were affiliated to the follwing parties during the considered period:
the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP), the Green Party of Switzerland (GPS), the Christian Social Party
(CSP), No Political Party (Misc.), the Liberal-Democratic Party of Basel Stadt (LDP), the Christian Democratic
People’s Party (CVP), the Liberals (FDP), the Burgher-Democratic Party (BDP), the Liberal Party of Switzerland
(PLS), the Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
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Table 6: Additional depreciation charges and special funds in real terms per capita by ideology
Additional depreciation charges (ADC) Net allocation to special funds (SF)
Ideology Mean Sdt. Dev. Min Max Mean Sdt. Dev. Min Max N
SP 35.24 107.29 0.00 574.86 64.20 142.99 -268.48 503.20 55
GPS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.41 15.16 -1.91 39.76 7
CSP 112.97 157.13 0.00 408.48 67.54 193.41 -564.28 366.46 16
Misc. 316.68 642.46 0.00 2827.58 -38.09 63.70 -163.88 67.56 19
LDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -70.80 301.05 -959.85 83.3 11
CVP 103.70 200.04 0.00 1563.19 31.18 367.85 -2382.66 3728.94 266
FDP 127.67 253.81 0.00 1261.12 20.93 188.70 -568.39 1352.59 239
BDP 89.57 77.65 0.00 138.04 -146.84 77.79 -236.66 -100.66 3
PLS 93.09 405.77 0.00 1768.71 41.01 84.20 -34.92 369.51 19
SVP 94.76 302.99 0.00 2444.80 48.17 213.84 -285.41 1439.55 94
Mean 97.37 214.71 0.00 1098.68 2.27 164.87 -546.64 785.02 729
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
When focusing more in detail on the data, it is brought to our attention that right-wing
finance ministers are those who have the largest average amount of additional depreciation
charges. Indeed, if we do not take into account independent finance ministers (Misc.), left-
wing and right-wing finance ministers respectively resorted to 49.40 CHF per capita on
average and to 84.79 CHF per capita. Nevertheless, Markus Stadler (canton of Uri) who was
affiliated to independent finance ministers during the considered period is now part of the
Green Party of Switzerland (GPS). We cannot therefore rule out that he partly embraced a
more left-wing practice of additional depreciation charges during his mandate. If that were
to be true, it would strongly change the picture. Indeed, left-wing finance ministers would
be associated with an average amount of additional depreciation charges of about 161.90
CHF per capita. As a consequence, it would tend to validate our hypothesis stating that
finance ministers situated on left of the political spectrum would have stronger incentives to
use accounting gimmicks than right-wing ones.
Then, when focusing on the use of special funds, quite similar conclusions may be drawn.
Again, the average amounts of special funds exhibit large differences depending on the ideol-
ogy of the finance ministers. This is confirmed when looking at the average standard deviation
at the bottom of the table. Moreover, data relative to special funds also tends to support our
hypothesis as to the relationship between the finance ministers’ political ideology and the
use of creative accounting operations. Indeed, while the average amount of net allocation to
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special funds is positive for left-wing parties (45.71 CHF per capita), it is negative for right
wing ones (-12.72 CHF per capita). In other words, amounts allocated to special funds are
larger than those withdrawn when more conservative finance ministers are in position. This
therefore tends to support the idea that left-wing finance ministers constitute larger reserves
than right-wing ones.
Finance ministers’ experience
Then, we expect that the finance ministers’ experience, measured by the time in position,
may strongly affect the use of creative accounting operations. Table 7 below reports the
average amounts of additional depreciation charges and special funds according to the finance
ministers’ experience. The column “Experience (E)” refers to the finance ministers’ tenure,
which is expressed in months. Nine periods of 24 months are displayed. For each time period,
the table shows the average amount of additional depreciation charges and special funds, the
standard deviation as well as the minimum and maximum values. The column “Ministers”
accounts for the number of finance ministers associated to each category.
Table 7: Additional depreciation charges and special funds in real terms per capita regarding the
finance ministers’ experience
Additional depreciation charges (ADC) Net allocation to special funds (SF)
Experience (E) Ministers Mean Sdt. Dev. Min Max Mean Sdt. Dev. Min Max N
0 < E < 24 8 89.75 136.88 374.89 0.00 14.84 86.45 132.54 -121.41 11
24 < E < 48 13 195.89 200.47 589.57 0.00 46.74 217.49 442.29 -393.85 41
48 < E < 72 15 43.50 60.32 170.75 0.00 24.39 115.43 236.33 -315.12 74
72 < E < 96 26 109.38 155.07 675.02 0.00 58.57 214.81 933.31 -358.50 161
96 < E < 120 9 65.71 82.06 234.43 0.00 37.30 65.90 167.46 -45.73 83
120 < E < 144 17 76.71 159.05 633.05 0.00 20.94 67.94 151.01 -115.05 133
144 < E < 168 11 36.88 60.04 194.80 0.00 23.56 73.01 223.03 -70.81 71
168 < E < 192 14 121.21 245.42 916.50 0.00 29.57 59.63 145.01 -58.12 106
E < 192 3 80.89 56.37 129.72 19.20 -14.05 14.15 -3.37 -30.10 49
Mean 116 91.10 128.41 435.42 2.13 26.87 101.65 269.74 -167.63 729
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
First of all, we notice that the use of additional depreciation charges strongly differs
according to political experience. For instance, whereas politicians having served as finance
ministers between 24 and 48 months show an average amount of additional depreciation
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charges of 195.89 CHF per capita, the most experienced finance ministers report an average
amount that is about two or three times smaller (80.89 CHF per capita). Moreover, with
the exception of finance ministers having an experience ranging from 168 to 192 months,
results highlight that the average amount of additional depreciation charges decreases with
political experience.58 In other words, conversely to the hypothesis formulated in Section 3,
more experienced finance ministers appear to be associated to lower amounts of additional
depreciation.
Then, quite similar findings ensue from the analysis of special funds. A first observation
is that the use of special funds strongly differs according to the finance ministers’ experience.
This may be observed by looking at the standard deviation at the bottom of the table.
Then, looking at the relationship between the finance ministers time in office and their
respective use of special funds, there is no clear evidence that more experienced finance
ministers are associated with lower reserves accumulated through special funds. Nevertheless,
when considering the first four and last four categories as two distinct groups, evidence is
given that finance ministers having a longer tenure accumulate lower reserves. Respectively,
while more experienced finance ministers are associated to an average amount of special
funds of 15.01 CHF per capita, less experienced finance ministers report an average amount
of 36.14 CHF per capita. That way, as for additional depreciation charges, results tend to
contradict our hypothesis since it appears that more experienced finance ministers account
for lower reserves than inexperienced ones.
Finance ministers’ educational background
Finally, as discussed in the section devoted to the hypothesis, we also expect that the fi-
nance ministers’ educational background may influence their behavior concerning the use
of creative accounting. In order to provide a first insight to this relationship, Table 8 re-
ports the descriptive statistics about the finance ministers’ educational background. While
58One must keep in mind that the category reffering to finance ministers having an experience ranging from 168
to 192 months is a particular case. Indeed, this category includes Carlo Dittli (Canton of Uri) whose the associated
amount of additional depreciation charges is 916.50 CHF per capita. However, if we exclude this outlier, the average
amount of additional depreciation charges for the considered category falls to 60.03 CHF per capita. This reinforces
previous observations even more suggesting that more experienced finance ministers resort to creative accounting to
a lesser extent.
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the first column (“Education”) indicates the different types of education attended by finance
ministers, the second one (“Ministers”) reveals the number of finance ministers associated to
each educational background. Then, for each training, the table shows the average amount
of additional depreciation charges and special funds, the standard deviation, as well as the
minimum and maximum values.
Table 8: Additional depreciation charges and special funds in real terms per capita regarding the
educational background
Additional depreciation charges (ADC) Net allocation to special funds (SF)
Education Ministers Mean Sdt. Dev. Min Max Mean Sdt. Dev. Min Max N
Apprenticeship 30 93.22 164.21 0.00 1’175.75 13.06 153.28 -475.32 920.17 215
Politics 6 96.37 102.97 0.00 262.87 -34.14 79.55 -217.16 52.70 16
Economics 28 250.12 439.93 0.00 2’827.58 89.97 382.25 -294.34 3’728.94 133
Law 38 64.86 193.84 0.00 2’444.80 6.91 282.54 -2’382.66 1’645.80 288
Other 15 67.20 140.98 0.00 718.41 42.27 209.09 -256.91 1’439.55 89
Mean 117 114.35 208.38 0.00 1’485.88 23.62 221.34 -725.28 1’557.43 741
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
As highlighted in the column “Ministers”, finance ministers who have a university degree
in economics are not the majority. Indeed, most of them have a degree in law. Moreover, sur-
prisingly enough, a large part of the finance ministers do not even have a university education
and underwent an apprenticeship instead. Afterwards, regarding the relationship between
the use of creative accounting operations according to the different educational backgrounds,
data reveals a strong heterogeneity for both additional depreciation charges and special funds.
Nevertheless, data tends to support our hypothesis. Indeed, finance ministers who have a
degree in economics are those who resort to creative accounting the most. Respectively, they
are associated to an average amount of additional depreciation charges and special funds of
about 250.12 CHF per capita and 89.97 CHF per capita respectively.59
59Nevertheless, among finance ministers having a degree in economics, there is Carlo Dittli from the canton of Uri
who is associated to relatively high amounts of additional depreciation charges compared to his counterparts.
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7 Qualitative analysis of creative accounting in Swiss cantons
In order to reinforce our theoretical framework and to validate the hypothesis formulated in
section 3, we performed one complementary qualitative analysis.60 The analysis is based on
nine interviews carried out with experts in the field of Swiss public finance and a questionnaire
sent to the 26 cantonal administrations of finance.
The content of the current section is structured as follows. After having detailed the
methodology in the first subsection, we then report results ensuing from interviews and ques-
tionnaires. Concretely, in distinct subsections, we present experts’ points of view regarding
the use of additional depreciation charges and special funds in Swiss cantons. We then deal
with the impact of these accruals on the governments’ financial performance and tackle the
role played by finance ministers in the use of both accruals. Finally, the last subsection is
devoted to a summary and a discussion of the results.
7.1 Methodology
Concerning the interviews analysis, the first step consisted in developing the plan of inter-
views. This includes a series of open questions devoted to the use of additional depreciation
charges and special funds in Swiss cantons.61 The objective is to get information about what
additional depreciation charges and special funds are and why they are used in Swiss cantons.
At the same time, we were interested in knowing whether finance ministers play a key role
in the use of such practices and mainly whether such practices have an impact on the gov-
ermnents’ financial situation. For the questionnaires sent to the 26 cantonal administrations
of finance, we almost used the same plan. The main differences relied on the fact that we
profit from the opportunity to ask more detailed questions to cantonal administrations of
finance about particular numbers reported in public accounts.62
Simultaneously to designing the plan of interviews, we defined our sample of experts.
Following a convenient sampling approach, the selection of the experts mostly relied on our
60The current qualitative analysis also gives food for thought regarding the interpretation of the results we obtain
in the next two sections.
61The plan of interviews we used to conduct the interview process is presented in Appendix O.
62We provide an example of the questionnaire we sent to cantonal administrations of finance in the Appendix O.
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network and on people’s availability. On the 10 people we solicited, 9 answered favorably.
Among these 9 experts, 3 of them are professors of public finance in a Swiss university;
3 others are current or former directors of a finance cantonal inspection and the last 3
experts are former members of a cantonal administration of finance. For the needs of the
research, we call them “Scholar”, “Auditor” and “Practitioner” respectively. Then, among
the 26 questionnaires we sent, 2 cantonal administrations did not reply. At this stage, some
considerations must be kept in mind regarding both samples of population we resorted to
to conduct this qualitative analysis. Whereas interviewed experts are external experts of
cantonal administrations, questionnaires were filled in by civil servants, i.e. internal members
of cantonal administrations.
Then, interviews took the form of semi-structured interviews and all of them were recorded
and then transcribed. Finally, the analysis of data consisted in gathering information into
main items; these items being the base of our analysis. As proposed by Braun and Clarke
(2006), by gathering and comparing the experts’ points of view regarding each item, we
obtained a broad and accurate understanding of our subject of interest. The same approach
was used to analyze questionnaires.
7.2 Use of additional depreciation charges in Swiss cantons
Interviews analysis
When starting to talk about additional depreciation charges, most experts highlighted the
importance of well defining the notion. As underlined by Practitioner III, it first implies
being aware about the ordinary depreciation charges. Naturally, both aspects are tightly tied
together as the methodology used for the ordinary depreciation charges will determine the
additional ones. Indeed, whether a canton uses the digressive or the straight-line depreciation
methodology will strongly influence the amounts recorded as ordinary depreciation charges
and therefore as additional depreciation charges. The same relationship appears when we
play with depreciation rates.63
In the nature of the HAM1, ordinary depreciation charges do not aim at reflecting the
63This is strongly in line with what we exposed in section 4 devoted to the main accounting elements.
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impairment loss of an asset. Through the depreciation charges, it is expected that communi-
ties have to feel the weight of their investments. That way, as mentioned by Scholar III, “by
depreciating on shorter time periods, communities should bear the cost of their investments”.
Therefore, it may be argued that ordinary depreciation charges may be considered as a tool
of budgetary policy. As a proof, Auditor III revealed that his canton has sometimes not
hesitated to play with the depreciation rates according to the financial situation. Moreover,
3 out of the 9 discussants declared that depreciation rates strongly differ between the Latin
and the German parts of Switzerland; the depreciation rates being higher in the eastern
part of Switzerland. Interestingly enough, the Latin cantons generally face higher deficits.
Therefore, one must notice that depreciation rates would not necessarily reflect the lifespan
of an asset since some considerations with regard to the fiscal policy seem to prevail when
considering the depreciation policy.64
After having discussed the ordinary depreciation policy, most of the people interviewed
went on to talk about additional depreciation charges. While they were speaking, they first
started by giving a definition or, at least, by explaining the reasons why such practices are
used in Swiss cantons.
When defining additional depreciation charges, Auditor II, Practitioner III and Scholar
I, first asserted that these operations would aim at adjusting the balance of the statement
of financial performance. In particular, according to 5 out of the experts, such a practice
would be embraced in Swiss cantons in order to hide surpluses. More precisely, 4 out of
them sustain that the objective behind the concealment of financial results is to avoid tax
rates decreases and/or spending increases. This would provide flexibility to governments in
order to cope with the business cycle. This point is supported by Practitioner II and Scholar
III who declare that this flexibility allows governments to smooth public deficits over time.
Practitioner I then explains that Swiss cantons use additional depreciation charges because
they are reluctant to borrow to finance their investments.
In light of the foregoing, it is obviously the financial situation that guides the use of
64At the same time, such practices go against the “user pays” principle though supported by the HAM1. Indeed, as
defended by three experts, this raises intergenerational problems. To sum up and highlight the problems surrounding
such high depreciation rates, as well as additional depreciation charges, Scholar I claims that “these depreciation
charges represent a gift for future generations since they will not have to pay for the assets they consume”.
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additional depreciation charges. However, there is no general rule, as sustained by Scholar I
and Practitioner II. Quite the contrary according to Scholar II. Based on his own experience,
there are probably 26 different strategies since the use of additional depreciation charges is
totally discretionary. Moreover, Practitioner I, Practitioner III and Scholar I assert that such
practices mostly depend on the finance ministers. And at the same time, Auditor III and
Scholar III do not exclude the possibility that those accounting practices rely on cultural
backgrounds, without actually providing more details.
When discussing additional depreciation charges, we confronted our definition of creative
accounting formulated in Subsection 5.3 with the experts’ point of view. In other words,
we investigated whether experts shared our opinion, meaning that additional depreciation
charges are creative accounting since we argue they have no economic reality and are conse-
quently used in the sole purpose of modifying the reported figures.
Table 9 below reports the extent to which experts express the opinion that additional de-
preciation charges have no economic reality and have to be assimilated to creative accounting.
While columns indicate whether additional depreciation charges are perceived by experts as
having no economic reality, lines report whether additional depreciation charges account for
creative accounting operations according to these experts.
Table 9: Experts’ perception regarding the use of additional depreciation charges
Economic reality +/- Economic reality No economic reality No opinion
Not creative accounting A-II ; P-I
Creative accounting P-III A-III ; S-III S-I ; S-II
No opinion A-I P-II
When looking at Table 9 and especially at elements presented in the second line, 5 out
of 9 experts consider additional depreciation charges as creative accounting although they
do not strictly call into question the economic reality. In other words, these experts as-
similate additional depreciation charges to creative accounting even if they argue that these
accruals may have an economic reality. According to Practitioner III, finance ministers could
strategically chose the year in which to perform fair assets write-downs through additional
depreciation charges. According to him, “some [real] corrections could have been made during
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good financial years. In that case, it would be a good means to combine cosmetic and eco-
nomic reality”. In such circumstances, although additional depreciation charges refer to “real
corrections”, they are considered as creative accounting since they are strategically used to
disguise the governments’ financial performance. Nevertheless, 2 out of 9 people interviewed
(Auditor III and Scholar III) support the idea that additional depreciation charges may have
an economic reality or may not. As for Scholar I and Scholar II, who express no opinion
regarding the economic reality of additional depreciation charges, they clearly argue that
additional depreciation charges are creative accounting operations. Alternatively, Auditor
II and Practitioner I offer another vision when they stipulate that additional depreciation
charges are not creative accounting as their use is not banned by cantonal financial laws. Ac-
cording to them, it is the legality of accounting operations that determines whether accruals
correspond to creative accounting. Consistently with Auditor II and Practitioner I, Auditor I
calls into question the economic reality of additional depreciation charges. However, he could
not confirm that it constitutes creative accounting as it is legal. Finally, Practitioner I and
Practitioner II have no opinion regarding the economic reality of these accruals. Further-
more, they do not confirm whether they condiser additional depreciation charges as creative
accounting operations or not.
Questionnaires analysis
When dealing with the use of depreciation charges in Swiss cantons, civil servants who filled
in the questionnaires first paid particular attention to presenting ordinary depreciation policy.
Indeed, the use of additional depreciation charges is strongly tied to the ordinary depreciation
charges. That way, one can hardly appreciate the latter without being fully aware of the
former.
The first thing that appears is the relative homogeneity among Swiss cantons when we
scrutinize their ordinary depreciation charges policy. Among the 24 cantonal administrations
in which questionnaires were completed, 19 of them announce that the diminishing balance
method is used in their canton. Conversely to the straight-line method, the diminishing bal-
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ance method expenses assets at a constant rate resulting in declining depreciation charges
every year which allows to have relative high amounts of depreciation charges during the first
years. Then, 7 out of the 19 cantonal administrations of finance provided precise indications
as to the depreciation rate applied in their respective canton. On average in those cantons,
depreciation rates range from 8% to 25%. In the canton of Fribourg (FR), it is stated that
public assets must be amortized in a maximum period of 20 years. When put in the per-
spective of the lifespan of public assets, those depreciation rates appear to be relatively high.
It thus supports the idea that, at least in those cantons, the main objective of depreciation
policy is not to reflect a true and fair view of public assets in the first place as required by
the IPSAS norms. Besides, this opinion is reinforced by the cantonal administration of Uri
(UR) when it informs that “[t]he evolution of ordinary depreciation charges is the result of
considerations motivated by financial policy reasons”. Finally, in 5 Swiss cantons, the resort
to the straight-line depreciation method is the rule. And in those cantons, depreciation rates
also appear to be mainly driven by fiscal (and political) considerations. Indeed, among them
only the cantons of Basel-Landschaft (BL) and Luzern (LU) consider the lifespan of public
assets to determine depreciation rates, whereas in the three others (NE, SG and SH) the
maximum duration to totally amortize an asset is 25 years.
Now, after having paid attention to ordinary depreciation charges, we focus on the addi-
tional ones. The first interesting thing to notice is that the practice of additional depreciation
charges appears to be strongly anchored in Swiss cantons’ culture. At the same time, our be-
lief that the economic reality of such accruals is secondary, not to say nonexistent, is strongly
confirmed. Indeed, it is admitted in 18 cantons that additional depreciation charges are used
as a tool of budgetary policy. For instance, in the canton of Thurgau (TG), there is no
criteria guiding the use of additional depreciation charges since “one must act in regard to
the financial situation”. And this is without any doubt the case in a large part of the Swiss
cantons as it is argued in some of them that additional depreciation charges were used in
order to hide the money coming from the Swiss National Bank in 2005 for example. And
the objective hidden behind such a practice seems to be clearly understood in cantons. In
accordance with other Swiss cantons, it is said in the canton of Glaris (GL) that “the ob-
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jective is to smooth results and to ease future figures through a reduction of the assets to
be amortized”. In light of this information, there is no doubt that additional depreciation
charges are obviously used as a tool of budgetary policy. This appears to be in line with
the reply obtained from the canton of Valais (VS) that suggests that “additional depreciation
charges and special funds are often seen as a manipulative behavior of the results”. There is
thus every reasons to believe that special funds are at least partially used in the same way
as additional depreciation charges.
7.3 Use of special funds in Swiss cantons
Interviews analysis
The second part of the interviews was then devoted to the use of special funds in Swiss
cantons. Generally, most of the experts started by discussing the definition of this accrual.
In this respect, Scholars II and III mention that this particular type of funds is more common
at the municipal level rather than at the cantonal one. According to their knowledge and
experience, both discussants argue that fees are not collected at the cantonal level. Instead,
special funds would be mostly bailed out through general tax revenues.
Consequently, Scholar I sustains there is almost no real special funds at the cantonal
level. This point is reinforced by Auditor II who thinks that “each canton should adapt
special funds depending on its financial situation”. It would seem that Swiss cantons “bail
out these funds when they have more tax revenues”, as suggested by Scholar III. Therefore,
everything suggests that operations on special funds are performed in order to influence
the reported governments’ financial situation. Moreover, as the link between the task to
be fulfilled and the origin of the payment gives the impression it is partially broken, some
discussants question the economic reality surrounding these funds. However, as defended
by Auditor I, there might also be an economic reality behind special funds even if they are
financed with general tax revenues. According to Auditor I, it is the objective of the special
funds that determines its economic reality rather than its mode of financing.
However, in spite of the last consideration, some interviewed experts tend to denounce
the lack of transparency regarding special funds at the cantonal level. Indeed, despite the
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clear definition formulated in the HAM1 and most of the cantonal legislation, Practitioner
III asserts that the use of special funds strongly differs among cantons. To resume his words,
“when looking at special funds, we are comparing apples and bananas”. For that reason, as
supported by 4 out of 9 experts, it is almost impossible to distinguish special funds, reserves
and provisions in Swiss cantons even though these operations are strictly different from a
pure accounting perspective.
The element exposed above would thus lead to the conclusion that special funds may be
used as a tool of budgetary policy. Although it is theoretically conceivable that special funds
may be used that way, Practitioner I and Practitioner II would not affirm it. However, even
if Auditor II admits that special funds are used as a political tool in his canton, he warns that
such practices must not be seen as creative accounting since they are legal. Moreover, 3 out
of the interviewed people do not hide the fact that these funds are used strategically under
particular circumstances. Scholar II remarks that “most of time, these funds are bailed out
discretionarily”. For example, Scholar II mentions that in 2005 several cantons decided to
put the money derived from the Swiss National Bank gold into these funds instead of leaving
it in the net equity.65 Then, even if he recommends not systematically considering special
funds as creative accounting, Auditor I reveals that some facts give a clue. For instance,
large fluctuations over time or budget overruns of the amounts allocated into special funds
highlight the fact that special funds are used to conceal good news without any doubt. In
that case, special funds “are accounting manipulations that have no economic reality”.
To conclude, for special funds, there is a strong opposition between the economic and the
legal perspectives; both angles are not compatible when dealing with the creative accounting
characteristics. Indeed, a number of experts point out legal aspects to justify accounting
operations which sole objective is to modify the reported governments’ financial situation.
652005 is a particular year to scrutinize in order to explain and understand the use of additional depreciation
charges and special funds. Indeed, that year, Swiss cantons received 21 billion CHF from the Swiss National Bank
subsequently to a public sale of gold reserves. Such a large amount of money represented exceptional revenues for
Swiss cantons. That way, in order to hide those exceptional revenues, Swiss cantons recorded unusually high amounts
of additional depreciation charges or allocation to special funds as demonstrated in Table 22 and Table 23 in Appendix
B and C, respectively. This therefore highlights the discretionary characteristic of both accruals and allows to question
their economic reality by far.
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Questionnaires analysis
In the light of the comments provided by cantonal administrations of finance, it is partly
brought to our attention that special funds may be used as an accounting gimmick. Never-
theless, subtle elements also have to be taken into account.
Contrary to our assertion, it would seem that some special funds having an economic
reality may also be present at the cantonal level. Indeed, every canton stipulates it has funds
devoted to particular tasks (cantonal hospital, cantonal roads, waste management, waste
water treatments, etc.).
Nonetheless, despite their (supposed) economic reality, the use of special funds seems
to be partially discretionary and in line with the use of additional depreciation charges.
Consequently, their use frequently appears to be in opposition with the recommendations
formulated in the HAM1 or cantonal laws. Indeed, while it is reported by cantonal adminis-
trations that the amount to be allocated to special funds is regulated by the law and mostly
respects the user pays principle, it is also admitted that amounts allocated to special funds
may fluctuate according to the business cycle. At the same time, it is widely admitted that
amounts allocated to special funds may be higher than those forecasted if a surplus is ex-
pected during the reporting process. To back this up, the questionnaire from the canton of
Thurgau (TG) says that “in years showing good financial results, it is common to use an
excess of operating revenues to allocate it to special funds”. The discussant of the canton of
Aargau (AG) corroborates this element when he reveals that “when operating expenses are
lower than those forecasted, supplementary amounts might be allocated to special funds”. In
a similar vein, it is reported in the questionnaire sent to the canton of Schaffhausen (SH)
that such practices occurred when “we wanted to save money during good years in order to
use reserves during hard financial periods”. This is the reason why it is sometimes confessed
that the money coming from the Swiss National Bank in 2005 was discretionarily allocated
to special funds in order to avoid large surplus.66 That way, although the economic reality
of some of these funds may not be called into questioned, bailing them out discretionary in
66As demonstrated in Table 23 in Appendix C, in 2005 the net allocation to special funds is drastically higher than
the annual average, revealing the discretionary characteristic of special funds when a particular event (i.e. a good
news) occurs.
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the sole purpose of manipulating the reported results is in opposition with the IPSAS norms
philosophy. Besides, some cantonal administrations of finance do not hide the fact that the
use of special funds in their canton is more or less questionable. In the canton of Neuchâtel
(NE) for example, it is supported that a part of special funds refer to cookie-jar reserves.
Then, in the canton of Valais (VS), special funds are obviously used as a tool of budgetary
policy since it is mentioned that “like additional depreciation charges, special funds serve to
prepare the future. They have several roles to play, one of which is prevention, another is a
countercyclical one, as well as a role of stabilization of the cantonal financial situation”.
7.4 Impact of creative accounting on governments’ financial performance
Interviews analysis
After having discussed additional depreciation charges and special funds, the impact of these
operations on the cantons’ financial situation was tackled. Regarding this question, 6 experts
share the same point of view, namely that these operations have a positive effect on fiscal
soundness. Auditor III, Practitioner I and Practitioner II, as well as Scholar III argue that
concealing surpluses tend to put operating expenses under pressure. The level of operating
expenses will therefore be lowered in the future. Consequently, Auditor III explains that
“there will be no deficits, no debt and finally no interest costs”. To sum up, as explained
by Scholar II, “it is clear that these accruals allow to smooth the fiscal balance over time”.
Moreover, this last stance is reinforced by Practitioner II since she considers there are strategic
stakes behind the resort to such practices. In her view, “although it aims at reducing deficit
by putting public spending under pressure, the other target is to increase the efficiency of
public spending”. In other words, while disposing of lower financial means, governments still
have to provide equivalent public policies in terms of quantity and quality. There would
thereby be an attempt aiming at defining priorities and at improving efficiency in the use of
public deniers. Finally, only Auditor I does not share the same opinion as the other experts.
Indeed, even though he agrees that accruals allow to put operating expenses under pressure,
he cannot ensure that the money put in reserve will be used to ensure fiscal soundness over
time. Conversely, with regards to his experience, he presumes the money would rather be
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used for some “guilty reasons”, i.e. before elections.
Questionnaires analysis
According to answers received from cantonal administrations of finance, additional depre-
ciation charges and operations on special funds appear to be generally beneficial for Swiss
cantons. Indeed, 14 out of the cantonal administrations of finance consider that both accruals
have allowed to improve the cantonal financial situation so far. More precisely, 5 out of the
14 cantonal administrations argue that additional depreciation charges are beneficial since
they reduce ordinary depreciation charges for the coming years. As reported in the ques-
tionnaire received from the canton of Glaris (GL), additional depreciation charges “relieve
future annual accounts”. At the same time, whereas it is justified in the canton of Appenzell
Ausserrhoden (AR) that additional depreciation charges enabled large debt reduction, it is
sustained in the canton of Valais (VS) that additional depreciation charges increased the
retention of cash. The same point of view is supported when we investigate the impact of
special funds. It is without any doubt in the canton of Graubünden (GR) that is given the
best grasp of the role played by special funds on the cantonal financial situation when it
is declared that “special funds enabled to smooth results”. Similar evidence is given for the
canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI) since it is revealed that “without special funds, annual
results would have been fickler”.
Then, whereas it is asserted in 4 cantonal administrations that such practices do not
impact the cantonal financial situation, it is only reported in the canton of Neuchâtel (NE)
that “discretionary operations may weigh hard on years that were first quite favorable”.
Finally, interestingly enough, in addition to recognizing that special funds have a positive
influence on the government’s financial performance, stakes encompassing such accounting
practices are clearly highlighted by some cantonal administrations. That way, in the canton
of Nidwald (NW) it is assumed that “when the result is null, there is no elbow room to use
this equity for other purposes”. Similarly, the canton of Uri (UR) expresses that “we cannot
know what the situation would have been if we had not resorted to additional depreciation
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charges and special funds. The only certainty is that when a large surplus occurs, citizens
or the parliament want tax decreases or investment expenditure increases in the future. In
2005, additional depreciation charges certainly helped to lower those appetites”. Nevertheless,
although the use of accounting gimmicks is recognized in the canton of Uri (UR), it also
agreed that “the use of additional depreciation charges is detrimental for transparency of the
cantonal financial situation”. That way it is reasonably highlighted that those accounting
practices allow to reduce spending appetites through a lower accounting transparency above
all else. Consequently, there is almost no doubt that finance ministers have to cope with
divergent interests; additional depreciation charges and operations on special funds are an
appropriate means to do so and, thus, at the same time, they guarantee financial stability in
Swiss cantons.
7.5 Role of finance ministers in the use of creative accounting
Interviews analysis
After having talked about the relationship between creative accounting and the cantons’
financial situation, we investigated the role played by the finance ministers in the use of
these operations. 3 out of the experts agree that finance ministers play a key role in the
resort to such practices. However, most of the experts have more nuanced words. Whereas
they all agree that finance ministers intervene at the end of the budgetary process, discussants
have different points of view about the finance ministers’ decision-making power. On the one
hand, Auditor I, Practitioner II and Scholar III sustain that finance ministers make the
decision regarding the operations to be used and the amounts to be recorded. On the other
hand, Auditor II, as well as Scholar I and Scholar II argue that finance ministers do not
necessarily decide alone. In these discussants’ view, finance ministers prepare a proposition
presented to the government and the final decision is taken collectively. That way, based
on her experience, Practitioner I mentions that “the finance minister makes the proposal to
the rest of the government. And then, he has to defend his proposal in front the rest of the
government and the parliament”.
According to 4 out of them, this constitutes a form of precautionary behavior from the can-
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tonal finance ministers regarding the spending appetite of other politicians, i.e. the deputies
of the parliament and the spending ministers. That way, as explained by Practitioner I,
by hiding surpluses, “the money is far away from other parties”. And Scholar II suggests
that such practices “allow to prevent possible claims from the parliament”. In other words,
Auditor III sustains that “each time there is a surplus, deputies want to spend it”. It must
therefore be understood that “if no surplus is viewed, it will slow down the increase of public
spending as deputies will not ask for additional credits or lower tax rates”. It is certainly
Auditor II who explains the situation and the whole stakes surrounding the use of creative
accounting in Swiss cantons best. According to him, “Politicians [deputies] want to invest,
this is their main objective. Then, either we depreciate or not, it does not matter. They do
not have the competence to understand the depreciation process. That way, as the cash-flow
from operating activities is composed by depreciation charges and the surplus, finance minis-
ters have incentives to increases depreciation charges. The cash-flow from operating activities
will be the same but operating expenses would have been put under pressure. While there is
no additional expenses [during coming years], deputies keep their capacity to invest”. This
strongly highlights the fact that finance ministers strategically use accounting gimmicks and
it also reveals the existence of an acting game among elected politicians, all of them acting
on behalf of their own interests.
Finally, 4 experts assert that finance ministers have the possibility to resort to such
accounting practices as they profit from an information asymmetry. For instance, Practitioner
I argues that “[i]t is not difficult to impose these accruals to the parliament and the other
ministers as they are not aware of accounting in general”. This is fully consistent with the
words of Scholar III who claims that “[o]nly (a) few people use accounting in parliament”.
Indeed, for Auditor III, “competence lacks within parliament”. That way, “[s]ince it is very
technical, other ministers and deputies do not question these operations and accept them”.
Questionnaires analysis
In this respect, although only 14 cantonal administrations replied to the question, they almost
110
all share the same point of view. Each response reflects the idea that the finance minister
makes a proposal and then the financial decision is taken by the parliament when reported
accounts are voted. The only distinction comes from the canton of Fribourg (FR). In this
canton, it would seem that the proposition issues from the cantonal administration of finance
and is approved by the finance minister. Consequently, it is obvious that finance ministers
play a key role in the direction of such accounting practices
7.6 Summary and discussion of the results
In the light of the information obtained in both analysis, strong evidence supports the hy-
pothesis we have formulated throughout this research.
The first clues tend to demonstrate that additional depreciation charges and operations
on special funds are mainly used in order to manipulate reported public figures. Nevertheless,
interestingly enough, there is no consensus on whether those practices must be considered as
creative accounting. Indeed, while discussants and cantonal administrations of finance agree
that finance ministers play with both accruals to hide surpluses, experts sometimes argue
that such operations are not cosmetic because they are legal. The way the legalistic vision
of accounting still pervades in practitioners is very surprising. According to this vision, all
practices should be accepted and/or could be justified if they are legal and even if they tend
to violate the essence of accounting, i.e. provide reliable information to anyone who would
need it. However, according to our point of view, this vision is outdated. Accounting is
changing, specifically under the pressure of IPSAS boards. Consequently, the definition and
the study of creative accounting also has to embrace this new trend. Indeed, if accounting
moves from a legalistic vision to an economic one, the definition of creative accounting must
also incorporate this change. It therefore makes sens to interpret both operations in light of
the definition formulated in subsection 5.3.
Then, although their apparent indecision in deciding whether additional depreciation
charges and special funds have to be considered as creative accounting, both groups of ex-
perts widely support the idea that those accruals allow to reach a better financial situation.
Nonetheless, both groups of experts do not completely confirm our hypothesis which is that
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additional depreciation charges and operations on special funds allow to simultaneously put
public spending under pressure and to generate higher revenues. According to their belief,
both accruals avoid finance ministers facing claims for higher public spending and/or tax
cuts above all else. And if additional depreciation charges engender lower operating expenses
over the years, it is mainly due to the fact that ordinary depreciation charges would be lower
in the future. Results ensuing from empirical analysis will confirm whether our hypothesis is
true.
Finally, our assertion stipulating that finance ministers play a fundamental role in the
resort to such practices also appears to be validated by both groups of experts. Even though
some discussants, especially those part of cantonal administrations, employ more prudent
speech and declare that finance ministers only make the proposal for the parliament, our
argument remains convincing. Indeed, as debated with some experts, deputies drastically
lack competences in accounting. That is why, although the final decision is in their hands,
finance ministers profit from information asymmetry. In other words, we may expect deputies
not to be fully aware about what they vote when accounting is the subject. We may thus
reasonably argue it is justified to handle the impact of finance ministers on the use of such
accounting practices in Swiss cantons.
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8 Quantitative impact of creative accounting on governments’ fi-
nancial performance
In this section, we model the influence of creative accounting on governments’ financial
performance. First, we present the set of variables we use in the research. We then present
both econometric models used to test the hypothesis previously formulated. Indeed, we
resort to two complementary approaches: (1) a single equation model directly estimating the
impact of additional depreciation and special funds on future balances and alternatively (2) a
system of two simultaneously estimated equations, one for the operating revenues and one for
the operating expenses, which models the influence of creative accounting on governments’
financial performance. The respective estimation strategies are also presented for each model.
Finally, we report and discuss the results.
8.1 Variables67
Dependent variables
The dependent variable used is “Balance” (B) - for the single equation model - which is the
cantonal corrected balance as defined in subsection 6.3. As a reminder, “Balance” (B) may be
either positive in a case of surpluses (“Surplus” - S) or negative in a case of deficits (“Deficit” -
D). The variable of interest is expressed in real term per capita. Then, the variables “Revenue”
(R) and “Expense” (E) - for the simultaneous equations model - that respectively refer to
the corrected operating revenues and expenses are used. Both variables are also expressed in
real terms par capita.68
Variables of interest
As main explanatory variables, we use the first lag of our variables of interest, namely “ADC(-
67Table 10 below reports summary statistics for variables used in the model explaining the balances of the statement
of financial performance.
68Moreover, in addition to creative accounting operations, both variables have been adjusted for partic-
ular events as explained in appendices D and E. Values for corrected operating revenues and expenses are
respectively presented in Appendix in tables 24 and 25.
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1)” and “SF(-1)”. The first lag of these two variables reflects the fact that creative accounting
operations booked in the reported financial statement of year t-1 are expected to almost
immediately influence the governments’ financial performance (“Balance”), as demonstrated
in the section devoted to the hypothesis. Additional depreciation charges and net allocations
to special funds reported in year t-1 should alleviate claims for additional operating expenses
and/or for tax cuts in year t already.
Control variables
To isolate the effect of our variables of interest (“ADC(-1)” and “SF(-1)”), we also control for
the influence of other variables on public balances. For each control variable, we mention
how the variable is compiled, its own expected effect on governments’ financial performance
as well as the source of the information we used.
The control variables introduced in models explaining the balances of the statement of
financial performance are as follows:
Lagged dependent variables (“Revenue(-1)”, “Expense(-1)” and “Balance(-1)”) are first
included to reflect that operating revenues and operating expenses, and therefore the balance
of the statement of financial performance, are not independent from their past level. They
may largely suffer from temporal inertia in particular because governments frequently resort
to incremental budgeting (Ibrahim and Proctor 1992).
“Error” is a variable reflecting the tax revenue budgeting error. It is the difference between
the forecasted amount of tax revenues and the eventually cash-in revenues. As shown by
Chatagny and Soguel (2012b), finance ministers in the Swiss cantons generally strategically
underestimate tax revenues during the budgeting process in order to restrain the candy
store mentality of spending ministries (“Error” < 0). Underestimating tax revenues should
therefore decrease deficits. The variable is expressed in real terms per capita.
“Growth” refers to the business cycle and is measured by the GDP growth rate. The
latter influences the level of operating revenues, operating expenses and therefore reported
balances. Because of the automatic stabilizers, the GDP growth rate is expected to influence
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the operating revenues positively and the operating expenses negatively. However, Martin
and Soguel (2004) show that Swiss cantons may be inclined to adopt a pro-cyclical behavior;
operating expenses would therefore increase during periods of economic growth. The final
effect of the GDP growth on governments’ financial performance is thus uncertain. As the
GDP growth rate does not exist for Swiss cantons, we use the national GDP growth rate
computed by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). Finally, this variable is
expressed as a percentage.69
At the same time, “Unemployment” causes an increase in operating expenses and a de-
crease in operating revenues. Therefore, a higher unemployment rate should induce degra-
dation of public surpluses. The independent variable we use is the cantonal unemployment
rate as a percentage of the active population.70
“Election” refers to years during which cantonal governments are elected. According to
Schuknecht (2000), Shi and Svensson (2002) and then Veiga and Veiga (2007), governments
would tend to increase public spending and reduce public revenues during an election year in
order to raise their reelection chances. This phenomenon is commonly known as the political-
budget cycle and tends to deteriorate reported balances. The effect of upcoming elections is
captured by a dummy variable taking the value 1 during election years and 0 otherwise.71
“Government” reflects the average political ideology of cantonal governments. Right-wing
governments have been shown to spend less than the ones leaning to the left (Tellier 2006),
although this finding is put into question (Imbeau and Tellier 2004). This variable controls
both the proportion of conservative ministers in the cantonal governments and their political
leanings.72
“Concordance” measures the solidarity between the executive and the legislative powers.
69Instead of taking into account the GDP growth rate, it is sometimes argued that the output gap (i.e. the
difference between the actual GDP and the potential GDP) would be more appropriate to capture the influence of the
business cycle on fiscal soundness. For several reasons, we contest this statement. Indeed, whereas after a peak the
output gap is still positive, the economic growth is yet dropping. In such a situation, in spite of the positive output
gap, tax revenues are lower and social expenses higher, resulting thus in lower financial performance. Inversely after
a through, whereas the output gap is negative, the economy is recovering. The tax revenues should therefore increase
and social expenses decrease, resulting thus in better financial performance.
70Data are provided by the State Secretariat of Economic Affairs (SECO).
71Data relative to election years were collected from Année politique suisse, BADAC and Swiss Federal Statistics
Office (SFSO).
72A detailed operationalization of the variable is proposed in Appendix M.
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This relationship may also influence the level of operating revenues, operating expenses and
therefore the level of public deficits. According to Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Volkerink
and De Haan (2001), if there is no concordance between both powers, they will probably face
difficulties reaching agreements. Authors believe that such a situation results in excessive
overall public spending, and that public deficits would therefore be higher or at least public
surpluses should be smaller. Finally, the variable is measured by the proportion of government
parties represented in parliament.73
“Coalition” is the political fragmentation of cantonal governments. As revealed by Roubini
and Sachs (1989) and more recently by Volkerink and De Haan (2001), the number of parties
in government may have an impact on reported figures. Their findings indicate that the more
there are parties coexisting within government, the higher public deficits will be. We intro-
duce an indicator of political fragmentation measured by the number of parties in cantonal
governments.74
“Departments” expresses the number of departments in cantonal administrations. Valesco
(2000) sees the government’s budget as a common good pulled by various interest groups.
Therefore, a large number of stakeholders within an administration would lead to higher
public spending. This would be explained by the fact that departments, that are headed by
a spending minister (by contrast to the ministry of finance headed by the finance minister),
would try to maintain or increase their own budget. This being said, we can reasonably expect
that a higher number of cantonal departments should result in stronger pressure to increase
or at least maintain public spending at a high level. Thus, if it were true, a larger number
of departments should be associated with higher public deficits or lower public surpluses.75
“Elderly” captures the percentage of the cantonal population over 65 years old. We expect
a larger share of elderly in the canton’s population should generate higher healthcare and
social expenses (Feld and Matsusaka 2003). Following this, a canton with an older population
should engender larger public deficits.76
Financial referendums (“Referendum”) and popular initiatives (“Initiative”) are two in-
73Source: Swiss Federal Statistics Office (SFSO).
74Source: Année politique suisse.
75Source: BADAC
76Source: Swiss Federal Statistics Office (SFSO).
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stitutional tools mainly used in Switzerland, which is a direct democracy, that can affect
governments’ financial performance. Financial referendums may influence public spending in
two ways (Feld and Kirchgässner 2000). First of all, they allow citizens to express their views
concerning spending that are put to the vote. They also cause governments to self-regulate
and to pay close attention to public spending if they do not want their projects to be sub-
jected to the ballot. In consequence, the more binding a financial referendum is (they are
more or less restrictive depending on the canton), the more it will lower spending. We there-
fore presume that financial referendums reduce public deficits or improve public surpluses.
Popular initiatives, on the other hand, give citizens the opportunity to suggest new laws or
modifications of the constitution. Their suggestions can lead increases, as well as decreases of
public spending. The effect of initiatives on public deficits is therefore unknown. To measure
the degree of severity that financial referendums and popular initiatives can have, we use the
operationalization suggested by Stutzer and Frey (2000).77
“Rule” indicates the stringency of cantonal fiscal rules. Previous works (Feld and Kirchgäss-
ner 2008; Luechinger and Schaltegger 2011) support the idea that fiscal rules force govern-
ments to lower public deficits and to show a positive structural balance of the statement of
financial performance over time. The variable reflecting the stringency of the fiscal rules is
the one proposed by Luechinger and Schaltegger (2011), where the value is 3 in case the rule
of the canton is among the most stringent, 2 where the rule is fairly stringent, 1 for the least
stringent and 0 otherwise (no rule).78
“Creative * Rule” is an interaction variable between creative accounting operations (“ADC(-
1)” and “SF(-1)”) and budget rules (“Rule”). Drazen (2002) and Von Hagen and Wolff (2006)
suggest that the more binding the fiscal rule is, the more governments would be incited to
engage in creative accounting. Since both fiscal rules and creative accounting operations are
expected to improve the cantons’ financial performance, the interaction variable should also
highlight a positive sign.
77The operationalization of the variable is presented in Appendix N.
78This operationalization was first proposed by Feld and Kirchgässner (2008).
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Table 10: Summary statistics
Variables Definition / Unit of measurement Source Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
Balance SPER-balance in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts 129.777 533.207 -3’158.800 2’376.233 729
Surplus Balance > 0; in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts 384.615 402.320 1.080 2’376.230 470
Deficit Balance < 0; in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts -332.670 418.341 -3’158.800 -1.680 259
ADC(-1) lagged ADC in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts 108.250 255.092 0.000 2’827.581 728
SF(-1) lagged SF in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts 29.178 266.949 -2’382.663 3’728.937 728
Balance(-1) lagged SPER-balance in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts 130.000 533.539 -3’158.800 2’376.233 728
Error direct tax revenue budgeting error in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts -88.038 230.017 -2’150.996 1’231.055 858
Growth swiss economic growth rate SECO 1.754 1.642 -1.937 4.376 858
Unemployment cantonal unemployment rate in percent of the active population SECO 2.130 1.732 0.000 7.800 858
Elderly percentage of the population over 65 old SFSO 14.990 2.186 10.142 21.756 858
Government percentage of the members of the government cabinet
belonging to right-wing parties
APS 5.546 0.508 4.220 7.057 858
Coalition number of political parties in the government cabinet BADAC / APS 3.432 0.911 1.000 5.000 858
Concordance percentage of the seats in the parliament that are occupied
by members of parties represented in the government
APS 0.837 0.141 0.000 1.000 858
Departments number of departments in the cantonal administration BADAC 7.179 2.191 4.000 13.000 858
Election dummy taking the value 1 in election years APS 0.261 0.439 0.000 1.000 858
Initiative Stringency of cantonal popular initiatives BADAC / FKF / APS / SFSO 4.567 1.136 2.333 6.000 858
Referendum Stringency of cantonal financial referendums BADAC / FKF / APS / SFSO 3.947 1.191 1.000 6.000 858
Creative * Rule Interaction variable Cantonal financial accounts 54.086 368.690 -4’734.920 4’406.164 728
Année Politique Suisse (APS), Database on Swiss cantons and Towns (BADAC), Fachgruppe für Kantonale Finanzfragen (FKF), Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(SFSO)
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8.2 Endogenous covariates
In empirical research, it is essential to cope with endogeneity since estimated parameters
may become biased and inconsistent (Kristensen and Wawro 2003). This is why, in this
subsection, we present endogenous regressors and provide some valid instruments (see tables
31 and 32 in Appendix P).79
Firstly, we expect that the tax revenue budgeting error (“Error”) may be endogenous.
Indeed, since current tax revenues are used to compute the indicator of tax revenue budget-
ing error, simultaneity in the determination of both the public deficits and the current tax
budgeting revenue error might exist. The first difference of the tax revenue budgeting error
is used as an instrument, as proposed by Chatagny and Soguel (2012b).
Secondly, it is sometimes assumed that financial institutions are endogenous as they
are influenced by the financial situation. Consequently, depending on the level of public
deficits, politicians could be tempted to adapt the stringency of these financial institutions.
Based on other research about Swiss cantons (Feld and Matsusaka 2003; Martin 2008), we
consider the financial referendums (“Referendum”), the popular initiatives (“Initiative”), as
well as the budget rules (“Rule”) as endogenous.80 Since our data do not exhibit second order
autocorrelation, we use the second lagged value of the concerning variables as instruments.81
8.3 Estimation strategies
In the current subsection, we present both estimation strategies employed in order to solve
our research question. Respectively, we first present the single equation model and only after
do we expose the simultaneous equations model.
79Instruments proposed in this subsection are used when 2SLS, GMM and 3SLS estimators are performed.
80However, Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that the endogeneity of such financial institutions may be called into
question.
81The choice of the lagged value as instruments is motivated by the works of Martin (2008), Krishnakumar et al.
(2010) and Chatagny and Soguel (2012b) who use the same methodology. Although these instruments sometimes
appear to be quite controversial, no better instrument has been provided so far.
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Single equation model
In order to identify the determinants of the balances of the statement of financial performance
as well as testing our hypothesis, we first test the following model:
Bi,t = α + δADCi,t−1 + ϑSFi,t−1 + βX it + µi + it
where B is the dependent variable representing the corrected balances of the statement of
financial performance of Swiss cantons. ADC and SF respectively refer to our variables of
interests and δ as well as ϑ are their respective associated coefficients and where α represents
the intercept. Then, X is the vector of control variables and β is the corresponding vector
of coefficients. Furthermore, µ refers to the cantonal fixed effects. The error terms are
represented by . Lastly, i and t denote Swiss canton “i” and year “t”.
Moreover, as formulated in Subsection 4, it is hypothesized that creative accounting should
improve the balance of the statement of financial performance over time. However, through
the estimation strategy proposed above, we cannot express whether such an eventual im-
provement of the financial situation is due to larger public surpluses, lower public deficits or
a combined effect of both phenomenons. To answer this question, we re-estimate the single
equation model presented above twice by replacing the dependent variable (“Balance” - B) by
either “Surplus” (S) when operating revenues are larger than operating expenses (Balance >
0) or by “Deficit” (D) when there is an excess of operating expenses over operating revenues
(Balance < 0).
Then, in order to ensure the significance and the consistency of our results, some el-
ements must be taken into account. First of all, for different reasons, Swiss cantons are
relatively heterogeneous in terms of budget size. That way, as highlighted by the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, the error terms strongly suffer of heteroskedasticity, although the
model is expressed per capita.82 Secondly, serial correlation is also an issue as most of the
variables depend on their past values. Despite the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
in the model, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation reveals the presence of serial correla-
tion of order one.83 Nevertheless, the Arellano-Bond test does not confirm the presence of
82Results of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test are presented in Table 33 in Appendix P.
83Results presented in Table 34 in Appendix P demonstrate the presence of serial correlation of order one.
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autocorrelation of order two.84 Thirdly, as cantons are part of the same country, error terms
may be contemporaneously correlated. Fourthly, in the light of the cantons heterogeneity, we
include cantonal fixed effects in our models.85 These fixed effects allow to capture cantonal
differences that can hardly be measured or observed in reality. The Breusch and Pagan test,
as well as the Hausman test, validate our decision to include cantonal fixed effects.86 Further-
more, as argued by Nerlove and Balestra (1996), the inclusion of fixed effects is more relevant
than random effects when studying a full population, i.e. the 26 Swiss cantons. However,
the inclusion of cantonal fixed effects has a drawback, which is that it increases multicolin-
earity.87 Fifthly, it must be noted that our panel is unbalanced as not every Swiss canton
had adopted the HAM1 in 1980. Nevertheless, it does not cause any econometric problem
since the HAM1 has been randomly implemented over time by cantons. In other words, the
reasons why some data are missing for some cantons are exogenous.88 Then finally, remember
that our panel is based on the 26 Swiss cantons (I = 26) over the period 1980 - 2012 (T =
33); the time series is therefore longer than the cross section. Nevertheless, according to Beck
(2004), econometric estimators are more adapted to cases where the inverse occurs.
Given the above mentioned characteristics of our data, five different econometric estima-
tors are considered. Firstly, we use an OLS estimator including cantonal fixed effects and
where error terms are corrected according to the White procedure. The White correction
allows to cope with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and simultaneously implements
clustered standard errors at the cantonal level. Secondly, we consider an estimator proposed
by Baltagi and Wu (1999) which fits a cross sectional time series regression model when the
84Results of the Arelano-Bond test are presented in Table 35 in Appendix P.
85However, following the methodology employed by Martin (2008) and Chatagny and Soguel (2012b), time fixed
effects are not incorporated in the current model. The inclusion of such fixed effects increases the risk of multicol-
inearity, notably with the control variables “Growth” and “Unemployment”. In addition, both variables (due to their
properties) also allow to capture particular events that could affect Swiss cantons. Finally, as detailed in Appendix
D, E, K and L, operating revenues and operating expenses have been cleaned of exceptional components (e.g. money
received from the Swiss National Bank in 2005), which also reduces the need for time fixed effects.
86Results ensuing from both tests are presented in Appendix P in tables 36 and 37 respectively.
87The Variance Inflection Factors (VIF) of explanatory variables are reported in Table 38 in Appendix P.
88According to most of experts interviewed in the framework of the qualitative analysis, the introduction of the
HAM1 in Swiss cantons mainly depended on the finance ministers’ willingness or on the one of the directors of cantonal
finance administrations. As the implementation of a new accounting guideline is tough and time consuming, finance
ministers sometimes gave priority to more delicate subjects in the short-run. Moreover, Scholar II reported that
directors of cantonal finance administrations or finance ministers close to retirement sometimes also enjoyed leaving
this job to their successors.
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error terms are first order correlated (REGAR). This estimator is particularly relevant as
it has been specially developed in order to support exogenously unbalanced panel data and
may incorporate fixed effects. Thirdly, we use the Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE)
estimator proposed by Beck and Katz (1995). This estimator has the advantage of correct-
ing heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Then, if needed, it also allows first
order autocorrelation to be dealt with. Furthermore, the panel does not need to be bal-
anced and the estimator works efficiently when the cross section is smaller than the time
series. However, cantonal fixed effects cannot be included. Fourthly, as these first three
estimators cannot deal with endogeneity issues, we also estimate our model through the Two
Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimator. Moreover, by applying the White correction which
produces robust standard errors, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are taken into ac-
count. Standard errors are also clustered at the cantonal level. Then, the 2SLS estimator
supports the inclusion of cantonal fixed effects and handles exogeneously unbalanced panel
data. Nevertheless, the 2SLS estimator is not time series asymptotic conversely to the PCSE
estimator. Fifthly, we employ the system-GMM procedure discussed by Arellano and Bover
(1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009). This estimator is relevant since it is
especially efficient for dynamic panels including individual fixed effects. Moreover, it allows
to deal with endogeneous regressors by taking the lags of the corresponding variables as in-
struments. System-GMM also allows standard errors to be robust to heteroskedasticity and
patterns of autocorrelation within individuals, equivalent to clustered standard errors at the
individual level (Roodman 2009). Nevertheless, system-GMM is more efficient for relatively
short panels, i.e. when the time series is smaller than the cross-section (T < I). Finally, since
fixed effects are automatically included in system-GMM and given that some of the regressors
are time-invariant, their respective parameters may be inflated due to multicolinearity.89
Simultaneous equation model
In the previous model, we assume there is no relation of simultaneity between operating
89Indeed, as shown in Table 38 (Appendix P), multicolinearity may be an issue when individual fixed effects are
incorporated into models.
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revenues and operating expenses. However, as we know, by definition the balance of the
statement of financial performance (“Balance” - B) is determined by the difference between
the operating revenues (“Revenue” - R) and the operating expenses (“Expense” - E). Resorting
to a simultaneous equations model allows to resolve this drawback. At the same time, using
such a simultaneous equations model allows to distinguish the respective determinants of
operating revenues and expenses that eventually affect public deficits. Moreover, while the
level of operating revenues will determine the level of operating expenses for a large part,
the latter should also influence the operating revenues to be collected by the government.
As a consequence, operating revenues (“Revenue” - R) and operating expenses (“Expense” -
E) are explanatory endogeneous variables. Finally, as previously formulated, we expect that
creative accounting allows governments to save money by restraining a high tax burden and
by avoiding increases in operating expenses. In other words, we hypothesize that creative
accounting operations improve the balance of the statement of financial performance by
increasing operating revenues and by decreasing operating expenses. According to what is
exposed above, running a simultaneous equations model is all the more relevant from both
econometric and economic points of views. The model is thus formulated in two equations,
one for the operating revenues and the other for the operating expenses, as follows:
Ri,t = α
R + δRADCi,t−1 + ϑRSFi,t−1 + γREi,t + βRWi,t + µi + Ri,t
Ei,t = α
E + δEADCi,t−1 + ϑESFi,t−1 + γERi,t + βEZi,t + µi + Ei,t
where αR and αE represent the intercepts. δR and δE, respectively ϑR and ϑE are the
coefficients associated with our variables of interest, ADC and SF . γR measures the marginal
effect of operating expenses on operating revenues and γE the marginal effect of operating
revenues on operating expenses. W and Z are the set of control variables explaining operating
revenues and operating expenses and βR and βE are their associated coefficients. Although
they include the same set of control variables,W and Z are still different as they each include
the lag of the dependent variable of their respective equation. Furthermore, µ refers to the
cantonal fixed effects. Then, R and E are the error terms. Finally, i and t denote Swiss
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canton “i” and year “t”.
In order to precise our investigation and to determine through which phenomenon the
governments’ financial performance is eventually improved, we re-estimate the simultaneous
equations model in cases of surpluses and of deficits. Concretely, we test the respective
influence of creative accounting on operating revenues (“Revenue” - R) and on operating
expenses (“Expense” - E) when the balance of the statement of financial performance is
either positive (Revenue > Expense) or negative (Revenue < Expense).
The simultaneous equations model discussed above will be tested with the Three Stage
Least Square (3SLS) estimator developed by Zellner and Theil (1962). Then, heteroskedas-
ticity is taken into account by correcting error terms through the White procedure and
cantonal fixed effects are included in the model. Finally, the 3SLS estimator also allows us
to use instrumental variables regarding the above mentioned endogenous regressors.
8.4 Results
In the current subsection, we provide results related to the explanation of the governments’
financial performance and how it is influenced by creative accounting operations. More
particularly, we first report results ensuing from the single equation model and secondly
those obtained through the simultaneous equations model.
Single equation model
Table 11 below reports results from the single equation model explaining the level of the
balance of the statement of financial performance as a whole (i.e. when “Balance” is
the dependent variable). We first note that not all explanatory variables are individually sig-
nificant. Nonetheless, the joint statistic (F-statistics and Chi2) indicates that the coefficients
are jointly significantly different from zero. Some independent variables are indeed strongly
statistically significant.
The parameter associated with the variable “ADC(-1)” highlights a positive and significant
relationship with the balance of statement of financial performance. This is robust since it
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holds whatever the estimators we use. We can conclude that the additional depreciation
charges improve the balances of the statement of financial performance in the future. Results
ensuing from the OLS estimator highlight that 1 additional CHF per capita recorded as
additional depreciation charges engenders an increase of public balances per capita by about
0.31 CHF. The coefficients computed through REGAR and 2SLS are relatively homogenous
whereas PCSE and GMM estimators provide a substantially larger coefficient. Then, as for
the variable “SF(-1)”, the result is less clear. Indeed, although the coefficient exhibits the
expected sign, results do not reveal any significant relationship between the net allocation to
special funds and the balance of the statement of financial performance. Additionally and
conversely to our hypothesis, the cumulative effect of both creative accounting operations and
fiscal rules (“Creative * Rule”) has no significant influence on the balance of the statement of
financial performance even if the variable brings out a positive coefficient, as expected.
Then, among all control variables included in the model, some of them also appear to have
significant and robust effects on governments’ financial performance. The lagged dependent
variable, as well as the revenue budgeting error have very significant and robust effects
on governments’ financial performance. Firstly, the lagged dependent variable (“Balance(-
1)”) turns out to be strongly significant with all five estimation strategies. Its coefficient
is positive, as expected, and is included between 0.279 and 0.415. This result confirms an
intertemporal intertia in the budgeting process. In other words, the budgeting process in
year t strongly relies on the already known reported values of year t-1 . Considering results
obtained through the OLS estimator, a surplus of 1 CHF per capita in year t-1 will result
in a surplus of 0.37 CHF per capita in the subsequent year. Secondly, the underestimation
of tax revenues (“Error”) also strongly impacts the balance of the statement of financial
performance. Moreover, the coefficient reveals a negative sign, as expected. This means that
the underestimation of tax revenues during the budgeting process allows governments to
improve the balance of the statement of financial performance. Quantitatively, a tax revenue
underestimation of 1 CHF per capita increases public balances by about 0.47 CHF per capita
if we consider the results obtained through the OLS estimator.
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Table 11: Results of the single equation model
OLS REGAR PCSE 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.315*** 0.317*** 0.373*** 0.306*** 0.380***
(0.085) (0.073) (0.081) (0.081) (0.075)
SF(-1) 0.088 0.104 0.046 0.075 0.083
(0.101) (0.074) (0.114) (0.105) (0.067)
Balance(-1) 0.373*** 0.279*** 0.345*** 0.386*** 0.415***
(0.077) (0.038) (0.078) (0.075) (0.074)
Error -0.476*** -0.498*** -0.492*** -0.409*** -0.491***
(0.106) (0.075) (0.130) (0.179) (0.068)
Growth 22.349** 18.963* 17.204 24.180*** 19.955**
(10.024) (10.542) (13.647) (8.495) (9.776)
Unemployment -24.536* -30.981** -36.391** -24.905* -28.682***
(13.409) (14.769) (14.666) (14.578) (10.010)
Elderly -18.038 -15.808 -8.544 -12.104 -10.124*
(16.947) (19.584) (16.785) (18.438) (5.865)
Government -143.427*** -150.355*** -79.073 -157.877*** -68.308**
(40.570) (52.824) (48.119) (46.878) (31.229)
Coalition 20.911 22.233 20.078 22.980 13.676
(29.153) (40.281) (22.499) (30.702) (14.604)
Concordance 25.763 24.686 108.638 37.496 135.062
(77.896) (139.117) (114.593) (70.530) (103.307)
Departments -7.016 -5.116 7.572 -7.887 -7.584
(6.645) (14.001) (7.796) (5.390) (5.310)
Election -5.033 -3.709 2.440 -6.377 -2.858
(38.291) (34.812) (39.333) (36.499) (36.388)
Initiative 80.656 106.031 64.643** 77.408 58.105***
(62.790) (93.137) (26.421) (83.548) (16.359)
Referendum -34.277 -41.264 -10.901 -54.604 -10.141
(27.432) (42.266) (20.149) (35.914) (11.045)
Rule 53.853 70.616* 15.896 10.342 20.115
(49.481) (40.055) (20.978) (49.610) (24.749)
Creative * Rule 0.029 0.021 0.046 0.051 0.009
(0.050) (0.053) (0.082) (0.053) (0.019)
Constant 782.806** 568.514 249.993 880.202 207.337
(347.196) (534.765) (315.297) (736.810) (223.843)
Cantonal FE YES YES NO YES YES
R-Squared 0.429 0.414 0.379 0.354 -
F-stat / Chi2 62.190 15.950 288.960 399.400 1637.980
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 712 686 712 703 686
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results were
computed with Stata 11 SE.
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The variable “Unemployment” shows robust but lower significant effects on public bal-
ances. Indeed, the variable is mainly statistically significant at the 95% and 90% levels. A
statistical significance at the 99% level is only offered by the system-GMM. However, its asso-
ciated coefficient has the expected negative sign revealing that a higher unemployment rate
decreases the balance of the statement of financial performance. Conversely, the variable
measuring the government average political leaning (“Government”) has strong but unsta-
ble robust effects. In addition, the coefficient boasts a negative sign suggesting that more
right-wing governments are associated with lower financial performance. While this result is
strongly robust when we consider the OLS, REGAR and 2SLS estimators, the variable turns
out to be insignificant with the PCSE estimator. Moreover, although the coefficient remains
negative, its value is twice as low regarding the values obtained from the three other estima-
tors. As to the coefficient estimated through system-GMM, its value is also relatively small
compared to values obtained with other estimators and it reveals a statistical significance at
the 95% level only.
A similar conclusion may be drawn as to the economic growth rate (“Growth”). While the
associated coefficient is positive and mostly stable, revealing that higher economic growth
rates are associated with larger balances of the statement of financial performance, the sta-
tistical significance may be questioned. Indeed, “Growth” is significant at the 99%, 95% and
90% levels and appears insignificant with the PCSE estimator. Finally, since the remain-
ing control variables have insignificant effects on reported balances, they do not require any
particular discussion.
Then, Table 12 below presents results for the model exclusively assessing the impact
of creative accounting operations on public surpluses (i.e. when “Surplus” is the
dependent variable). In the light of the model devoted to the explanation of public surpluses,
the parameter associated to the variable “ADC(-1)” highlights a positive and significant
relationship with the variable “Surplus”. This suggests that additional depreciation charges
improve future surpluses. Besides, results appear to be robust since they hold whatever the
considered estimator is. Moreover, the variable is statistically significant at the 99% level.
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Table 12: Results of the single equation model with "Surplus" as dependent variable
OLS REGAR 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.235*** 0.332*** 0.224*** 0.309***
(0.076) (0.079) (0.077) (0.120)
SF(-1) 0.100* 0.159*** 0.102* 0.089*
(0.060) (0.062) (0.061) (0.051)
Surplus(-1) 0.358*** -0.086 0.361*** 0.466***
(0.055) (0.063) (0.058) (0.053)
Error -0.477*** -0.437*** -0.363*** -0.449***
(0.075) (0.076) (0.110) (0.082)
Growth 15.047 0.782 18.948* 15.839**
(10.113) (10.255) (10.378) (7.947)
Unemployment -12.433 -39.192 -12.472 2.057
(19.175) (28.242) (19.821) (11.754)
Elderly -9.332 44.834 -5.918 1.727
(18.656) (29.635) (19.112) (5.875)
Government -154.177*** -188.798*** -164.031*** -89.998**
(60.988) (73.069) (64.309) (38.878)
Coalition 4.115 38.946 8.470 37.515**
(38.981) (55.347) (42.085) (18.890)
Concordance 13.097 -58.459 17.442 38.712
(116.252) (180.107) (122.389) (56.256)
Departments -18.848 11.050 -15.508 0.631
(16.132) (21.005) (19.475) (6.940)
Election 27.850 42.494 24.265 25.572
(36.273) (31.447) (36.573) (45.764)
Initiative 81.122 192.546** 103.678 48.421***
(86.456) (93.548) (161.451) (15.710)
Referendum -71.330 -106.000 -79.590 8.582
(43.870) (71.785) (70.819) (10.980)
Rule 42.490 61.019 17.846 20.181
(40.733) (63.069) (66.571) (15.286)
Creative * Rule 0.017 -0.030 0.025 -0.020
(0.044) (0.043) (0.047) (0.028)
Constant 1132.261* 83.569 1043.430 105.406
(641.849) (89.570) (889.049) (208.379)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 42.440 14.510 43.080 -
F-stat / Chi2 12.830 4.930 940.520 8346.720
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 377 351 373 363
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Results ensuing from the OLS estimator reveal that 1 additional CHF per capita recorded
as additional depreciation charges engenders an increase of public surpluses of 0.23 CHF per
capita . Whereas it is consistent with results obtained through the 2SLS estimator, REGAR
and GMM estimators generate larger coefficients. As for the variable SF(-1), results are less
clear even if parameters are positive. Indeed, whereas results suggest that the net allocation
to special funds is associated with larger surpluses, the variable is only significant at the
90% level in models ran by OLS, 2SLS and GMM. Moreover, these three estimators produce
relatively comparable coefficients. But when looking at results ensuing from the REGAR
estimator, the variable “SF(-1)” appears to be statistically significant at the 99% level and
its associated coefficient is larger than usual. Considering this, a net allocation to special
funds of 1 CHF per capita would increase public surpluses by about 0.15 CHF per capita.
However, as a whole, the influence of special funds on public surpluses should be interpreted
with caution regarding the small statistical significance of the variable.
Now, Table 13 below concentrates on the model especially devoted to the impact of
creative accounting on public deficits (i.e. when “Deficit” is the dependent variable).
Considering the impact of additional depreciation charges on public deficits, results show
that the parameter associated to the variable “ADC(-1)” is positive. Amounts recorded as
additional depreciation charges in year t-1 are thus supposed to alleviate public deficits of the
subsequent year. However, the variable is only statistically significant at the 90% level when
estimated through the OLS and 2SLS estimators. The variable is then no longer significant
when the model explaining public deficits is estimated with REGAR and GMM estimators.
Additional depreciation charges do not appear as being key determinants of future public
deficits. Similar evidence may also be drawn as to the impact of special funds on public
deficits. Although the coefficient of the variable “SF(-1)” is positive, the variable is not
statistically significant. That way, neither additional depreciation charges nor operations on
special funds significantly influence the level of public deficits over time. As a consequence,
results obtained through single equation models demonstrate that creative accounting only
structurally improves governments’ financial performance by increasing public surpluses over
time.
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Table 13: Results of the single equation model with "Deficit" as dependent variable
OLS REGAR 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.275* 0.258 0.319* 0.229
(0.148) (0.158) (0.170) (0.152)
SF(-1) 0.198 0.129 0.165 -0.096
(0.227) (0.253) (0.261) (0.215)
Deficit(-1) 0.232*** 0.096 0.179** 0.571***
(0.075) (0.089) (0.091) (0.079)
Error -0.445*** -0.467*** -0.551*** -0.230
(0.118) (0.131) (0.190) (0.196)
Growth 40.052*** 13.746 34.637** 37.264***
(13.522) (17.140) (16.107) (9.962)
Unemployment 2.389 -5.729 7.795 -5.078
(12.163) (17.386) (15.588) (12.932)
Elderly 3.872 14.328 10.003 -17.437
(21.680) (28.868) (26.083) (18.061)
Government -101.216** -134.029 -149.119** -34.569
(48.825) (65.231) (63.578) (36.297)
Coalition -56.362 -113.132 -129.904 -50.166
(58.867) (85.356) ( 89.381) (34.052)
Concordance 8.551 95.269 282.001 284.633
(300.973) (441.969) (463.172) (283.780)
Departments 26.296** 23.229 27.398** -8.199
(11.972) (14.766) (13.053) (11.416)
Election -19.650 18.723 -11.879 -35.402
(37.262) (38.785) (40.623) (34.674)
Initiative 99.033 111.158 46.099 27.671
(111.841) (115.056) (315.614) (23.647)
Referendum -30.284 -50.256 133.563 -11.547
(47.780) (61.194) (154.740) (18.010)
Rule 0.466 56.885 -41.379 -44.163*
(52.906) (77.146) (87.798) (26.532)
Creative * Rule -0.180 -0.139 -0.229 -0.049
(0.121) (0.131) (0.137) (0.053)
Constant -132.408 51.826 -332.594 207.927
(599.407) (195.403) (963.108) (556.376)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 30.080 25.120 22.940 -
F-stat / Chi2 3.350 1.750 534.310 1255.480
p-value 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.000
N 170 145 169 167
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Simultaneous equations model
Table 14 below reports results from the simultaneous equations model explaining the level of
the balance of the statement of financial performance as a whole. Whereas not all
explanatory variables are individually significant, the joint statistic (F-statistics) indicates
that the coefficients are jointly significantly different from zero. Some independent variables
are indeed strongly statistically significant.
In the light of the results presented earlier, it appears that the variable “ADC(-1)” sig-
nificantly influences both operating revenues and operating expenses, and its respective co-
efficients have the expected sign, i.e. supporting the future tax burden and restricting the
future operating expenses. These results confirm our expectations. We can confirm that
additional depreciation charges improve governments’ financial performance by generating
higher tax revenues and by lowering the level of operating expenses. Nonetheless, the effect
of creative accounting is quantitatively slightly more pronounced on operating expenses than
on operating revenues. Indeed, 1 additional CHF per capita booked as additional deprecia-
tion charges tends to allow future operating revenues to be 0.26 CHF per capita higher and
simultaneously to restrict future operating expenses by 0.30 CHF per capita. The combined
effect of accounting gimmicks on operating revenues and on operating expenses improves
future balances of the statement of financial performance by about 0.56 CHF per capita.
This impact is slightly larger compared to the one obtained from the single equation model.
Nevertheless, greater attention should be paid to the results ensuing from this second model
since it disentangles the respective effect of creative accounting on operating revenues and
expenses.
As for the impact of special funds (“SF(-1)”) on governments’ financial performance, re-
sults seem to be in line with those obtained through the direct estimation of the balance
of the statement of financial performance. Although coefficients boast the expected signs,
the variable is not statistically significant regarding the operating expenses equation and it is
only statistically significant at the 90% level for the operating revenues equation. Considering
the results obtained from the single equation model, operations involving cookie-jar reserves
appear to have no impact on the governments financial performance.
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Table 14: Results of the simultaneous equations model
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.266*** -0.304***
(0.067) (0.069)
SF(-1) 0.112* -0.013
(0.065) (0.072)
Revenue(-1) 0.373***
(0.040)
Expense(-1) 0.522***
(0.056)
Revenue 0.360***
(0.063)
Expense 0.618***
(0.050)
Error -0.515***
(0.137)
Growth 27.493*** -17.541*
(9.083) (9.833)
Unemployment -26.374* 67.541***
(13.709) (13.586)
Elderly -4.806 62.782***
(18.289) (18.971)
Government -147.97*** 119.119**
(44.341) (47.662)
Coalition 18.402 56.417
(34.813) (37.068)
Concordance 21.595 -250.309*
(122.043) (129.721)
Departments 0.799 1.041
(12.057) (12.852)
Election -11.550 11.697
(31.710) (33.733)
Initiative 92.434 -151.457
(141.795) (149.935)
Referendum -6.574 53.320
(59.630) (63.453)
Rule 37.732 33.108
(47.061) (50.506)
Creative * Rule 0.007 0.047
(0.048) (0.051)
Constant 536.752 -343.582
(634.592) (674.910)
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 0.987 0.986
F-statistics 56538.070 50496.31
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 703 703
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.132
And again, the cumulative effect of both creative accounting operations and fiscal rule
(“Creative * Rule”) has no significant influence on operating revenues or on operating ex-
penses. This result goes against our hypothesis.
However, some control variables included in the model still reveal significant influences
on operating revenues and operating expenses. Besides, results strongly corroborate the ones
obtained thanks to the single equation model. Nonetheless, as it has been formulated above,
a simultaneous equations model is particularly relevant when studying the explanation of
public balances as operating revenues (“Revenue”) and operating expenses (“Expenses”) si-
multaneously influence each other. Such an effect is verified in the light of our results. Indeed,
both variables are strongly significant and have a positive coefficient. The influence of operat-
ing expenses on operating revenues is stronger than the inverse phenomenon suggesting that
the level of revenues to be collected mainly depends on the public services provided. Then,
by looking at the lagged dependent variables (“Revenue(-1)” and “Expenses(-1)”), strong ev-
idence is provided as to the practice of incremental budgeting in Swiss cantons during the
budgeting process. Indeed, their respective coefficient is statistically significant and shows
a positive sign. Therefore, 1 CHF per capita of operating revenues or operating expenses
reported in year t-1 will increase the operating revenues and the operating expenses in the
subsequent year by about 0.37 CHF per capita and 0.52 CHF per capita respectively.
By paying attention to the operating expenses equation, it is shown that the coefficient
associated to the variable “Error” is strongly significant and has a negative value. In other
words, the underestimation of tax revenues lowers the balances of the statement of financial
performance through a reduction of operating expenses. Indeed, when tax revenues are un-
derestimated by 1 CHF per capita, it ensues an operating expenses reduction of about 0.51
CHF per capita. Moreover, the cantonal unemployment rate (“Unemployment”) also has a
significant negative influence on the balance of the statement of financial performance since it
decreases operating revenues and increases operating expenses at the same time. Nonetheless,
the impact of the unemployment rate on governments financial performance is mainly due to
higher operating expenses. The operating expenses equation reveals a more significant and
higher coefficient. Conversely, the economic growth rate (“Growth”) improves the balance of
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the statement of financial performance through higher operating revenues mainly. Finally,
consistent with results obtained with the previous estimation strategy, more right-wing gov-
ernments are associated with lower financial performance as they tend to simultaneously
increase operating expenses and decrease operating revenues.
Further, Table 15 below reports results ensuing from the simultaneous equations model
in cases of surpluses (i.e. when “Revenue” is larger than “Expense”). The results pre-
sented in the following table show that the parameter associated to the variable “ADC(-1)”
has a positive sign in the “Revenue” equation and a negative sign in the “Expense” equation,
respectively. Moreover, in both equations, the variable “ADC(-1)” is strongly statistically sig-
nificant. Consequently, additional depreciation charges improve surpluses by simultaneously
generating higher revenues and by putting expenses under pressure. Whereas 1 CHF per
capita reported as additional depreciation in year t-1 engenders future additional revenues
of about 0.20 CHF per capita, future expenses are lowered by an amount of 0.24 CHF per
capita. However, the influence of special funds on future surpluses is less clear. Strangely
enough, the respective coefficients of the variable SF(-1) are positive in both “Revenue” and
“Expense” equations, suggesting that operations on special funds increase both operating rev-
enues and operating expenses in cases of public surpluses. Nonetheless, the variable “SF(-1)”
is only statistically significant (at the 95% level) in the revenue equation. That way, a net
allocation of 1 CHF per capita would improve future public surpluses through an increase of
revenues by about 0.11 CHF per capita.
Table 15 below also reports results of the simultaneous equations models in cases of
deficits (i.e. when “Revenue” is smaller than “Expense”). In such circumstances, the vari-
able “ADC(-1)” does not have any statistical influence on operating revenues or on operating
expenses. Though, its coefficient has the expected sign. A similar conclusion may be formu-
lated as to the influence of the variable “SF(-1)”. Moreover, these results are consistent to
those obtained through the various single equation models.
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Table 15: Results of the simultaneous equations model in cases of surpluses and deficits
Surpluses Deficits
Revenue Expense Revenue Expenses
ADC(-1) 0.203*** -0.247*** 0.166 -0.160
(0.058) (0.058) (0.176) (0.172)
SF(-1) 0.119** 0.009 0.341 -0.419*
(0.052) (0.060) (0.305) (0.231)
Revenue(-1) 0.207*** 0.131
(0.035) (0.183)
Expense(-1) 0.390*** 0.089
(0.063) (0.094)
Revenue 0.473*** 0.925***
(0.075) (0.096)
Expense 0.832*** 0.851***
(0.045) (0.193)
Error -0.514*** -0.070
(0.134) (0.122)
Growth 19.474** -14.932 16.667 -13.670
(8.787) (9.164) (14.855) (14.559)
Unemployment -32.411* 82.033*** -31.634* 39.866***
(18.206) (17.503) (17.177) (14.949)
Elderly -7.618 69.508*** 12.501 -23.343
(17.614) (18.862) (34.145) (33.589)
Government -105.054** 152.618*** -78.064 56.496
(50.645) (51.622) (61.920) (65.710)
Coalition -30.184 55.808 24.591 -5.870
(35.565) (36.391) (61.170) (58.478)
Concordance 58.375 -266.363** -222.540 250.234
(112.708) (118.575) (302.121) (296.938)
Departments -4.800 11.789 3.764 -4.409
(14.005) (14.549) (15.876) (14.825)
Election 34.359 -17.915 -39.666 33.727
(31.431) (32.499) (44.184) (43.106)
Initiative 145.106 -179.634 7.569 89.592
(128.341) (132.509) (348.784) (322.324)
Referendum -58.703 58.582 139.170 -155.453
(56.539) (58.469) (119.471) (118.419)
Rule 43.523 39.791 -111.571 67.334
(51.883) (56.152) (81.694) (73.557)
Creative * Rule 0.001 -0.052 0.004 0.004
(0.040) (0.043) (0.133) (0.126)
Constant 404.570 -650.492 -308.858 161.680
(648.711) (673.355) (1216.228) (1181.731)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 99.340 99.280 99.020 99.000
F-stat / Chi2 69993.020 62221.830 22649.080 26775.780
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 449 449 254 254
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Hence, it is by ensuring larger surpluses that creative accounting operations (and above
all additional depreciation charges) improve government’s financial performance over time
since they do not put public deficits under pressure.
8.5 Robustness checks
In order to ensure the validity of the results obtained thanks to the different models (i.e.
the single and the simultaneous equations models) and the different estimators (i.e. OLS,
REGAR, PCSE, 2SLS, GMM and 3SLS), we also performed several robustness checks.
Explanation of public surpluses and deficits through the Tobit estimation
Throughout this research, we have investigated whether the improvement of governments’
financial performance is due to larger surpluses, smaller deficits or to a combination of
both phenomenons. This was done by replacing the dependent variable “Balance” either
by “Surplus” when operating revenues are larger than operating expenses (Balance > 0) or
by “Deficit” otherwise (Balance < 0). However, variables “Surplus” and “Deficit” have the
particularity of being censored at 0. Whereas the variable “Surplus” only contains positive
values, the inverse occurs with the variable “Deficit”. In such circumstances, linear regres-
sions (e.g. with the OLS estimator) might lead to inconsistent estimates. In order to cope
with this issue, it is recommended to use the Tobit estimator, which is appropriate when
the dependent variable is observed over some interval of its support (Tobin 1958). Table 39
in Appendix P reports results of the estimation of public surpluses (“Surplus”) and deficits
(“Deficits”) with the Tobit estimator.
When considering the impact of creative accounting on public surpluses, results obtained
through the Tobit estimator are consistent with those ensuing from initial linear regression
models (OLS, REGAR, 2SLS and GMM). The parameter associated to the variable “ADC(-
1)” points out a positive sign and is strongly statistically significant at the 99% level. In
comparison to other estimation strategies, this confirms that additional depreciation charges
136
improve governments’ financial performance over time by ensuring larger surpluses. However
it is not the case of special funds. The variable “SF(-1)” is not statistically significant even if
its coefficient has a positive sign.
The picture provided by the Tobit estimator as to the explanation of public deficits is
somewhat different to results initially obtained. Here, the variable “ADC(-1)” appears to be
statistically significant at the 95% level and is associated to a positive coefficient. In light of
these results, it seems that additional depreciation charges reduce public deficits over time.
As to the variable “SF(-1)”, it does not seem to significantly put public deficits under pressure
even though its coefficient is also positive.
In spite of the fact additional depreciation charges have been shown to alleviate future
public deficits with the Tobit estimator, this result should be interpreted with caution. Simi-
lar results were not obtained in the single equation models nor in the simultaneous equations
model . The variable “ADC(-1)” never turns out to be strongly statistically significant through
initial estimation strategies.
Influence of creative accounting on revenues and expenses
During interviews, experts or civil servants mainly expressed the fact that creative accounting
should improve the governments’ financial performance by principally putting expenses under
pressure. Indeed, only few of them argued that creative accounting could generate additional
revenues. Thence, in order to ensure the consistency of the results obtained through the
simultaneous equations model, we also re-estimated it by only including “ADC(-1)” and
“SF(-1)” in the “Expense” equation. To check, we also ran the simultaneous equations model
by incorporating the variables of interests in the “Revenue” equation only.
When looking at the “Expense” equation reported in Table 40 in Appendix P, results
are consistent with the original simultaneous equations model. Indeed, whereas the variable
“SF(-1)” does not show any statistical significance, the parameter associated to “ADC(-1)” is
positive and strongly significant. However, the coefficient is slightly smaller (-0.256) compared
to the original model (-0.304). Similar evidence is also provided when only “ADC(-1)” and
“SF(-1)” are included in the “Revenue” equation (see Table 41 in Appendix P). The variable
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“ADC(-1)” reveals a positive and significant coefficient, highlighting the fact that additional
depreciation charges effectively generate additional revenues in the future. Nonetheless, the
coefficient obtained through the original simultaneous equations model is sensitively larger
(0.266) than the one ensuing from the robustness check (0.208). As to the influence of special
funds on revenues, the coefficient of the variable “SF(-1)” obtained through the robustness
check is comparable to the one obtained in the original model. Moreover, in both cases, the
coefficient reveals almost no statistical significance (90% level only).
Suspicion of multicollinearity between the variables of interest and “Error”
Since an underestimation of tax revenues during the budgeting process could engender the
resort to additional depreciation charges or particularly large allocations to special funds,
our variables of interest may be suspected to be collinear with the variable “Error”. However,
ADC(-1) and SF(-1) are based on year t-1 , whereas “Error relies on year t . Collinearity
should thus not be an issue as revealed in Table 16 below. Despite everything and in order
to ensure the robustness of the initial results, models are re-estimated after having excluded
“Error” from the set of control variables.
Table 16: Detection of multicollinearity between the variables of interest and “Error”
Variables VIF 1/VIF
Error 1.00 1.00
ADC(-1) 1.01 1.00
SF(-1) 1.01 1.00
Mean VIF 1.01
Multicolinearity may be an issue when the VIF is equal to or higher than 10.
When analyzing the single equation model, the exclusion of “Error” does not appear to
alter initial results as reported in Table 42 in Appendix P. In addition to remain strongly
significant, the variable “ADC(-1)” presents almost comparable coefficients than initially even
if they are slightly larger when estimated through OLS, REGAR and 2SLS or slightly smaller
when estimated through PCSE and GMM. Then, no significant change is noticed regarding
other variables.
However, the picture is very different when “Error” is excluded from the simultaneous
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equations model as demonstrated in Table 43 in Appendix P. Notably, “ADC(-1)” looses its
significance in the “Revenue” equation whereas it keeps it in the “Expense” equation. This
loss of significance seems to be offset by “Revenue(-1)” that shows a coefficient twice as large
as it was in the initial model. Similarly, “Revenue” is also associated with a larger coefficient
when it explains “Expense”.
The variable “Growth” is also affected by the exclusion of “Error” since its parameter
becomes negative and insignificant in the equation devoted to “Revenue”. Moreover, whereas
“Unemployment” was associated to a negative and almost insignificant parameter in the
initial model, the variable shows a large positive and significant coefficient in the revisited
model. Nonetheless, the fact that higher unemployment rates generate additional revenues
is difficulty justifiable from a pure economic perspective. Similar considerations may also be
drawn regarding the variable “Elderly”. Finally, “Coalition” and “Concordance” turn out to
be strongly significant after the exclusion of “Error”.
As collinearity was not revealed between the variables of interest and, in the light of the
results obtained from the robustness check, it does not appear relevant to exclude “Error”
from the set of control variables.
Exclusion of insignificant control variables
It also appears relevant to control whether main results are affected by the exclusion of in-
significant variables. More particularly, we are interested in making sure that the coefficient
and the significance of our variables of interest (“ADC(-1)” and “SF(-1)”) remain stable when
insignificant control variables are dropped. As demonstrated in Table 44 in Appendix P,
“ADC(-1)” remains strongly significant at the 99% level in the single equation model. Its
associated coefficient is nonetheless revealed as being slightly larger. For instance, the coef-
ficient estimated through OLS points out a value of 0.315 for the initial model and a value
of 0.327 for the model not including insignificant control variables. The variable “ADC(-1)”
does not appear affected by the exclusion of insignificant control variables in the simultaneous
equations model (see Table 45 in Appendix P). Only its coefficient in the “Expense” equation
is slightly smaller revealing a value of -0.304 in the initial model instead of a value equal to
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-0.262 in the model excluding insignificant control variables. Finally, the variable “SF(-1)”
never turns out to be significant whereas the set of control variables is substantially reduced.
Exclusion of some particular cantons
As discussed in the section devoted to the data, the canton of Uri (UR) registers particularly
high amounts of additional depreciation charges compared to other cantons. Therefore, in
order to check the robustness of our results, we have excluded the canton of Uri from our data
set and have re-estimated various models.90 Table 46 and Table 47 in Appendix P reveal
that our results are strongly robust. The parameter associated to our variable of interest
(“ADC(-1)”) is consistent with former results and the variable remains strongly significant.
The same is true when we look at control variables.
Evidence also supports the idea that the canton of Geneva (GE) turns out to be much
more spendthrift than other Swiss cantons. Indeed over the considered period, its average
deficit is much larger than anywhere else. This particular case could thence be suspected
of influencing our results. That is why we re-estimated the various models by excluding
the canton of Geneva from the data set. Results ensuing from this new estimation strategy
provide consistent results with those initially obtained, as shown in tables 48 and 49 in
Appendix P. However the coefficient of the variable “ADC(-1)” is slightly larger when the
canton of Geneva is excluded from the data, independently from the considered estimator.
Furthermore, with regard to their particular use of creative accounting, it appeared rele-
vant to re-estimate models without the cantons of Jura (JU) and Aargau (AG). As revealed
in Section 6, the canton of Jura (JU) has reported an average surplus over the considered
period whereas, in reality, its balance was negative. As to the canton of Aargau (AG), its
reported average surplus is larger than its true and fair representation. Such a use of creative
accounting is relatively surprising since Swiss cantons were expected to hide surpluses instead
of embellishing reality. Two different models were re-estimated, each of them excluding either
the canton of Jura (JU) or Aargau (AG). In light of the results presented in tables 50 and 51
in Appendix P, the exclusion of the canton of Jura (JU) does not affect the results initially
90Another possibility would have been to include a dummy for each particular canton. Nonetheless, this solution
does not appear relevant since cantonal fixed effects are already included in the various models to be tested.
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obtained. However, the models performed without the canton of Aargau bring out the fact
that the coefficient associated to the variable “ADC(-1)” is smaller than in the initial model
(see Table 52 and Table 53 in Appendix P). When considering results obtained through the
OLS estimator, the value of the coefficient is 0.315 in the initial model and it is about 0.306
when the panel does not include the canton of Aargau.
Inclusion of time fixed effects
Moreover, although there are economic justifications to include variables “Growth” and “Un-
employment” in the initial model, we also suggest that both variables could account for time
fixed effects. This is among other things the reason why time fixed effects are not included in
initial models devoted to the explanation of public deficits. By consequent, in order to vali-
date our first estimation strategy, we have re-estimated models by including time fixed effects
instead of variables “Growth” and “Unemployment”. According to the results reported in ta-
bles 54 and 55, the coefficient associated to the variable “ADC(-1)” appears to be sensitively
smaller than usual. Nevertheless, our variable of interest remains statistically significant at
the 99% level. Moreover, usual significant control variables also keep their expected sign and
do not lose their statistical significance when time fixed effects are included in the models.
This new robustness check supports the results obtained in initial specifications.
Shorter time series
The last robustness check consisted in re-estimating models on a shorter time period. As Swiss
cantons did not implemented the HAM1 the same year, the panel is strongly unbalanced.
Besides, even if it should not have been the case, it cannot be ruled out that some cantons
chose the year of implementation for strategical reasons. In order to alleviate the potential
influence of the unbalanced panel, we ran both models on a shorter period going from 1997 to
2012, i.e. the canton of St-Gallen (SG) was the latest canton to have implemented the HAM1,
in 1997. As it was the case in other robustness checks, results appear to be consistent with
those initially obtained although, as reported in tables 56 and 57 in Appendix P, variables
generally point out smaller coefficients.
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8.6 Summary and discussion of the results
The econometric results, based on several estimators and assessed through several robust-
ness checks, prove to be robust and thus reliable. They confirm that creative accounting
relying on additional depreciation charges significantly and positively affect the future level
of operating revenues, whereas they negatively affect the level of future operating expenses;
with the magnitude of the former impact being slightly smaller than the one of the latter.
Consequently this trick produces a positive and structural impact on the future balance.
Depending on which model is considered - single or simultaneous - 1 CHF per capita of
additional depreciation improves the balance of the coming fiscal year by about 0.30 to 0.50
CHF per capita. As for the special funds (i.e. the net allocation to cookie-jar reserves), the
trick has no significant impact on the operating revenues, nor on the operating expenses,
nor on the balance. Consequently, the use of special funds does not appear to structurally
improve the future governments’ financial performance. Instead, we can reasonably assume
that special funds account for a device allowing to smooth the statement of financial per-
formance in the short run, i.e. to absorb the shocks of the business cycle. For this reason,
with or without special funds, the average financial performance of Swiss cantons would have
been unchanged over the considered period since this particular accounting trick does not
allow to structurally modify the balance of the statement of financial performance. Besides,
this assumption is consistent with the words expressed by some of the experts from cantonal
administrations of finance .
Moreover, results have demonstrated that it is exclusively by generating larger surpluses
that additional depreciation charges allow to structurally improve government’s financial
performance. Indeed, creative accounting operations were not revealed to be efficient tools
to lower public deficits. Depending on which estimator is considered in the single equa-
tion model, 1 CHF per capita recorded as additional depreciation charges increases future
surpluses by an amount bounded between 0.22 and 0.33 CHF per capita. Similarly, the simul-
taneous equations model highlighted the fact that additional depreciation charges increase
future surpluses by generating supplementary operating revenues and by putting operating
expenses under pressure. The impact of additional depreciation charges on operating ex-
142
penses is slightly stronger (0.24 CHF per capita) than their impact on operating revenues
(0.20 CHF per capita).
Nevertheless, in spite of the above mentioned considerations, results provide food for
thought regarding the finance ministers’ behavior as to the public sector financial manage-
ment. Whereas it is almost exclusively debated in the literature that creative accounting is
used to hide public deficits, we provide evidence that such practices are also embraced in
order to conceal good news. As supported by Daﬄon and Rossi (1999), “since the political
decision-makers are always afraid to be forced to take unpopular budgetary measures [when
they face fiscal distress] (which ultimately might threaten their own individual goals), creative
accounting may represent a good instrument of the last resort to avert such decisions”. In-
deed, as discussed in Section 3, the finance ministers’ chances of reelection heavily rely on
their capacity to ensure fiscal soundness. Therefore, instead of facing the risk of not being
reelected, resorting to creative accounting may appear more convenient than resolving the
structural financial problems. However, in our particular case, we may argue that finance
ministers enlist in a sort of “preventive” creative accounting. By ensuring a structural sur-
plus through the use of accounting gimmicks, they try to make sure they will not have to
implement measures (i.e. tax increases and/or spending cuts) that could damage their re-
election chances. Interestingly enough, either they try to sweep the dust under the rug or
to dissimulate good news, finance ministers resort to creative accounting in the sole purpose
of maximizing their own utility, namely increasing the probability of remaining in position
during the coming legislature.
Moreover, this research offers interesting political implications. First, additional depreci-
ation charges appear to be an asymmetric mechanism that allows the government and the
finance minister to maximize the cash flow from operating activities over time. This finding is
in line with existing research dealing with public sector financial management. Chatagny and
Soguel (2012b) show that cantonal finance ministers tend to engage in strategic budgeting
by largely underestimating tax revenues during the budgeting process. This underestimation
also restrains the level of operating expenses and ends up by improving public balances.
Nevertheless, we assume that the underestimation of tax revenues needs then strategic and
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asymmetric reporting like additional depreciation to become fully effective. Indeed collecting
more tax revenues than budgeted represents a pleasant surprise, which could wet spending
ministers’ appetites either for increased spending or for tax cuts. As a consequence, addi-
tional depreciation charges (or similar creative accounting operations) would be required in
order to avoid such political claims as demonstrated by Rose and Smith (2012).
Another implication concerns fiscal rules. Fiscal rules were initially implemented to re-
strain government deficits and debt (Bohn and Inman 1996; Feld and Kirchgässner 2008;
Bodmer 2012). Nevertheless, some authors consider them as ineffective since some govern-
ments engage in accounting manipulations to meet the targets set by the rules. Under this
interpretation, rules would not be the right device to ensure fiscal soundness. Instead, they
appear more as an objective in themselves. Our results point in that direction since the
variable controlling for the stringency of the fiscal rules does not show any statistical sig-
nificance.91 According to the estimated models, it is not the fiscal rules that allow to cut
government deficits or to enhance surplus but the accounting tricks implemented to meet the
targets set by the rules. As largely discussed in the literature, this would be particularly true
when governments face very binding fiscal rules. For example, Luechinger and Schaltegger
(2011) show that such fiscal rules reduce the occurrence of government deficits in Swiss can-
tons.92 However they also mention that deficits may have been lowered - at least partially
- with the help of creative accounting operations. Now our results provide strong evidence
that accounting tricks are one of the most efficient techniques allowing the Swiss cantons to
fulfill the fiscal rules requirements.
Our assertion appears all the more obvious since it is partly in line with the one of Wagner
and Sobel (2006). Indeed, both authors demonstrate that it is the implementation of rainy
91Methodological reasons might also partly explain the statistical insignificance of the variable “Rule”. To various
degrees and differently in each canton, fiscal rules are expected to regulate the level of public spending and public
revenues. But as demonstrated in the simultaneous equations model, the variable “Rule” is included as a determinant
of “Revenue” and “Expense”, whereas “Revenue” and “Expense” are explanatory endogenous variables. Consequently,
we cannot rule out that the influence of “Rule” be (at least marginally) captured by “Revenue” (“Expense”) in the
explanation of “Expense” (“Revenue”).
92The model tested in this research is different to the one of Luechinger and Schaltegger (2011). Indeed, whereas
they investigate whether fiscal rules affect the occurrence of public deficits in Swiss cantons, we question the influence
of such fiscal rules on the level of public deficits over time. Not following the same approach as the one initially
proposed by Luechinger and Schaltegger (2011), this might therefore partly explain the results ensuing from our
research.
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day funds that have allowed US States to reach targets fixed by budget rules. That way, it
would seem that those targets could not be achieved by simply adjusting public revenues and
public spending. There is every reason to believe that the legal framework does not provide
enough flexibility to do so. Consequently, since governments (and thus Swiss cantons) cannot
play with “common” public revenues and public spending to reach the target fixed by budget
rules, they need alternative solutions. Whereas some governments (EU countries) resort
to “corrective” creative accounting to artificially conceal public deficits, some others (US
States) use legal devices like rainy day funds to do so. Then, in Switzerland, the alternative
solution embraced by cantons can be assimilated to a sort of “preventive” creative accounting
performed through the use of additional depreciation charges. Regardless to the solution
used, strong evidence supports the idea that the constraints fixed by budget rules do not
appear achievable by themselves. In other words, it is as if a step was missing between the
objective to be reached and its fulfillment. And so, it may reasonably be asserted that to be
effective, budget rules should be systematically accompanied by a legal measure allowing to
achieve its targets.
A further policy implication should be drawn in conjunction with the implementation
of more stringent international accounting standards for the public sector, like the IPSAS.
The main objective of the IPSAS is to guarantee the transparency of governments’ financial
statements. In other words, if fully applied, these standards should provide a true and fair
view of government financial performance and position. Consequently, the IPSAS should act
as a barrier against the creative accounting by forbidding tricks. The acknowledged final aim
is to facilitate the decision-making process and to give way to policy makers taking better
decisions. Of course this aim is legitimate, notably in case governments are facing an unsus-
tainable financial situation. However, this position must be considered with critical distance,
as shown by the case of the Swiss cantons. In this particular case, creative accounting op-
erations, and specifically additional depreciation charges, represent an elbow room to ensure
structural surpluses, but also to prevent structural deficits.
Without this accounting trick the financial situation of the Swiss cantons could not have
been as sound as it is now. In the case of accounting standards ruling out the possibility of
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using accounting tricks, the structural surplus would be truly and fairly reported. If this was
the case, perhaps tax cuts or spending increases would have been claimed for possibly with
threatening consequences on the fiscal sustainability. Moreover, without a structural surplus
obtained partially through such gimmicks, governments could have strong incentives to resort
to drastic tax increases and/or spending cuts in order to reach the financial equilibrium.
In such cases, the provision of public services over time would be precarious. The latter
demonstration strongly suggests the existence of a tradeoff between fiscal soundness and a
true and fair financial reporting in the public sector.
Nonetheless, in spite of the undeniable need to safeguard a reasonable degree of trans-
parency, it can be reasonably supported that creative accounting is a lesser evil since it allows
to ensure fiscal soundness and therefore a constant provision of public services on the long
run. Our recommendation in order to cope with the above mentioned tradeoff, is to give
formal legal force to loopholes such as additional depreciation charges since their capacity to
avoid a structural deficit has been demonstrated.
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9 Quantitative impact of finance ministers’ personal characteristics
on the use of creative accounting
In this section, we introduce the model covering the determinants of creative accounting
operations recorded in Swiss cantons. First, we present the set of variables we use in the
research. We then present the three econometric models we use to test the previously for-
mulated hypothesis. Indeed, we resort to three complementary estimation strategies: (1) we
tackle the determinants of the creative accounting operations level through linear regression
models, (2) we also investigate the determinants of the creative accounting operations level
through a Tobit regression model since the dependent variable is censored at 0 and (3) we
tackle the probability that the use of creative accounting occurs through logistic regression
models. The respective econometric estimators for each model are also presented. Finally,
we present and discuss the results.
Before going further, preliminary remarks are necessary. Although we are interested
in highlighting the finance ministers’ personal characteristics that matter for the resort to
creative accounting, we also want to provide glimpses as to those personal characteristics
that indirectly and structurally influence the governments’ financial performance. As the
use of creative accounting (at least additional depreciation charges) structurally impacts
governments’ financial performance, finance ministers resorting the most largely to accounting
gimmicks are also those who structurally influence the cantonal financial situation. Indeed,
it is not directly but through the policies they implement that finance ministers structurally
impact the balance of the statement of financial performance. Consequently, as special funds
do not structurally influence the governments’ financial performance, the current section is
only devoted to the role played by finance ministers in the record of additional depreciation
charges during the reporting process.
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9.1 Variables93
Dependent variables
Depending on the estimation strategy we perform, two different dependent variables are
considered. The variable “ADC” is used for the first and second estimation strategy. As
for the explanation of public deficits, “ADC” accounts for the total amount of additional
depreciation charges recorded in reported figures and is expressed in real terms per capita.
We also have to bear in mind that the use of additional depreciation charges is asymmetric. In
other words, this trick may only be used to hide surpluses by artificially increasing operating
expenses. Swiss cantons can thus only embrace two choices when a surplus occurs during
the reporting process: resorting to additional depreciation charges or not. For the second
estimation strategy, we use the variable “ADCbinary” which highlights whether or not a Swiss
canton resorts to such a practice and has the value 1 when a Swiss canton uses additional
depreciation charges and 0 otherwise.
Variables of interest
As discussed in subsection 4.3, the variables that are the object of our attention are as follows:
“Balance” is the cantonal corrected balance of the statement of financial performance
as defined in subsection 6.3. As a reminder, “Balance” may be either positive in cases of
surpluses (“Surplus”) or negative otherwise (“Deficit”). The variable is expressed in real term
per capita. As already argued, larger corrected balances should be associated with larger
amounts of additional depreciation charges or a larger probability they will be used, since
finance ministers may want to avoid political pressure aiming at reducing tax rates and/or
at increasing public spending.
“Ideology” refers to the finance ministers political leaning. In this research, we expect that
left-wing finance ministers should be associated with higher amounts of additional deprecia-
tion charges. To operationalize the variable, we use the political ideology scale proposed by
93Table 17 below reports summary statistics for variables used in the various models dealing with the determinants
of creative accounting.
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Ladner (2006), which assigns a value to each political party. This scale is bounded between
0 and 10; 0 being the far left and 10 the far right wing.
“Experience” captures the finance ministers political experience. As hypothesized, more
experienced finance ministers should resort to creative accounting operations more actively
since they should be more capable to create information asymmetry between themselves, on
one hand, and other stakeholders (spending ministers, deputies, citizens and media) on the
other hand. The variable measures the finance ministers’ tenure on a monthly basis and is
incrementally operationalized, i.e. the time in position increases year after year.
“Education” is the set of variables capturing the finance ministers’ educational back-
ground. While we focus on finance ministers having a university degree in economics (“Eco-
nomics”) and expect these ministers to be associated with larger amounts of creative account-
ing or a larger probability to resort to it, we also control for other trainings. We take into
account finance ministers having done an apprenticeship (“Apprenticeship”) or that have a
university degree in political sciences (“Politics”) or in law (“Law”) or any other university
degree (“Other”). These five variables are dummy variables taking the value 1 regarding the
finance ministers’ educational background and the value 0 otherwise.
Control variables
In order to isolate the effect of our variables of interest, we also control for other variables’
influence on additional depreciation charges. For each control variable, we mention how the
variable is compiled, its own expected effect on additional depreciation charges and the source
of the information we used. The control variables introduced in the model are as follows:
“Error” reflects the tax revenue budgeting errors. Here we assume that in a situation
where reported tax revenues are higher than initially forecasted, finance ministers may have
strong incentives to hide the good news by resorting to creative accounting operations. A
larger underestimation of tax revenues should therefore be associated with higher amounts
of additional depreciation charges. Lastly, the variable is expressed in real terms per capita.
“Rule” captures the stringency of cantonal budget constraints. According to Milesi-
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Ferretti (2004), fiscal rules may provide the incentive for creative accounting. Moreover,
as mentioned by Drazen (2002) and Von Hagen and Wolff (2006), more binding fiscal rules
are generally associated to harder accounting gimmicks. Following both assertions, we as-
sume that Swiss cantons having to deal with more stringent fiscal rules will resort to cre-
ative accounting more widely and more frequently. Using the operationalization proposed by
Luechinger and Schaltegger (2011), the variable presents as follows: cantons having the most
stringent fiscal rules take the value 3, the value 2 corresponds to fairly stringent rules, the
value 1 is for the least stringent rules and 0 otherwise.
“Election” refers to years where cantonal government are elected. Since it is strongly ten-
able that finance ministers are assessed by voters on their capacity to ensure fiscal soundness,
they have a vested interest to report - high - surpluses when an election occurs in order to
increase the reelection chances. Consequently, we expect that the resort to creative account-
ing is lower during election years. The effect of elections on creative accounting operations is
captured by a dummy variable taking the value of 1 during election years and 0 otherwise.94
“Concordance” reflects the solidarity between the executive and the legislative powers.
According to Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Volkerink and De Haan (2001), if there is no
concordance between both powers, they will probably face difficulties to reach agreements.
Both bodies having different interests in such a situation, finance ministers would have even
more incentives to hide public surpluses through accounting gimmicks in order to reach their
own targets. As a consequence, the lower the concordance between the government and
the parliament, the higher the resort to creative accounting by finance ministers should be.
Finally, the variable is measured by the proportion of government parties represented in the
parliament.95
“Coalition” is the political fragmentation of cantonal governments. As also revealed by
Roubini and Sachs (1989) and more recently by Volkerink and De Haan (2001), such a
fragmentation is associated with higher public deficits. We may thus reasonably expect that
finance ministers performing in such a context would tend to resort to creative accounting
more largely in order to ensure fiscal soundness. In other words, the larger the political
94Source: Année politique suisse, BADAC and Swiss Federal Statistics Office (SFSO).
95Source: Swiss Federal Statistics Office (SFSO).
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fragmentation of the government, the higher the amounts of creative accounting should be.
The indicator capturing the political fragmentation measures the number of parties in a
cantonal government.96
“Age” measures the finance ministers’ age during the period they are in position.
“Gender” indicates the finance ministers’ gender. The variable takes the value 1 when the
finance minister is female and the value 0 otherwise.
9.2 Potential endogeneous covariates
Endogeneity may be an important issue as it may cause the estimated parameters to be both
biased and inconsistent. We therefore question whether some endogeneous covariates are
present in models to be estimated in this subsection.
One must first tackle whether the selection of politicians gives rise to potential endo-
goneity. Indeed, since ministers in Swiss cantons are elected through the direct universal
suffrage, i.e. directly by citizens, one could argue that the ministers’ personal characteristics
are determined by citizens preferences. Despite everything, here we argue that our model is
not affected by endogeneity. First of all, the idea that creative accounting operations have a
reverse causal effect on citizens voting behavior (or on the finance ministers personal char-
acteristics) does not appear realistic. Although in the Swiss context most of the creative
accounting operations are transparent and reported in public figures (at least additional de-
preciation charges), they do not receive attention from the public and especially from the
media. It is mainly the balance of the statement of financial performance that is the subject
of such attention. Secondly, while politicians are elected through the direct universal suf-
frage, citizens do not have any influence on which ministry will be assigned to which elected
politician. It is quite the contrary since the allocation of the ministries is carried out after
the election and is monitored by implicit rules (e.g. years in office, political experience, etc.).
Hence, the allocation of ministries mainly ensues from a bargain between elected politicians.
96Source: Année politique suisse
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Table 17: Summary statistics
Variables Definition / Unit of measurement Source Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
Error direct tax revenue budgeting error in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts -88.038 230.017 -2’150.996 1’231.055 858
Rule Stringency of cantonal budget rules Lueschinger & Schaltegger (2012) 0.515 0.949 0.000 3.000 858
Election dummy taking the value 1 in election years APS 0.261 0.439 0.000 1.000 858
Coalition number of political parties in the government cabinet BADAC / APS 3.432 0.911 1.000 5.000 858
Concordance percentage of the seats in the parliament that are occupied
by members of parties represented in the government
APS 0.837 0.141 0.000 1.000 858
Age age of the cantonal finance ministers Own data 52.305 6.778 32.000 69.000 858
Gender dummy taking the value 1 for female finance ministers Own data 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 858
Balance SPER-balance in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts 129.777 533.207 -3’158.800 2’376.233 729
Surplus Balance > 0; in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts 384.615 402.320 1.080 2’376.230 470
Deficit Balance < 0; in real CHF per capita Cantonal financial accounts -332.670 418.341 -3’158.800 -1.680 259
Ideology political ideology of the cantonal finance ministers FKF 5.956 1.348 2.600 7.700 858
Experience number of months in position Own data 77.960 47.399 7.500 219.000 858
Apprenticeship dummy taking the value 1 for apprenticeship background Own data 0.270 0.444 0.000 1.000 858
Economics dummy taking the value 1 for a background in economics Own data 0.198 0.399 0.000 1.000 858
Law dummy taking the value 1 for a background in law Own data 0.406 0.491 0.000 1.000 858
Politics dummy taking the value 1 for a background in politics Own data 0.029 0.168 0.000 1.000 858
Année Politique Suisse (APS), Database on Swiss cantons and Towns (BADAC), Fachgruppe für Kantonale Finanzfragen (FKF), Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(SFSO)
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Finally, as argued by Dreher et al. (2009), “profession and education of politicians is al-
most idiosyncratic. While politicians with different profession and education pursue different
policies, voters can usually choose between few candidates running for office only. They can
thus not freely select a candidate with a certain profession and education, but only between
profession and education of few opponents”. Consequently, reverse causality should not be
an issue in this particular case.
Then, as demonstrated in the previous section, additional depreciation charges reported in
year t-1 (“ADC(-1)”) significantly impact the corrected balance of the statement of financial
performance (“Balance”) reported in year t . Then, since we have formulated the hypothesis
that the corrected balance of the statement of financial performance determines the level
of additional depreciation charges, a reverse causal effect between the variables “Balance”
and “ADC” could be suspected. Nevertheless, while the past (“ADC(-1)”) affects the future
(“Balance”) as brought out in the first empirical research, the inverse effect is unlikely to
occur. Despite this argumentation, we want to make sure the variable “Balance” is not
endogenous in the current model. Following the Hausman test procedure for endogeneity,
results highlight the variable “Balance” as being exogenous. There is therefore no need to
instrumentalize the variable “Balance”. The procedure and the results of the Hausman test
are presented in Appendix Q.
9.3 Estimation strategies
In the current subsection, we present the various estimation strategies employed in order to
solve the second research question. We start by presenting the linear regression models and
then the Tobit and logistic regression models. Nevertheless, particular attention is paid to
linear regression models since we are especially interested in knowing the determinants of the
amounts recorded as additional depreciation charges.
Linear regression
In order to identify the determinants of the amounts recorded as additional depreciation
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charges as well as testing our hypothesis, we first test the following model:
ADCijt =α+ βBalanceit + δIdeologyijt + ϑExperienceijt + γEducationijt
+ θWijt + ϕZit + µi + τt + ijt
where i identifies Swiss cantons, j identifies finance ministers and t identifies years. ADC
is our measure of additional depreciation charges. α is the constant term. Then, Balance
is the variable referring to the corrected balance of the statement of financial performance
and β is the associated coefficient measuring the effect on additional depreciation charges.
Ideology and Experience respectively measure the finance ministers’ political ideology and
their tenure. δ and ϑ are the respective associated coefficients. The matrix Education is
constituted of variables measuring the finance ministers’ educational background as explained
above and γ is their associated vector of parameters. Then, W and Z are two matrix of
controls. Whereas W reflects finance ministers personal characteristics, Z is constituted by
controls at the cantonal level. θ and ϕ are their respective associated vectors of parameters.
Finally, while µ and τ are respectively the cantonal and time fixed effects,  is the error term.
Moreover, as depicted in Subsection 6.3 devoted to descriptive statistics, it appears that
the use of creative accounting would differ depending on whether finance ministers have
to cope with a surplus or a deficit. To investigate whether finance ministers behave dif-
ferently according to the financial situation, we re-estimate linear regression models by re-
operationalizing the variable “Balance” as “Surplus” when there is an excess of operating
revenues over operating expenses (Balance > 0). In the same way, we re-estimate linear
regression models by replacing the variable “Balance” by “Deficit” when operating revenues
are smaller than operating expenses (Balance < 0).
To ensure the significance and the consistency of our results, some elements must be taken
into account. First of all, for different reasons, Swiss cantons are relatively heterogeneous in
terms of budget size. Thence, as highlighted by the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, the
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error terms strongly suffer of heteroskedasticity, although the model is expressed per capita.97
Secondly, serial correlation may also be an issue as most of the variables depend on their
past values. While the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation does not reveal the presence of
serial correlation of order one, the Arellano-Bond test highlights it but only at the 90% level.
Nevertheless, the latter test strongly rejects the the presence of autocorrelation of order two.98
Thirdly, as cantons are part of the same countries, error terms may be contemporaneously
correlated. Fourthly, in the light of the cantons heterogeneity, we include cantonal fixed
effects in our models. These fixed effects allow to capture cantonal differences that can
hardly be measured or observed in reality.99 The Hausman test validates our decision to
include cantonal fixed effects.100 At the same time, in order to take into account any time
specific effect that is not included in the model, we also include time fixed effects. The
Wald test validates the inclusion of such time fixed effects even in the presence of cantonal
fixed effects101. However, in spite of the inclusion of both cantonal and time fixed effects,
multicolinearity is not an issue.102 Fifthly, it must be noted that our panel is unbalanced as
not every Swiss canton had adopted the HAM1 in 1980. Nevertheless, it does not cause any
econometric problem since the HAM1 was randomly implemented over time by cantons. In
other words, the reasons why we have missing data for some cantons are exogenous. Lastly,
one must bear in mind that our panel is based on the 26 Swiss cantons (I = 26) over the period
1980 - 2012 (T = 33); the time series is longer than the cross section. Nevertheless, according
to Beck (2004), econometric estimators are better adapted to cases where the inverse occurs.
Given the above mentioned characteristics of our data set, three different econometric
97Results for the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test are presented in Table 61 in Appendix Q.
98Results are reported in Table 62 in Appendix Q.
99Among those differences, we might think of cultural differences. Although economic aspects are mostly expected
to drive the finance ministers’ use of additional depreciation charges, we may not rule out that each canton follows
its own rules based on its culture. For instance, we may reasonably argue that cantons follow a path dependency
concerning their use of specific accounting practices. In other words, the idea that incumbent finance ministers strictly
act as their predecessors regarding the resort to additional depreciation charges is defendable. Moreover, it could be
ethic reasons that convinced some cantons to not use additional depreciation charges whereas in some others their use
is not subjected to debate. It would notably be these ethical and philosophical issues that persuaded some cantons,
at least partially, to implement IPSAS norms instead of the HAM1. Cultural aspects being delicate to operationalize,
we prefer to include cantonal fixed effects in our model instead.
100Results relative to the Hausman test are reported in Table 63 in Appendix Q. Moreover, the inclusion of fixed
effects is more relevant than random effects when studying a full population, i.e. the 26 Swiss cantons (Nerlove and
Balestra 1996).
101Results of the Wald test are presented in Table 64 in Appendix Q.
102The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is presented in Table 65 in Appendix Q.
155
estimators are considered. First of all, we use an OLS estimator including cantonal and
time fixed effects. Moreover, the error terms are clustered at the cantonal level in order to
correct heteroskedasticity and potential autocorrelation within cantons. Then, since we may
reasonably expect that error terms are also autocorrelated at the individual level, error terms
are also clustered at the finance minister level. Secondly, we consider an estimator proposed
by Baltagi and Wu (1999) which fits a cross sectional time series regression model when the
error terms are first order correlated (REGAR). This estimator is particularly relevant as it
has been especially developed in order to support exogeneously unbalanced panel data and
may incorporate cantonal fixed effects. Thirdly, we use the Panel Corrected Standard Errror
(PCSE) estimator proposed by Beck and Katz (1995). This estimator has the advantage of
correcting heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Then, it also allows to deal
with first order autocorrelation. Furthermore, the panel does not need to be balanced and the
estimator efficiently works when the cross section is smaller than the time series. Consistent
with the two other estimation strategies, cantonal and time fixed effects are incorporated
when models are estimated through PCSE.
Tobit regression
Since reported amounts of additional depreciation charges cannot be negative, those amounts
are by definition bounded between 0 and infinity (at least in theory). Consequently, as ob-
servations are censored, linear regressions such as OLS regressions might lead to inconsistent
estimates. In such circumstances, the econometric literature recommends to use Tobit models
that are relevant when the dependent variable is observed over some interval of its support.
Tobit models were first discussed by Tobin (1958).
Through a Tobit estimation, the general model to be estimated is as follows:
ADC∗ijt = αi + βXijt + ijt
where the latent variable (ADC∗) depends on a vector of regressors (X) and where β is
the associated vector of parameters. The idiosyncratic error is represented by . Finally, i
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identifies Swiss cantons, j identifies finance ministers and t identifies years.
Moreover, as in our particular case, for the left censoring at L = 0, we observe ADCijt
when
ADCijt =
 ADC
∗
ijt if ADC
∗
ijt > 0
0 if ADC∗ijt ≤ 0
However, as indicated above, error terms suffer of heteroskedasticity and are potentially
correlated within individuals (i.e. within Swiss cantons). Both particularities therefore ne-
cessitate the implementation of robust standard errors. However, for Tobit models, such
a transformation of the error terms requires the implementation of pooled estimators (also
called population averaged estimators). Concretely, pooled estimators simply regress the
dependent variable on an intercept and regressors, using both between (cross-section) and
within (time series) variation in the data (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). Nevertheless, pooled
estimators are assumed to lead to inconsistent parameter estimates when individual fixed
effects are needed. Despite this drawback, pooled estimation is preferred in order to have
standard errors clustered at the cantonal level.
Logistic regression
Through this third estimation strategy, we want to tackle the probability that the resort to
creative accounting occurs. The dependent variable for the logistic regression is “ADCbinary”,
which is a binary variable taking the value 1 when additional depreciation charges are used
and the value 0 otherwise.
The model to be estimated takes the following form:
Pr(ADCbinary = 1 | Xijt, β) = Λ(X ′ijtβ)
where Pr denotes the probability that creative accounting is used and Λ is the cumula-
tive distribution function of the logistic distribution. X denotes the matrix of independent
variables and β is the associated vector of parameters to be estimated through the maxi-
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mum likelihood procedure. The independent variables are the same as those for the linear
regressions. Then, a cluster-robust estimate is used to correct for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation for a given canton.103 Finally, i identifies Swiss cantons, j identifies finance
ministers and t identifies years.
Then, in order to ensure the robustness of our results, we also ran a probit model which
is very similar to the logit one. The difference between both estimation strategies only
relies on their cumulative distribution function since the probit model follows the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Cameron and Trivedi (2009) assert
that in many cases the fitted probability is very similar over a large part of the range of
X
′
ijtβ.104
9.4 Results
In the current subsection, we report the results obtained from the three different estima-
tion strategies. Table 18 reports results for which all variables of interests are estimated
all together in a large model.105 Moreover, we first consider cases during which it is the
governments’ financial performance as a whole that influences the resort to creative
accounting. Then, regarding the variables relative to the finance ministers’ educational back-
ground, we notice that the category “Other” reflecting the other university degrees is omitted.
Hence, the interpretation of the results regarding the impact of the finance ministers’ educa-
tional background on the level of additional depreciation charges is relative to this baseline
group.
When looking at Table 18, we note that not all explanatory variables are individually
significant. Nonetheless, the joint statistics (F-test and Chi2) reveal that coefficients are
jointly statistically significant. This is true independently from the estimation strategy taken
into account.
103Similarly to the Tobit estimation, robust standard errors necessitate to run a population averaged model instead
of fixed effects models.
104It is therefore commonly assumed that the choice between logit versus probit mainly depends on individual
preferences. Not wanting to arbitrarily make this choice, we consider more legitimate to employ both estimation
strategies.
105Short models specifically devoted to each variable of interest (“Balance”, “Ideology”, “Experience” and “Education”)
are presented in Appendix Q from Table 66 to Table 71.
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Table 18: Importance of finance ministers on the use of creative accounting - Main results
OLS PCSE REGAR Tobit Logit Probit
Error -0.009 -0.020 -0.023 0.080 0.000** 0.000**
(0.033) (0.043) (0.042) (0.114) (0.000) (0.000)
Rules 15.540 15.364 17.898 21.818 0.141 0.103
(23.137) (35.110) (22.320) (48.078) (0.251) (0.157)
Election -4.580 -8.631 -6.715 -8.168 0.045 0.023
(15.170) (14.865) (17.447) (31.107) (0.111) (0.069)
Coalition 30.860 26.536 25.012 -20.480 -0.269 -0.174
(18.906) (23.641) (22.127) (47.519) (0.188) (0.117)
Concordance -0.355 -0.246 -0.216 0.541 0.001 0.001
(0.759) (0.886) (0.770) (2.750) (0.009) (0.005)
Age 3.427 3.774 3.376 7.180 0.026 0.016
(2.513) (2.781) (2.237) (7.067) (0.032) (0.019)
Gender 11.426 0.267 2.511 43.866 -0.003 -0.007
(46.826) (62.457) ( 34.330) (117.662) (0.368) (0.223)
Balance 0.091*** 0.067*** 0.073*** 0.266*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000)
Ideology 9.757 6.951 9.032 19.849 -0.037 -0.022
(10.385) (10.299) (9.742) (44.002) (0.124) (0.077)
Experience -0.220 -0.277 -0.215 -0.755 -0.004 -0.002
(0.250) (0.320) (0.260) (0.651) (0.003) (0.001)
Apprenticeship -4.722 -4.943 -6.048 43.376 0.314 0.184
(32.044) (41.098) (38.293) (96.822) (0.349) (0.209)
Economics 151.036*** 144.224*** 156.755*** 264.580* 0.631 0.408
(47.782) (48.902) (41.804) (141.879) (0.415) (0.251)
Law 29.527 14.285 21.277 21.005 0.101 0.067
(31.116) (44.743) (37.351) (87.433) (0.395) (0.238)
Politics 19.782 -4.331 3.368 87.302 0.913 0.554
(71.728) (135.294) (75.946) (140.349) (0.738) (0.453)
Constant -278.911 -410.235 -275.811 -701.642 -0.991 -0.600
(199.580) (257.193) (147.903) (571.051) (2.175) (1.329)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES NO NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES NO NO NO
R2 / Log likelihood 23.080 28.030 21.03 -2519.340 0.000 0.000
Joint 2.310 1.480 3.740 3.080 44.740 44.150
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.007 0.000 0.000
N 729 729 703 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
159
The first element of analysis concerns the impact of the corrected balance of the statement
of financial performance on creative accounting operations. When considering linear regres-
sion models (OLS, PCSE and REGAR), the parameters associated to the variable “Balance”
point out a positive and significant relationship with the level of additional depreciation
charges. This means that reported amounts of additional depreciation charges increase with
the size of the corrected balance of the statement of financial performance. In other words,
larger corrected balances are associated to larger amounts of additional depreciation charges.
In the light of the results obtained through the OLS estimation, a larger balance of 1 CHF per
capita, just before reporting, leads finance ministers to record additional depreciation charges
of about 0.09 CHF per capita. Nonetheless, coefficients appear to be sensitively smaller when
estimated through PCSE and REGAR. Results ensuing from the Tobit estimator appear to
be consistent since the parameter associated to the variable “Balance” is also positive and
strongly significant. Then, the two other estimators (Logit and Probit) tackle the influence of
the corrected balance of statement of financial performance on the probability that additional
depreciation charges are reported in public figures. The parameter associated to the variable
“Balance” is positive and statistically significant at the 99% level. This result provides strong
evidence that the occurrence of creative accounting operations is strongly tied to the balance
of the statement of financial performance. Moreover, since the relation is positive, the larger
the balance before reporting is, the larger the probability that finance ministers resort to
accounting manipulations.
This being said, results do not support our hypothesis that the finance ministers’ political
ideology matters for the level of additional depreciation charges. The variable “Ideology” is
not statistically significant and its associated coefficient reveals a positive sign contrary to our
expectations. The same evidence is seen when we tackle whether the probability of recording
additional depreciation charges depends on the finance ministers’ political ideology. Results
do not show a significant influence of the variable “Ideology” on the occurrence of creative
accounting operations either. However, whereas the coefficient of the variable “Ideology” is
revealed to be positive when the model is estimated through linear regressions, the coefficient
turns out to be negative when the model is estimated either by Logit or by Probit. As the
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the variable “Ideology” does not show any statistical significance, our hypothesis stipulating
that left-wing finance ministers would use additional depreciation charges more often and to
a larger extent than right-wing ones must be rejected. Interestingly enough, the resort to
creative accounting and especially to additional depreciation appears to be independent from
the finance ministers’ political ideology.
Similar conclusions are drawn regarding the finance ministers’ political experience since
the variable “Experience” does not show any statistical significance. Moreover, conversely
to our expectations, its associated parameter is negative. One must therefore conclude that
the greater experience gained through a longer tenure as finance minister is not associated
with a larger resort to creative accounting operations. The sign of the coefficient associated
to the variable “Experience” even tends to demonstrate the contrary, i.e. more experienced
finance ministers would resort to creative accounting operations to a lesser extent. Moreover,
analogous results are obtained through logistic regressions. Therefore, the time a finance
minister spends in office does not affect his probability to manipulate public figures during
the reporting process either.
The following variables of interest examine whether the finance ministers’ educational
background determines the amounts recorded as additional depreciation charges. Consis-
tently with our hypothesis, the parameter associated to the variable “Economics” is positive
and significant. This is at least true for linear regression models (OLS, PCSE and REGAR).
Finance ministers who have a university degree in economics use additional depreciation
charges to a greater extent than finance minister who have another education. This supports
our belief that the former have better knowledge in accounting which provides them with
greater abilities to manipulate reported figures when needed. No other training significantly
determines the reported amounts of additional depreciation charges. Quite similar results
are obtained with the Tobit estimator. However, although the variable “Economics” shows a
positive sign, it is only statistically significant at the 90% level. The picture is then slightly
different when considering results obtained through logistic regression models. In these mod-
els, the variables of interest indicates whether the finance ministers’ educational background
influences the probability of recording additional depreciation charges. Contrary to linear
161
regression models, the parameters associated to the variable “Economics” are not significant
although they highlight a positive sign. Therefore, in the light of the logistic regression
models, results do not verify our hypothesis suggesting that finance ministers in possession
of a university degree in economics are more likely to use additional depreciation charges
than finance ministers who have any other training. Nonetheless, when trained economists
resort to creative accounting, they book larger amounts of additional depreciation charges
compared to other finance ministers.
Turning to the set of control variables present in linear regression models, none of them
ever brings out a significant influence on the amount recorded as additional depreciation
charges. As to control variables estimated through logistic regressions, comparable results
are obtained. Only the variable “Error” appears to significantly influence the probability
of resorting to additional depreciation charges. As hypothesized, the underestimation of
tax revenues during the budgeting process is equivalent to good news during the reporting
process, corrective action may thus be needed to hide these higher revenues. However, this
result must be interpreted with caution since the significance of the variable “Error” is only
revealed with Logit and Probit estimators.
As shown in Subsection 6.3, the use of creative accounting in Swiss cantons seems to
vary depending on whether finance ministers have to deal with public surpluses or public
deficits. Table 19 below presents results for cases during which finance ministers enjoy the
occurrence of a surplus of the statement of financial performance. According to
results ensuing from this new estimation strategy, the large model reveals that a surplus of 1
CHF per capita engenders the resort to additional depreciation charges by finance ministers
comprised between 0.13 CHF per capita (REGAR) and 0.19 CHF per capita (OLS) on
average. Moreover, similar evidence is provided by results ensuing from the model estimated
with the Tobit estimator. In both short and large models, the parameter associated to the
variable “Surplus” is positive and strongly statistically significant.
However, whereas the coefficient of the variable “Economics” shows a positive sign, the
variable is only statistically significant at the 95% and 90% levels when estimated with OLS
and REGAR estimators respectively. The influence of trained economists on the amount
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recorded as additional depreciation charges is even revealed to be insignificant when the
model is estimated with the Tobit estimator.
Table 19: Results of the linear regression models - Estimation with "Surplus"
OLS REGAR Tobit
Short Large Short Large Short Large
Error 0.003 -0.007 -0.044 -0.047 0.033 0.009
(0.038) (0.042) (0.048) (0.048) (0.101) (0.118)
Rule 46.380* 49.105** 51.027* 59.177** 28.986 14.905
(24.907) (24.689) (29.303) (29.682) (64.360) (57.479)
Election -16.118 -16.099 -20.191 -19.891 -23.945 -20.748
(20.110) (19.837) (20.166) (20.389) (23.585) (24.386)
Coalition 12.728 17.292 -1.275 -0.683 -54.905 -60.945
(23.758) (23.589) (27.813) (27.615) (57.799) (57.949)
Concordance -1.846 -1.384** -1.624* -1.403 -1.182 -0.016
(0.740) (0.553) (0.901) (0.879) (3.453) (3.170)
Age 1.731 2.590 1.112 1.416 2.066 3.415
(2.617) (2.859) (2.236) (2.666) (6.430) (7.301)
Gender 109.456** 103.486* 78.255* 80.803* 148.076 152.335
(50.025) (52.992) (45.798) (45.141) (110.839) (130.687)
Surplus 0.221*** 0.193*** 0.158*** 0.138*** 0.311*** 0.264***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.034) (0.035) (0.109) (0.083)
Ideology 12.687 0.492 24.020
(14.383) 14.781 (43.523)
Experience -0.019 0.088 -0.115
(0.303) (0.338) (0..797)
Apprenticeship -39.613 -36.753 -45.161
(47.666) (52.475) (93.747)
Economics 110.304** 96.686* 188.049
(49.780) (54.895) (118.067)
Law 8.522 -14.711 2.489
(45.119) (50.541) (78.634)
Politics -11.272 -77.635 95.426
(102.853) (111.049) (687.842)
Constant 7.695 -157.114 308.356 319.557 -14.341 -302.536
(193.533) (205.027) (104.274) (116.599) (407.857) (484.975)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES YES NO NO
R-Squared 0.173 0.190 0.141 0.177 -2009.241 -1998.947
F-stat 4.650 4.530 2.570 2.530 2.850 3.110
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.007
N 470 470 444 444 470 470
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Then, paying attention to the set of control variables, fiscal rules appear to influence the
use of creative accounting in cases of surpluses as the parameter associated to the variable
“Rule” is positive and statistically significant at the 95% level. This suggests that, in presence
of surpluses, finance ministers would use to additional depreciation charges to a larger extent
when they face more stringent fiscal rules. Nonetheless, this finding is not confirmed by
results obtained with the Tobit estimator.
Moreover, although the resort to additional depreciation charges should only occur when
the balance of the statement of financial performance is positive, statistical analysis has
demonstrated that the use of creative accounting in Swiss cantons also occurs during time
of deficits. Finance ministers may therefore be suspected of having sometimes resorted to
big bath accounting when they had to cope with a deficit of the statement of financial
performance. Detailed results of this new estimation strategy are presented in Table 20
below. In the light of the results presented in the table below, it cannot be asserted that
big bath accounting has been significantly carried out in Swiss cantons through the use of
additional depreciation charges. Indeed, although the coefficient associated to the variable
“Deficit” is positive, the variable is not statistically significant. In other words, amounts
booked as additional depreciation have not increased with the size of public deficits over the
considered period.
Furthermore, political experience seems to have influenced the way finance ministers use
creative accounting in cases of public deficits. More precisely, more experienced finance
ministers are associated with smaller amounts of additional depreciation charges. The vari-
able “Experience” shows a negative coefficient. However, results should be interpreted with
caution as the variable is only statistically significant at the 99% level when the model is
estimated with the REGAR estimator.
Like the previous models revealed, trained economists appear to be associated to larger
amounts of additional depreciation charges. Nonetheless, although the variable “Economics”
shows a positive sign, its statistical significance is relatively low. Besides, the variable does
not show any statistical significance when the model is estimated with the Tobit estimator.
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Table 20: Results of the linear regressions model - Estimation with "Deficit"
OLS REGAR Tobit
Short Large Short Large Short Large
Error 0.020 0.064 0.047 0.095 0.146 0.162
(0.077) (0.090) (0.095) (0.098) (0.308) (0.303)
Rule -114.101** -89.207** -140.887** -62.911 -32.024 -61.390
(54.851) (45.224) (62.862) (63.824) (129.861) (125.516)
Election -3.795 0.342 -24.275 -2.457 68.893 68.054
(34.741) (33.393) (31.608) (30.452) (118.972) (124.846)
Coalition 72.574 78.145 66.652 29.757 176.152 158.383
(50.707) (51.347) (59.470) (59.818) (176.139) (206.784)
Concordance -2.589 -2.941 0.158 1.650 3.950 3.708
(2.384) (2.403) (3.136) (3.081) (11.606) (9.070)
Age 0.945 10.239 1.934 3.081** 9.151 28.621
(3.429) (8.337) (5.162) (6.996) (17.024) (24.098)
Gender -59.614 -57.054 -125.749 -142.564* -199.947 -159.957
(107.462) (87.432) (83.834) (82.674) (476.711) (321.310)
Deficit 0.077 0.083 0.049 0.054 0.176 0.106
(0.065) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) (0.267) (0.269)
Ideology -16.029 -19.557 7.989
(13.565) (21.020) (136.075)
Experience -1.445* -1.954*** -3.919
(0.860) (0.660) (2.781)
Apprenticeship 95.0953** 104.117 300.671
(45.052) (87.862) (263.273)
Economics 159.878** 192.019* 397.621
(78.855) (108.471) (405.012)
Law 13.407 -66.134 56.683
(43.701) (95.725) (246.117)
Politics 53.235 -7.199 263.370
(112.282) (162.754) (307.382)
Constant 31.549 -311.678 4.588 178.650 -2057.187 -2890.218
(225.341) (412.138) (98.861) (94.355) (1720.788) (1776.776)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES YES NO NO
R-Squared 0.179 0.255 0.189 0.247 -476.603 -470.696
F-stat 88.750 82.950 2.370 2.860 0.260 1.370
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.973 0.237
N 259 259 233 233 259 259
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Hereafter, when looking at the set of control variables, the variable “Rule” seems to offer
interesting information. In cases of deficits, it would appear that finance ministers resort
less to creative accounting when they simultaneously have to deal with stringent fiscal rules.
That way, in such particular circumstances, the more finance ministers have to deal with
stringent a fiscal rules, the least they book additional depreciation charges. This is at least
what the negative sign of the coefficient associated to the variable “Rule” suggests. However,
this relationship between the stringency of fiscal rules and the use of additional depreciation
charges has only been revealed to be statistically significant when models are estimated
through OLS and REGAR estimators.
Finally, we may conclude that the resort to creative accounting is mainly driven by the
financial situation in Swiss cantons. However, we cannot rule out that the finance ministers’
educational background is also a crucial determinant of the level of additional depreciation
charges reported in public figures.
9.5 Robustness checks
In order to ensure the validity of the initial results, four robustness checks were carried out. As
previously mentioned, the focus of this second analysis is on investigating the determinants
of the amounts reported as additional depreciation charges. Nonetheless, additional tests
presented in this subsection are only applied on linear regression models (OLS, PCSE and
REGAR).
Exclusion of the canton of Uri
As already discussed, the canton of Uri (UR) is a particular case since its average amount
of additional depreciation charges is drastically higher than in other Swiss cantons. Conse-
quently, in order to make sure that the canton of Uri (UR) does not single-handedly influence
the whole results, we have excluded it from the data set and have re-estimated the various
models. Results are presented in Appendix Q in tables 72, 73 and 74. Generally, in spite
of the exclusion of Uri, results are consistent with those obtained through the initial estima-
tion strategies. The only difference concerns the variable “Economics”. Compared to initial
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results, the variable shows smaller coefficients and is now statistically significant at the 95%
level. This shift may obviously be attributed to the exclusion of Carlo Dittli who accounts
for very high amounts of additional depreciation charges. Despite everything, in the light of
the results ensuing from the robustness check, it may reasonably be concluded that our main
results are robust.
Exclusion of cantonal and time fixed effects
In the initial estimation strategy, linear regression models sensitively differ from the Tobit
and logistic regression models. Whereas the former models include both cantonal and time
fixed effects, the latter models are void of such fixed effects. Wanting to evaluate whether
the inclusion of cantonal and time fixed effects affect the overall results, we re-estimated
linear regression models without them. Moreover, standard errors were only clustered at
the cantonal level for the OLS estimation in order to be consistent with Tobit and logistic
regressions models.
Results obtained after the exclusion of cantonal and time fixed effects appear to be similar
to the initial ones. The variable “Balance” brings out identical coefficients and the variable
remains strongly significant at the 99% level with regard to the three different estimators.
However, in spite of a stable coefficient, the variable “Economics” partly looses its significance
when estimated through OLS and PCSE. Detailed results are presented in tables 75, 76 and
77 in Appendix Q.
Inclusion of a time trend
Even though descriptive statistics did not demonstrate this, it may be wondered whether
the use of creative accounting has evolved at a constant rate over time during the considered
period. Assuming that finance ministers implicitly carry out a learning process allowing them
to become more and more comfortable with accounting over time, we cannot rule out that
their resort to creative accounting increases year after year. In order to take into account
this eventuality, we re-estimated initial models after having had a time trend. The series for
the variable “Trend” has the property of increasing by the same constant amount each time
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period. Results reported in tables 78, 79 and 80 in Appendix Q are strictly similar to those
obtained in initial estimations. Moreover, the variable “Trend” does not reveal any statistical
significance suggesting that the amounts reported as additional depreciation charges do not
follow a constant evolution over time.
Shorter time series
Finally, the last robustness check consisted in re-estimating models on a shorter time period.
As Swiss cantons had not implemented the HAM1 the same year, the panel is strongly
unbalanced. Besides, even if it should not have been the case, we cannot rule out that some
cantons chose the year of implementation for strategical reasons. Therefore, in order to
alleviate the potential influence of the unbalanced panel, we ran linear regression models on
a shorter period going from 1997 to 2012, i.e. as the canton of St-Gallen (SG) was the last
canton to have implemented the HAM1, in 1997.
In light of the results reported in tables 81, 82 and 83, coefficients associated to the
variable “Balance” seem to be sensitively smaller than usual. Whereas those coefficients were
comprised between 0.067 and 0.091 in the initial models, they are now bounded between
0.053 and 0.064. Moreover, when estimated through PCSE and REGAR, the variable is
only significant at the 95% level. Similar considerations can also be formulated regarding
the variable “Economics”. Whereas its respective coefficients appear to be consistent with
those initially obtained, the variable is slightly less significant when models are estimated on
a shorter time period.
9.6 Summary and discussion of the results
The initial econometric results as well as the additional robustness checks reveal that our
results are robust. Mainly they confirm and support hypothesis that additional deprecia-
tion charges strongly depend on the level of the statement of financial performance before
reporting. More precisely, the resort to additional depreciation charges is significantly likely
to occur when the corrected balance of the statement of financial performance is large. Be-
sides, results have not confirmed that finance ministers give the bath to the statement of
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financial performance when they have to cope with a deficit. However, the use of additional
depreciation charges strongly depends on the size of public surpluses. Therefore in cases
of surpluses, results demonstrate that a surplus of 1 CHF per capita before reporting leads
finance ministers to record amounts of additional depreciation charges comprised between
0.13 CHF per capita and 0.22 CHF per capita. In other words, just because of additional
depreciation charges, reported surpluses of the statement of financial performance are on
average 13% or even 22% smaller than a true and fair reported surplus would be, all other
things being equal.
Although this finding may appear quite trivial, it is the first time that such an analysis
is carried out while it is commonly known that additional depreciation are used to conceal
surpluses reported in the statements of financial performance. At the same time, in addition
to demonstrating the phenomenon, we quantify it. Furthermore, results provide evidence
that the use of additional depreciation charges is not random but obviously follows particular
rules. Indeed, in the light of the results, it is proved that the use of additional depreciation
charges is tightly stuck to the cantons’ financial situation. And to some extent, this gives
insights as to the finance ministers’ rationality and comprehension of the stakes surrounding
the public sector financial management.
Simultaneously, it could suggest that finance ministers could have personal interests in
keeping out surpluses from the stakeholders’ hands part of the budgetary policy-making
process. This current element may be a moot point. As assumed in this essay, finance
ministers should be distinguished from spending ministers as they are the only ones who
care and/or have a personal interest in sound public finance. Consequently, knowing that
additional depreciation charges are an efficient tool to improve the governments’ financial
performance, it is all the more logical that finance ministers resort to such gimmicks in order
to reach their own targets.
Nonetheless, such practices are obviously questionable. We may indeed wonder whether
it is legitimate for finance ministers to embrace strategical behaviors in regard to spending
ministers, deputies and eventually citizens. Is it the role of the agent to develop and apply
particular plans of action in the sole purpose of misleading the principals? Conversely, if
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finance ministers really and only aimed at ensuring fiscal soundness, should they not spend
time educating stakeholders about the necessity of running a structural surplus (or at least
to avoid a structural deficit) instead? It could be even more relevant as without sufficient
financial means on the long run, public policies under the direction of spending ministers could
certainly not be implemented anymore. It is all about transparency and thus fairness vis-à-vis
the stakeholders of the budgetary process and citizens. Unfortunately, finance and spending
ministers as well as deputies probably only have one ultimate common objective which is the
willingness to be reelected. It is therefore strongly doubtful that such a learning process could
be undertaken. Indeed, whereas finance ministers are evaluated on their capacity to ensure
fiscal soundness, spending ministers and deputies need greater financial means to highlight
their competences; both criteria being discordant and mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, in light of our results, other interesting conclusions may be drawn regard-
ing the role played by the finance minister in government. Whereas our initial hypothesis
was that finance ministers’ personal characteristics could influence the way public finance
are managed (at least in Swiss cantons), such a relation has not been clearly demonstrated
through the current empirical research. Indeed, the resort to creative accounting has been
revealed to be mainly driven by the occurrence and the level of a surplus reported in the
statement of financial performance. Concerning the importance of the finance ministers’
personal characteristics, only the educational background was demonstrated as a factor in-
fluencing the amounts reported as additional depreciation charges. In particular, results
provide evidence that finance ministers who have a university degree in economics are most
likely to resort and to a larger extent to creative accounting. These findings could suggest
that trained economists could be better equipped regarding technical issues for their position
since they are elected. Their adaptation period should be shorter than finance ministers
who do not have any accounting knowledge. Moreover, these results reasonably suggest that
trained economists are practically the only ones who have knowledge in accounting. Such
competence in accounting would therefore, consistent with our assumption, give them the
opportunity to create an information asymmetry between themselves on the one side and
the other stakeholders on the other side. At the same time, since these finance ministers are
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expected to be more reluctant to showing a structural deficit, it appears reasonable to argue
they use additional depreciation charges more largely in order to put operating expenses
under pressure and to restrain the tax burden. However, the use of creative accounting in
Swiss cantons seems to be totally independent from the finance ministers’ political ideology
and experience. In other words, despite their position on the political spectrum and their
tenure, finance ministers resort to creative accounting in order to hide surpluses.
This also gives interesting food for thought regarding policy implications. Even though
it cannot be asserted that a finance minister does not matter in government, results have
demonstrated that every finance minister embraces the same behavior as to the use of creative
accounting under particular circumstances. We may therefore question whether the finance
minister’s behavior would not be mainly or even only driven by institutional and economic
constraints. Indeed, according to the stringency of these constraints, it cannot be ruled out
that finance ministers face a lack of elbowroom allowing them to append their own trademark
on the public sector finance management. In other words, regardless of their political ideology
or experience, it could be the position and the tasks to be fulfilled that would drive the way
finance ministers manage cantonal public finance.
Moreover, independently from their time in position or their political color, finance minis-
ters (are expected to) have the common objective of ensuring fiscal soundness and ultimately
increasing their reelection chances. Since additional depreciation charges represent an effi-
cient mechanism to structurally improve fiscal soundness over time, it is in the interest of
finance ministers to use such an accounting trick. Put differently, a finance minister look-
ing for reelection has no reason to deprive himself of such a tool regardless of his personal
characteristics. At least, in light of the results presented in this research, everything suggests
that, for finance ministers, the end justifies the means.
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10 Conclusion
This research has been realized with the aim to deepen and broaden the comprehension of
creative accounting in the public sector. Although the study of this phenomenon is not new,
the approach we have embraced to perform this research is undoubtedly innovative. Indeed,
whereas it is almost exclusively debated that creative accounting occurs in the sole purpose
of hiding public deficits, we bring proof that finance ministers may have strong incentives to
conceal surpluses and play a key role in this issue.
Being assessed by voters on their capacity to ensure fiscal soundness, finance ministers are
expected to be keen on saving surpluses in order to structurally improve the governments’
financial performance. By doing so, they implicitly make sure to run a structural surplus,
which can be used to avoid the risk of reporting deficits during economic downturns. That
way, by reporting sound public finances over the years, finance ministers should increase their
reelection chances. However, it is hardly justifiable for finance ministers to report a surplus
since it would indicate that the provision of public services was too weak compared to the
taxes paid by citizens. In that case, claims from spending ministers, deputies and eventually
from citizens aiming at reducing taxes and/or increasing public spending could appear.
Nonetheless, thanks to accounting tricks, finance ministers give themselves the possibility
to avoid such claims by artificially worsening the reported balances of the statement of finan-
cial performance. By reporting a lower surplus compared to the true and fair one, finance
ministers justify maintaining higher tax rates than needed while putting public spending
under pressure. That way, by restraining the level of public spending and by simultane-
ously generating high revenues, those tricks are expected to improve the future governments’
financial performance. This is at least the first research question that was tested in this essay.
Two specific kinds of accounting tricks are used in Swiss cantons, they are additional
depreciation charges and operations on special funds. Although the use of both accruals is
ruled by the Harmonized Accounting Model (HAM1) for Swiss cantons as well as by most of
the cantonal financial laws, additional depreciation charges and operations on special funds
systematically alter the true and fair view of reported figures and therefore violate the basic
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philosophy of the IPSAS norms. When assessing additional depreciation charges and special
funds in light of IPSAS norms, both operations have to be considered as creative accounting.
Indeed, additional depreciation charges inflate operating expenses because they go beyond
the actual wear and tear and obsolescence of assets and do not imply any disbursement.
Operations into cookie-jar reserves do not have any economic reality: they either inflate
operating expenses when allocations are larger than withdrawals while they inflate operating
revenues when withdrawals are larger than allocations.
In addition to relying on the freedom given by the HAM1 and cantonal financial laws,
finance ministers enjoy a relatively high information asymmetry allowing them to carry out
creative accounting operations and thus to reach their own targets. Compared to spending
ministers and deputies, finance ministers have a specific expertise in financial issues that
make it quite easy for them to manipulate reported figures without being worried. Moreover,
politicians associated to the budgeting process do not call additional depreciation charges
and special funds into question since they are legal. Since public accounts are scrutinized by
auditors who evaluate the respect of cantonal financial laws, additional depreciation charges
and operations on special funds are validated even if they violate the true and fair represen-
tation of the governments’ financial performance. Therefore, finance ministers have all the
latitude they want to shape reported figures according to their own interests.
However, although each finance minister is likely to resort to creative accounting in order
to reach self-interested goals, we support the fact they all use creative accounting in a different
way. Following recent research providing evidence that the elected politicians can be driven
by their personal characteristics, we have investigated whether the same occurs in our field
of interest. That way, as second research question, we tackled whether the finance ministers’
political ideology, experience and educational background impact the extent to which books
are cooked when a surplus or a deficit occurs during the reporting process.
To test the hypothesis relative to the impact of creative accounting on the governments’
financial performance and the one devoted to the role played by finance ministers in the
use of accounting gimmicks, we first performed a qualitative analysis carried out with nine
experts in the field of Swiss public finance and the 26 cantonal administrations of finance.
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Additionally, we also performed two quantitative analysis relying on panel data based on
the 26 Swiss cantons and on the 116 finance ministers in position between 1980 and 2012.
Firstly, the objective of the qualitative analysis was to give the first insight as to the use and
consequences of creative accounting in Swiss cantons and the role played by finance ministers
in this issue. As this kind of information is not available through official channels (Swiss
cantons websites, public accounts, etc.), the resort to auditors, practitioners, scholars and
civil servants working on the ground everyday constitutes a valuable asset for the current
research. In addition to discussing hypothesis formulated in this research, discussants also
deepened and broadened our knowledge regarding our field of research. Moreover, they also
provided good food for thought about the interpretation of the results ensuing from the
two quantitative analysis. Secondly, concerning the quantitative analysis investigating the
explanation of public balances, two different models were tested. The first model consists in a
single equation model where the balance of the statement of financial performance (surplus or
deficit) is the dependent variable. In the second model, the impact on the balance is indirectly
estimated through a simultaneous equations model where the level of operating revenues and
the level of operating expenses are estimated simultaneously. This simultaneous strategy
allowed us to disentangle the respective effect of creative accounting operations on operating
revenues and operating expenses and therefore provide more precise estimations than the
single equation model. Thirdly, three different estimation strategies were considered in order
to investigate the extent to which finance ministers matter in the use of creative accounting.
Using linear regression models and Tobit estimations, we first aimed at determining the
level of creative accounting operations reported in cantonal statements. By running logistic
regressions, we then tackled the probability to which creative accounting operations depend
on the finance ministers’ personal characteristics.
Based on several estimators, econometric results referring to the impact of creative ac-
counting on governments’ financial performance were proved robust. As expected, results
significantly support that creative accounting allows the improvement of future balances
reported in the statement of financial performance by simultaneously putting operating ex-
penses under pressure and by generating additional operating revenues. Nonetheless, the
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influence of accounting tricks has been revealed to be stronger on operating expenses than
on operating revenues. Consistently with other research in the field of local public finance,
results provide new evidence that improving governments’ financial performance is usually
mainly achieved through a reduction of public spending instead of higher revenues. Con-
cretely, according to the considered estimators, it has been demonstrated that 1 CHF per
capita of additional depreciation charges improves the balance of the coming year by about
0.30 to 0.50 CHF per capita. Then, when considering the simultaneous equations model, 1
CHF per capita reported as additional depreciation charges respectively allows to decrease
future operating expenses by about 0.30 CHF per capita and to increase future operating
revenues by 0.26 CHF per capita. Nevertheless, special funds are revealed ineffective to struc-
turally improve the governments’ future financial performance since they have no significant
effect neither on the operating expenses nor on the operating revenues. No statistical signif-
icance was revealed when the balance of the statement of financial performance was directly
estimated. Therefore, special funds are rather expected to smooth the governments’ financial
performance over time. In other words, whereas additional depreciation charges appear to
structurally increase public balances, special funds would only allow to absorb the shocks of
the business cycle.
Moreover, we were interested in knowing whether the improvement of the governments’
financial performance over the considered period has mainly been due to larger surpluses,
smaller deficits or a combination of both phenomenons. Results demonstrated that addi-
tional depreciation charges allowed to improve the balance of the statement of financial
performance by generating larger surpluses. On average, 1 CHF per capita recorded as ad-
ditional depreciation charges engendered an increase of public surpluses of about 0.23 CHF
per capita. However, additional depreciation charges have not been revealed efficient to put
public deficits under pressure. Concerning operations on special funds, they have been shown
to be ineffective to ensure larger surpluses or to alleviate public deficits.
Regarding models dealing with the determinants of creative accounting, results also ap-
peared to be strongly robust and simultaneously confirmed some of the formulated hypothesis.
Through the different estimation strategies, we highlighted the fact that the amount reported
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as additional depreciation charges is significantly and positively correlated with the level of
the balance before reporting. We have confirmed the hypothesis that the use of additional
depreciation charges in Swiss cantons is positively related to the occurrence and the level
of public surpluses in particular. On average, it has been demonstrated that a surplus be-
fore reporting of 1 CHF per capita leads finance ministers to record additional depreciation
charges by about 0.22 CHF per capita. Consequently, we have provided evidence that creative
accounting may also be preventive when it consists in saving surpluses through unorthodox
practices. Creative accounting is thus not only a corrective process embraced by governments
in order to hide public deficits. At the same time, it reinforces our assertions that reporting
surpluses may also be as delicate as reporting deficits. Whereas it could have been expected
that additional depreciation charges have also been used in Swiss cantons in order to worsen
the governments’ financial performance in cases of public deficits, the occurrence of big bath
accounting has not been confirmed by empirical analysis.
Furthermore, the resort to creative accounting in Swiss cantons appears to mainly de-
pend on the occurrence and the level of surplus as it has not been clearly demonstrated that
finance ministers significantly influence the way additional depreciation charges are used in
Swiss cantons. Finance ministers’ personal characteristics do not appear to be key determi-
nants of creative accounting. Only the educational background has been revealed to influence
the probability and the extent to which finance ministers have executed accounting tricks
during the reporting process in order to artificially conceal good news. More concretely, fi-
nance ministers who have a university degree in economics are associated to larger amounts of
additional depreciation charges. This would also tend to confirm our assumption that people
who possess accounting knowledge profit from information asymmetry as to the understand-
ing of reported figures. However, political ideology and experience do not affect the way
finance ministers resort to creative accounting. Instead of appending their own trademark
on the public policies they are in charge of, it appears it is mainly the position and the tasks
to be fulfilled that drive finance ministers’ behavior.
Thanks to its undoubtedly innovative aspects, this research provides new and relevant
knowledge regarding the phenomenon of creative accounting, as well as a better and broader
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comprehension of the explanation of governments’ financial performance. New evidence is
also provided as to the role played by finance ministers in governments. Notably, through the
discussions of the results following the qualitative and the two quantitative analysis, we have
largely filled in the knowledge gap initially formulated. However, in spite of these successes,
improvements can be still made.
The measure of creative accounting and especially of depreciation charges would con-
stitute the most valuable improvement of the current research. Indeed, while additional
depreciation charges have especially been implemented to put the statement of financial
performance under pressure, it is commonly known that Swiss cantons may also have dis-
cretionary manipulated ordinary depreciation charges with the same purpose. Consequently,
extracting the amounts without economic reality that are reported in the statement of finan-
cial performance would provide a betterment for future researches. To do so, more or less
sophisticated methodologies aiming at capturing those unfair amounts have been discussed
in the literature. Although there is no consensus regarding the most effective method to
measure the unexpected depreciation charges, some of them have already been tested and
have been proved effective. Notably, the methodology developed by Marquardt and Wied-
man (2004) and applied by Pilcher and Van Der Zahn (2010) has given interesting results.
In their research, they assume that depreciation charges should remain a constant propor-
tion of gross property, plant and equipments from one year to another; the gap between the
current amount and the trend referring to the unexpected part of depreciation charges. That
way, combining additional depreciation charges to ordinary depreciation charges that are
discretionary manipulated would offer the possibility to bring out a new and more accurate
measure of the corrected balances of the statements of financial performance. In other words,
we would be in a better position to highlight a true and fair view of the governments’ financial
performance over the considered period. Following this methodology could also provide new
and more accurate evidence as to the impact of creative accounting on public deficits as well
as the role played by finance ministers in the use of such gimmicks.
Finally, new evidence has been provided as to the role played by finance ministers in gov-
ernments. Notably, it has been shown that, independently from their personal characteristics
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(with the exception of trained economists), finance ministers in general embrace the same
strategy regarding the use of creative accounting, namely they use it to hide good news.
Besides we strongly postulate that finance ministers strategically use creative accounting in
order to alleviate the spending appetite of other government members and ultimately report
better financial performance over time. Being assessed by voters on their capacity to ensure
fiscal soundness, we assume that finance ministers, through the use of creative accounting,
aim at reporting good financial performance over time and thus at increasing their reelection
chances. Whereas such an argument is widely defended, no empirical evidence to support it
has been provided so far. An extension of the research could therefore consist in investigating
whether the governments’ financial performance effectively affects the reelection probability
of incumbent finance ministers.
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Appendix
A - Statement of financial performance according the classification of the HAM1
Table 21: Statement of financial performance according to the classification of the HAM1
3 - Expense 4 - Revenue
No. Account. Entry Account. Entry No.
30 Wages Tax revenues 40
31 Supplies and consumables used Royalties and concessions 41
32 Interest costs Assets and financial revenues 42
33 Depreciation charges Contributions 43
331 Ordinary depreciation charges Share to revenue without allotment 44
332 Additional depreciation charges Reimbursments of juridictions 45
34 Contributions Received grants 46
35 Transfer expenses Grants to be distributed 47
36 Allowed grants Withdrawals from special funds 48
37 Grants to be distributed Internal service charges 49
38 Allocation to special funds
39 Internal service charges
198
B - Average annual amounts of additional depreciation charges
Table 22: Time series presentation of additional depreciation in real terms per capita
Canton N Mean Std. dev. Min Max Occurrence
1980 9 31.25 62.57 0.00 178.79 3
1981 10 55.19 95.85 0.00 263.76 6
1982 13 58.90 98.46 0.00 321.27 6
1983 14 34.38 69.27 0.00 248.36 6
1984 15 41.11 86.47 0.00 290.40 5
1985 15 98.17 298.65 0.00 1’170.44 6
1986 17 109.59 200.31 0.00 754.23 8
1987 19 128.05 200.52 0.00 811.85 10
1988 21 178.29 254.62 0.00 788.79 12
1989 21 161.03 281.63 0.00 1’261.12 13
1990 22 130.75 249.91 0.00 1’055.10 12
1991 22 94.28 233.71 0.00 948.60 9
1992 22 114.71 270.74 0.00 1’142.30 8
1993 22 121.58 235.62 0.00 1’003.21 14
1994 22 180.18 276.51 0.00 972.93 13
1995 24 109.13 221.79 0.00 941.62 12
1996 25 100.10 194.96 0.00 773.95 11
1997 26 59.91 144.20 0.00 559.18 7
1998 26 24.14 75.48 0.00 377.56 8
1999 26 41.21 107.24 0.00 407.21 7
2000 26 37.65 114.33 0.00 464.37 7
2001 26 58.54 111.01 0.00 398.67 9
2002 26 91.57 262.84 0.00 1’304.73 10
2003 26 63.26 136.67 0.00 611.84 10
2004 26 77.41 163.59 0.00 605.02 10
2005 26 479.16 797.82 0.00 2’827.58 18
2006 26 152.55 278.47 0.00 1’175.75 14
2007 26 166.29 232.20 0.00 767.64 16
2008 26 197.86 273.39 0.00 930.50 15
2009 26 78.73 141.15 0.00 501.11 13
2010 26 72.63 173.04 0.00 782.28 10
2011 26 58.52 115.00 0.00 369.91 8
2012 26 32.09 69.14 0.00 245.74 7
Mean 104.19 197.79 0.00 765.33 10
Source: Swiss cantons accounts and own calculations
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C - Average annual amounts of the net allocation to special funds
Table 23: Time series presentation of the net allocation to special funds in real terms per capita
Canton N Mean Std. dev. Min Max Occurrence
1980 9 57.69 81.09 0.00 252.19 8
1981 10 34.53 86.85 -88.31 216.53 5
1982 13 1.22 70.33 -121.41 142.49 8
1983 14 -0.77 50.81 -129.37 54.38 10
1984 15 -17.33 91.12 -319.00 74.19 7
1985 15 11.24 76.88 -114.31 251.66 10
1986 17 34.30 98.55 -81.64 290.61 11
1987 19 26.10 58.38 -104.16 142.07 13
1988 21 55.49 149.61 -113.71 551.92 11
1989 21 -5.25 47.94 -107.12 80.96 11
1990 22 -19.04 127.07 -419.22 208.60 11
1991 22 -51.37 140.08 -568.39 105.64 8
1992 22 -21.65 110.43 -328.69 244.16 11
1993 22 -15.14 102.84 -402.52 131.04 11
1994 22 -13.49 71.08 -275.78 71.78 12
1995 24 21.53 140.01 -293.99 565.10 17
1996 25 -9.59 100.82 -354.40 83.30 17
1997 26 -2.63 131.87 -302.51 359.40 14
1998 26 -12.12 240.56 -959.85 528.14 17
1999 26 -16.57 117.57 -466.28 168.13 14
2000 26 43.74 199.26 -365.05 779.23 15
2001 26 -7.26 156.42 -564.28 346.64 15
2002 26 -29.64 130.95 -475.32 252.26 12
2003 26 -9.65 89.23 -301.30 118.52 15
2004 26 -67.58 330.40 -1665.30 133.71 14
2005 26 309.66 538.58 -163.88 1645.80 20
2006 26 0.78 187.91 -631.91 482.75 15
2007 26 94.29 155.24 -187.04 389.02 19
2008 26 167.74 896.64 -2382.66 3728.94 19
2009 26 169.64 389.85 -90.37 1854.29 19
2010 26 42.63 169.81 -415.37 367.32 12
2011 26 74.78 319.74 -372.61 1352.59 12
2012 26 41.25 226.77 -460.86 920.17 17
Mean 26.89 178.32 -412.93 511.93 13
Source: Swiss cantons accounts and own calculations
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D - Reported and corrected operating revenues
Table 24: Reported and Corrected operating revenues per capita (1980 - 2012)
Reported Revenues - RevenueR Corrected Revenues - RevenueC
Canton Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
ZH 9’045.51 871.68 7’020.18 10’675.16 8’970.71 869.14 7’015.12 10’617.21
BS 22’755.85 3’034.10 18’722.95 29’273.70 22’602.96 3’095.40 18’719.43 29’267.98
GE 16’012.02 2’554.87 13’008.33 20’152.60 16’000.42 2’554.95 12’991.63 20’134.41
GR 11’683.78 1’647.01 9’850.70 15’725.78 11’590.72 1’676.94 9’608.01 15’577.95
FR 10’189.06 1’477.39 8’286.58 13’711.04 10’073.07 1’438.47 8’230.65 13’591.71
GL 9’123.04 2’179.79 5’983.25 15’085.44 8’970.96 2’045.11 5’983.25 14’675.27
UR 8’821.18 1’392.43 5’905.92 12’272.16 8’704.24 1’396.47 5’858.16 12’214.75
VD 8’734.66 1’829.38 5’838.12 11’978.97 8’677.11 1’850.30 5’788.37 11’914.85
ZG 8’686.35 2’039.63 5’355.79 12’365.77 8’147.04 2’308.27 5’228.27 12’336.64
SG 8’556.28 712.37 7’361.40 10’253.23 8’384.08 669.42 7’243.18 10’237.71
BL 8’426.81 1’613.74 5’977.19 12’172.02 8’377.09 1’556.25 5’960.94 11’851.03
BE 8’377.58 1’423.33 5’747.69 10’444.00 8’291.74 1’378.42 5’747.69 10’188.56
JU 8’343.99 2’414.60 4’806.99 14’056.13 8’243.76 2’392.96 4’753.80 13’965.04
NE 8’331.56 2’248.55 4’830.26 12’789.52 8’262.50 2’199.84 4’828.08 12’736.37
LU 8’070.36 1’638.98 5’790.33 12’384.59 8’033.35 1’634.52 5’757.87 12’311.53
TI 7’970.08 1’068.59 5’727.58 10’280.95 7’960.26 1’068.70 5’720.33 10’277.57
AG 7’342.88 1’205.59 5’917.79 10’677.44 7’041.81 838.76 5’852.84 9’058.99
VS 7’327.64 1’742.29 5’144.99 12’509.48 7’246.68 1’674.35 5’137.55 12’313.86
OW 7’043.34 1’738.83 4’813.84 12’639.72 7’011.40 1’676.30 4’804.34 12’637.03
SH 7’029.16 1’320.48 5’172.64 9’717.37 6’985.30 1’279.86 5’167.14 9’576.56
NW 6’980.02 1’105.72 4’859.77 8’931.54 6’956.08 1’116.80 4’821.90 8’919.01
AI 6’649.27 1’810.92 4’187.85 9’534.71 6’577.96 1’747.75 4’187.85 9’435.27
SZ 6’161.66 1’122.46 4’722.11 7’941.01 6’148.00 1’126.05 4’701.33 7’940.21
SO 6’122.26 1’048.15 4’388.23 8’574.58 6’055.81 1’036.89 4’284.86 8’553.26
AR 6’046.46 1’737.49 4’059.35 9’835.98 6’023.90 1’719.98 4’050.66 9’823.41
TG 5’917.26 873.84 4’610.01 8’089.03 5’880.26 869.34 4’601.55 8’061.04
Mean 8’828.10 1’639.22 6’442.79 12’455.87 8’729.86 1’614.08 6’401.19 12’304.00
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
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E - Reported and corrected operating expenses
Table 25: Reported and Corrected operating expenses per capita (1980 - 2012)
Reported Expenses - ExpenseR Corrected Expenses -ExpenseC
Canton Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
BS 22’005.75 2’714.28 18’376.34 27’185.41 21’768.94 2’618.81 18’338.44 26’827.97
GE 16’337.66 2’167.85 12’420.47 20’743.92 16’229.24 2’076.28 12’328.19 19’798.16
GR 11’471.51 1’456.91 9’831.86 15’278.52 11’135.49 1’180.32 9’494.18 13’183.80
FR 9’921.99 1’130.41 8’253.28 12’017.22 9’711.71 1’001.86 8’193.69 11’776.33
GL 9’081.74 2’137.15 5’964.57 15’048.14 8’668.03 1’605.69 5’964.57 10’979.53
ZH 9’047.86 913.73 6’806.22 11’027.82 8’955.39 896.33 6’658.67 10’977.09
VD 8’866.14 1’689.59 5’827.42 11’970.18 8’743.40 1’737.92 5’687.42 11’892.70
UR 8’679.57 1’280.96 5’891.95 12’380.48 7’987.65 1’382.77 5’556.75 10’531.10
BE 8’543.44 1’250.96 5’741.37 10’634.33 8’316.95 1’230.79 5’732.82 10’484.90
NE 8’498.20 2’255.67 4’957.40 13’292.77 8’401.64 2’210.97 4’854.14 12’870.10
SG 8’430.08 699.68 7’366.06 10’033.67 8’239.95 525.76 7’295.54 9’079.09
BL 8’364.62 1’706.10 6’032.65 12’046.66 8’090.50 1’430.10 6’022.83 10’269.50
JU 8’321.39 2’246.37 4’744.69 11’964.91 8’274.28 2’267.45 4’507.06 11’833.31
ZG 8’203.43 1’946.80 5’140.86 11’770.03 7’470.32 2’093.81 4’891.27 11’279.21
TI 7’943.57 1’172.53 6’061.35 10’108.22 7’841.31 1’133.36 6’032.05 9’757.96
LU 7’902.17 1’306.48 5’611.31 9’805.32 7’818.12 1’262.50 5’563.57 9’693.16
AG 7’184.86 1’083.65 6’065.26 10’649.35 6’899.77 973.48 5’982.30 10’140.42
VS 7’183.84 1’388.37 5’094.55 9’694.20 6’947.40 1’182.67 5’063.30 9’351.15
SH 6’947.02 1’169.44 5’165.63 8’540.29 6’785.84 1’120.43 4’995.92 8’324.37
NW 6’928.73 1’053.90 4’844.75 8’558.60 6’624.77 970.45 4’705.11 8’531.32
OW 6’900.19 1’318.45 4’804.37 8’870.70 6’623.21 1’229.00 4’420.30 7’941.37
AI 6’598.66 1’816.29 4’134.26 9’477.89 6’337.72 1’684.95 3’807.49 8’999.33
SO 6’261.83 1’064.84 4’467.05 7’852.46 6’131.74 1’064.32 4’397.48 7’742.55
AR 6’031.99 1’695.91 3’996.48 9’544.13 5’910.55 1’595.44 3’771.27 8’545.86
SZ 5’997.77 1’272.90 4’417.86 8’573.86 5’843.30 1’196.88 4’290.88 8’295.20
TG 5’856.57 899.93 4’375.38 8’124.45 5’754.11 807.97 4’361.99 7’520.71
Mean 8’750.41 1’493.81 6’399.75 11’738.21 8’519.67 1’403.09 6’266.05 11’024.08
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
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F - Reported and corrected SPER-balances
Table 26: Reported and corrected balances of the statement of financial performance in real terms per capita (1980 - 2012)
Reported SPER-balance - BalanceR Corrected SPER-balance - BalanceC
Canton Mean Std. dev. Min Max Deficits Mean Std. dev. Min Max Deficits
BS 750.10 729.93 -494.68 2’088.29 3 449.29 1’253.07 -3’158.80 2’049.49 4
ZG 482.92 465.74 -159.12 1’656.85 2 635.16 603.94 -127.05 2’376.23 2
FR 267.07 837.94 -131.33 3’478.55 5 178.95 249.27 -215.83 636.39 5
GR 212.27 567.05 -796.02 1’955.26 10 384.69 602.94 -419.63 2’206.24 7
OW 169.49 727.38 -224.40 3’769.02 9 244.01 246.63 -217.16 889.40 5
LU 168.19 559.61 -377.19 2’610.08 11 121.27 286.77 -378.84 687.97 9
SZ 163.89 418.63 -632.85 1’003.66 7 242.29 400.09 -481.26 1’108.74 7
AG 158.02 479.38 -147.46 1’975.91 5 157.80 939.03 -3’042.75 1’946.38 4
VS 143.81 849.69 -473.06 4’515.67 10 181.35 355.46 -418.04 844.88 8
UR 141.61 318.42 -286.11 1’133.23 7 619.09 654.49 -305.10 1’732.78 9
SG 126.20 214.40 -273.88 660.27 5 57.62 306.45 -505.91 638.41 5
SH 82.14 329.37 -383.49 1’346.55 9 149.18 264.69 -413.22 769.25 7
BL 62.19 234.82 -264.08 695.12 13 202.64 302.14 -258.44 824.95 12
TG 60.69 176.71 -229.45 368.81 10 64.85 201.00 -262.65 429.81 10
NW 51.28 137.52 -231.13 511.46 5 263.32 338.79 -240.31 1’181.75 6
AI 50.61 60.44 -36.94 192.74 1 240.24 198.39 -79.32 802.81 1
GL 41.30 378.60 -552.57 1’924.53 5 169.92 540.23 -823.84 1’917.30 6
TI 26.51 440.05 -967.27 916.17 13 35.56 478.96 -991.29 1’040.40 14
JU 22.60 591.96 -806.83 3’153.16 13 -149.30 278.78 -901.65 246.74 22
AR 14.47 528.99 -1’182.18 2’553.07 12 66.70 218.80 -362.86 828.99 11
ZH -2.35 424.44 -1’464.98 1’082.26 13 -26.79 403.08 -1’416.07 633.33 16
VD -131.48 405.24 -798.81 536.63 17 -67.09 465.31 -872.79 706.70 17
SO -139.57 681.69 -1’915.52 2’362.39 19 -144.28 486.70 -1’022.17 795.31 19
BE -165.86 419.48 -1’055.83 300.82 11 -123.60 509.58 -2’203.28 325.25 14
NE -166.64 185.36 -622.30 89.72 25 -138.23 211.72 -657.21 184.56 25
GE -325.64 971.45 -1’730.84 1’832.96 14 -277.09 966.13 -1’724.00 1’872.72 14
Mean 87.07 466.70 -624.55 1’642.81 10 136.06 452.40 -826.90 1’064.49 10
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
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G - Time series presentation of the reported and corrected SPER-balances
Table 27: Time series presentation of reported and corrected SPER-balances in real terms per capita
Reported SPER-balance - BalanceR Corrected SPER-balance - BalanceC
Year N Mean Std. dev. Min Max Deficits Mean Std. dev. Min Max Deficits
1980 9 -16.05 178.07 -440.01 207.97 2 72.88 202.21 -398.16 272.13 1
1981 10 15.57 248.37 -417.05 597.57 3 105.29 256.73 -380.83 594.21 3
1982 13 103.40 343.77 -210.80 1’185.30 5 163.53 389.83 -171.13 1’314.11 5
1983 14 92.83 222.41 -108.49 787.19 3 126.44 197.80 -62.96 706.18 2
1984 15 122.74 202.34 -103.57 628.27 1 146.52 184.40 -54.48 493.40 3
1985 15 147.20 225.52 -152.03 722.71 2 256.61 339.72 -131.87 1’198.00 3
1986 17 186.36 359.50 -510.07 916.17 2 330.26 423.68 -149.74 1’374.49 3
1987 19 180.43 281.64 -81.92 865.36 2 334.59 381.23 -101.55 1’137.33 3
1988 21 142.37 207.83 -115.41 760.86 2 351.89 370.02 -86.27 1’423.51 1
1989 21 148.78 236.11 -275.82 695.12 2 304.56 349.22 -256.14 1’259.84 3
1990 22 -23.59 233.37 -677.49 388.66 8 79.33 355.01 -635.52 948.92 9
1991 22 -207.52 421.44 -1’730.84 441.14 15 -164.61 509.88 -1’724.00 916.67 14
1992 22 -248.86 417.26 -1’455.69 521.15 17 -155.80 544.03 -1’423.65 1’483.78 16
1993 22 -186.19 374.94 -1’464.08 253.82 14 -79.74 472.53 -1’419.04 1’235.77 11
1994 22 -240.17 520.99 -1’915.52 275.42 10 -90.73 480.86 -1’193.96 1’000.36 10
1995 24 -106.56 380.56 -1’132.66 466.06 11 57.26 539.36 -1’097.17 1’724.96 11
1996 25 -163.57 359.59 -1’305.61 443.56 16 -73.06 406.13 -1’279.01 673.63 14
1997 26 -211.95 401.89 -1’623.55 325.41 18 -154.67 463.08 -1’584.74 572.34 19
1998 26 -1.95 443.67 -1’022.10 1’366.90 14 35.17 427.74 -988.33 812.23 11
1999 26 73.14 272.45 -633.62 739.43 7 97.78 341.18 -824.25 1’108.74 8
2000 26 103.71 383.50 -731.85 1’403.49 6 238.46 528.28 -746.87 1’772.15 7
2001 26 21.48 209.17 -627.99 523.42 8 99.20 262.72 -627.14 598.66 8
2002 26 -92.22 228.18 -614.81 247.37 12 -64.70 306.41 -823.84 590.81 14
2003 26 -192.88 361.81 -1’149.44 493.54 18 -139.26 412.54 -1’132.42 696.34 15
2004 26 64.36 970.33 -967.27 4’515.67 13 -143.06 729.05 -3’042.75 769.25 13
2005 26 980.83 1307.54 -1’047.55 3’769.02 5 18.94 701.61 -2’203.28 824.95 10
2006 26 308.99 590.72 -1’182.18 1’955.26 3 470.90 650.62 -901.65 2’206.24 3
2007 26 379.01 622.77 -647.54 2’088.29 3 424.25 942.17 -3’158.80 2’376.23 5
2008 26 322.03 310.47 1.72 1’108.81 0 635.14 465.40 -42.52 1’865.59 1
2009 26 257.50 419.12 -205.47 1’633.09 3 505.87 526.89 -176.90 1’917.30 3
2010 26 196.18 346.52 -292.02 1’494.00 5 311.44 416.69 -280.78 1’793.46 7
2011 26 56.72 533.90 -1’464.98 1’729.69 9 190.02 598.96 -1’416.07 2’049.49 9
2012 26 -33.25 565.66 -992.84 1’975.91 15 40.09 609.58 -992.84 1’946.38 14
Mean 66.03 399.44 -766.62 1’076.53 8 132.28 437.97 -874.18 1’150.37 8
Source: Swiss cantons accounts and own calculations
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H - Reported and corrected SPER-surpluses
Table 28: Reported and corrected surpluses of the statement of financial performance in real terms per capita (1980 - 2012)
Reported SPER-surpluses Corrected SPER-surpluses
Canton Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Surpluses Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Surpluses
NE 43.72 33.38 0.55 89.72 8 124.76 69.71 2.17 214.10 7
BE 145.00 106.47 6.32 300.82 15 217.22 105.86 14.87 354.89 13
AR 183.47 547.35 2.52 2’553.07 21 238.06 527.03 4.38 2’544.99 22
AI 53.34 59.30 1.81 192.74 32 250.22 192.95 17.46 802.81 32
TG 156.99 119.94 3.69 368.81 21 265.28 411.86 6.44 1’968.83 21
JU 193.69 697.80 0.67 3’153.16 20 323.37 880.36 3.00 3’105.43 12
ZH 244.13 249.47 11.22 1’082.26 18 331.18 298.74 2.17 1’225.03 16
SH 217.83 354.42 3.26 1’346.55 14 343.80 396.83 6.80 1’628.87 16
SG 223.09 174.30 11.70 660.27 11 350.58 474.36 31.85 1’688.28 11
VD 216.21 219.71 8.78 536.63 16 355.26 208.35 22.15 706.70 16
NW 79.42 126.08 1.58 511.46 28 426.58 504.01 20.65 2’082.00 27
TI 299.02 285.27 26.04 916.17 20 433.22 402.97 44.42 1’550.05 20
LU 411.79 649.47 54.95 2’610.08 14 439.50 611.40 73.68 2’618.37 16
GL 107.44 360.16 2.20 1’924.53 28 452.33 952.16 7.50 4’416.17 27
SZ 366.31 262.25 22.60 1’003.66 19 473.21 298.30 43.48 1’193.38 20
OW 280.67 876.13 4.42 3’769.02 18 497.55 992.66 33.13 4’851.67 22
BL 203.93 199.87 7.49 695.12 19 498.85 481.72 15.17 2’281.72 21
SO 400.41 657.50 6.31 2’362.39 12 517.16 641.29 20.20 2’444.53 12
AG 260.46 532.77 1.77 1’975.92 13 520.86 624.47 16.99 1’946.38 13
VS 328.54 990.93 1.61 4’515.67 20 537.67 958.93 1.08 4’528.78 21
FR 400.36 976.92 9.73 3’478.55 12 547.01 1’020.36 48.64 3’737.49 12
GE 547.85 536.77 15.22 1’832.96 13 595.38 517.28 41.76 1’872.72 14
ZG 520.02 455.65 2.89 1’656.86 31 727.33 620.62 8.54 2’376.23 31
GR 455.48 597.88 12.60 1’955.26 15 737.17 871.47 2.53 3’199.95 17
BS 947.23 623.52 23.03 2’088.29 15 991.53 748.24 16.51 2’440.01 16
UR 236.54 306.49 6.96 1’133.23 22 1’051.51 592.10 239.30 2’724.11 21
Mean 289.34 466.70 9.61 1’642.81 18 471.02 466.70 28.65 2’250.13 18
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
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I - Reported and corrected SPER-deficits
Table 29: Reported and corrected deficits of the statement of financial performance in real terms per capita (1980 - 2012)
Reported SPER-deficits Corrected SPER-deficits
Canton Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Deficits Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Deficits
GE -1’136.74 387.30 -1’730.84 -275.82 14 -1’116.42 399.93 -1’724.00 -256.14 13
AG -108.33 48.30 -147.46 -43.11 5 -842.88 1’068.69 -2’339.37 -47.43 5
VD -458.72 220.28 -798.81 -49.72 17 -463.03 222.42 -872.79 -149.74 17
SO -480.61 439.50 -1’915.52 -2.62 19 -450.51 335.99 -1’022.17 -11.80 19
BS -235.54 242.04 -494.68 -15.32 3 -426.06 310.46 -645.59 -206.53 2
GL -329.10 262.73 -552.57 -8.23 5 -369.36 323.60 -823.84 -13.96 6
TI -392.74 270.84 -967.27 -45.87 13 -364.56 286.51 -991.29 -14.63 13
ZH -343.64 380.65 -1’464.98 -11.85 13 -321.58 353.14 -1’416.07 -22.18 15
SG -86.97 117.52 -273.88 -4.66 5 -310.06 184.89 -505.91 -52.35 5
BE -589.75 285.36 -1’055.83 -115.41 11 -267.64 200.33 -616.81 -1.68 13
SZ -385.54 204.84 -632.85 -100.66 7 -256.99 201.24 -481.26 -45.45 6
VS -225.65 160.91 -473.06 -24.73 10 -256.95 156.65 -477.49 -47.77 9
JU -240.62 199.09 -806.83 -11.09 13 -232.74 253.50 -901.65 -22.86 21
NE -233.96 161.30 -622.30 -22.92 25 -210.19 183.34 -657.21 -8.12 26
LU -141.84 120.17 -377.19 -3.09 11 -183.46 124.51 -378.84 -8.46 9
TG -141.54 71.00 -229.45 -35.41 10 -166.04 86.82 -262.65 -2.95 10
UR -156.77 86.42 -286.12 -30.70 7 -162.54 104.86 -305.10 -3.19 8
GR -152.55 234.38 -796.02 -30.71 10 -143.89 129.54 -419.63 -17.53 8
AR -281.27 345.56 -1’182.18 -12.53 12 -136.09 119.15 -362.86 -26.23 11
SH -128.93 108.93 -383.49 -15.68 9 -130.47 135.93 -413.22 -9.08 7
BL -144.97 64.99 -264.08 -55.46 13 -118.64 74.16 -258.44 -37.70 11
ZG -92.08 94.80 -159.12 -25.05 2 -107.76 27.27 -127.05 -88.47 2
NW -106.30 86.08 -231.13 -5.89 5 -97.44 90.04 -240.31 -3.11 6
OW -52.87 70.31 -224.40 -2.31 9 -93.00 70.44 -217.16 -42.62 5
FR -52.80 53.26 -131.33 -0.69 5 -84.18 77.09 -215.83 -24.09 5
AI -36.94 -36.94 -36.94 1 -79.32 -79.32 -79.32 1
Mean -259.11 466.70 -624.55 -37.94 10 -284.30 466.70 -644.46 -47.82 10
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
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J - Creative accounting according to the corrected governments’ financial per-
formance
Table 30: Creative accounting according to the corrected governments’ financial performance in
real terms per capita (1980 - 2012)
Canton Surpluses ADC SF Canton Deficits ADC SF
UR 1’051.51 786.85 23.08 GE -1’116.42 0.00 27.19
BS 991.53 0.00 104.46 AG -842.88 3.04 -775.01
GR 737.17 264.29 119.62 VD -463.03 8.58 -12.89
ZG 727.33 288.45 -80.24 SO -450.51 54.16 -24.06
GE 595.38 126.34 35.15 BS -426.06 0.00 -80.40
FR 547.01 20.86 129.73 GL -369.36 0.00 -96.02
VS 537.67 126.82 105.06 TI -364.56 0.01 28.18
AG 520.86 4.41 270.37 ZH -321.58 0.00 -31.97
SO 517.16 106.48 10.27 SG -310.06 0.00 -252.44
BL 498.85 140.13 191.28 BE -267.64 218.98 9.46
OW 497.55 196.63 73.58 SZ -256.99 182.81 -6.78
SZ 473.21 124.60 5.64 VS -256.95 0.00 -22.81
GL 452.33 89.46 251.65 JU -232.74 1.43 -91.26
LU 439.50 74.85 5.26 NE -210.19 0.00 8.26
TI 433.22 109.42 24.78 LU -183.46 0.36 -12.10
NW 426.58 325.90 18.38 TG -166.04 0.40 -29.59
VD 355.26 80.96 58.09 UR -162.54 8.36 -50.09
SG 350.58 0.00 140.83 GR -143.89 19.33 -75.89
SH 343.80 107.77 50.10 AR -136.09 109.90 22.17
ZH 331.18 4.66 59.57 SH -130.47 0.00 24.63
JU 323.37 56.14 -45.01 BL -118.64 17.41 2.70
TG 265.28 42.57 67.95 ZG -107.76 358.66 -388.31
AI 250.22 169.73 28.40 NW -97.44 0.00 -9.12
AR 238.06 11.83 70.45 OW -93.00 0.00 -7.98
BE 217.22 40.22 12.62 FR -84.18 0.00 -40.81
NE 124.76 0.00 98.99 AI -79.32 81.30 -163.88
Mean 471.02 126.90 70.39 Mean -284.30 40.95 -78.80
Source: Swiss cantons’ statement of financial performance and own calculations
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K - Adjustments for the series of operating revenues
In addition to have been adjusted for withdrawal from special funds, operating revenues
(“Revenue”) also needed to be adjusted for other particular events. First, as previously
formulated, 2005 accounts for a particular year for Swiss cantonal governments since they
received several billion CHF from the Swiss National Bank subsequently to a public sale of
gold reserves. Such high amounts of money being exceptional, adjustments were strongly
required in order to ensure the accuracy and the reliability of our results. The following
amounts have therefore been subtracted from the operating revenues in each Swiss canton
in 2005: ZH (1.5 billion CHF); BE (2.3 billion CHF); LU (804.7 million CHF); UR (95.3
million CHF); SZ (214.5 million CHF); OW (137.3 million CHF); NW (51.6 million CHF);
GL (73.1 million CHF); ZG (140.4 million CHF); FR (757 million CHF); SO (475 million
CHF); BS (263.6 million CHF); BL (372.6 million CHF); SH (82 million CHF); AR (117.9
million CHF); SG (612 million CHF); GR (436.2 million CHF); AG (841.3 million CHF);
TG (428 million CHF); TI (577 million CHF); VD (16.7 million CHF); VS (1.1 billion CHF);
NE (425.7 million CHF); GE (539.5 million CHF) and JU (260.4 million CHF). In addition
to the money received from the Swiss National Bank, operating revenues have also been
adjusted for the following elements. In the canton of Nidwald (NW) where the government
enjoyed exceptional operating revenues (32.4 million CHF) in 2002 from the exploitation of
administrative assets. In the canton of Glarus (GL), 35 million CHF referring to unusual tax
revenues have been subtracted from the total amount of operating revenues. Then, in the
canton of Ticino (TI), inheritance tax revenues were especially high in 1988 and 1994. For
that reason, each year, operating revenues have been reduced by about 100 million CHF. The
canton of Neuchâtel (NE), also had to deal with exceptional inheritance tax revenues in 1990
for an amount of 23.6 million CHF. Moreover, the implementation of the “postnumerando”
tax system engendered additional operating revenues (235.6 million CHF) that requires to
be taken into account.
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L - Adjustments for the series of operating expenses
The data have also been adjusted to take into account exceptional events having occasionally
affected the average level of operating expenses (“Expense”) during the considered period.
In this respect, the canton of Obwald (OW) suffered exceptional operating expenses in 2000
by about 12 million CHF due to bad weather. The same year, the canton of Valais (VS)
also bear the cost of the bad weather for an amount of 178 million CHF. Then, unusual high
operating expenses (272 million CHF) were reported in 2006 in the canton of Neuchâtel (NE)
subsequently to the implementation of the “postnumerando” tax system.
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M - Operationalization of the variable “Government”
To construct the variable “Right” , we use data provided by the publication “Année politique
suisse” and by the Swiss Federal Statistics Office. The latter source of data lists, for each
Swiss political party, the number of politicians members of a cantonal government’s cabinet.
The following cantonal political parties are represented : The Liberals (FDP), the Christian
Democratic People’s Party (CVP), the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP), the
Swiss People Party (SVP), Landesring der Unabhängigen (LdU), Evangelische Volkspartei
(EVP), the Liberal Party of Switzerland (PLS), Parti de la liberté (PdL), Swiss Democrats
(SD), Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz (PdAS) and other various cantonal parties (Misc.).
The variable “Right” represents the proportion of right-wing parties (EVP, PRD, PLS,
DS, SVP and PdL) members of the cantonal government’s cabinets. Parties classified as
Various are assimilated to other parties that have the closest political ideology. Finally, a
value is attributed to each political party according to their political leaning. Ladner 1999
proposes to dedicate the following values to the various cantonal political parties: PdAS (1);
SP (2.6); PES (3.2); LdU (5.2); CVP (5.4); EVP (5.9); FDP (6.8); PLS (7.6); DS (7.6); SVP
(7.7) and PdL (8.2). That way, the higher the value, the more right-wing a political party is.
Moreover, some other precisions have to be underlined. First of all, the difference between
all the members of a government’s cabinet and the right-wing members does not constitute the
proportion of left-wing parties. Indeed, the LdU and CVP parties occupy the middle of the
political spectrum. Furthermore, the classification elaborated by Ladner 1999 presupposes
two assumptions: (a) a given political party has the same ideology in all Swiss cantons, even
if some differences may effectively existed and (b) the ideology of each party is constant over
the considered period.
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N - Operationalization of the variables “Referendum” and “Initiative”
To operationalize these two variables, we use indices suggested by Stutzer and Frey 2000.
For referendum we use a categorical variable that measures the stringency of referendum.
In Switzerland, two types of financial referendum do exist : mandatory and optional. The
mandatory referendum occurs automatically whenever a new amount of public spending goes
beyond a certain threshold. The optional referendum gives to the citizens a certain amount
of time in order to collect a certain amount of signatures required for the referendum to
take place. The stringency of the mandatory referendum thus depends only on the financial
limit (per capita) and is evaluated on a 6 point scale (1 is a high barrier, 6 is a low one).
The stringency of the optional referendum is evaluated on the same scale (1 to 6) for each
dimension (financial limit, signature, time span). The three resulting indices are aggregated
using a simple average. The variable Referendum is the maximum of the index for the
mandatory referendum and the composite index for the optional referendum. Using the
number of signatures required to launch an initiative and the time span within which the
signatures have to be collected the index for the stringency level of the variable Initiative
is constructed in the same way as optional referendum.
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O - Qualitative analysis of creative accounting in Swiss cantons
The plan of interviews distributed to the 9 experts, as well as the questionnaire sent to the 26
cantonal administrations of finance are presented in their initial form on the following pages.
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Plan of interviews 
 
An investigation of additional 
depreciation charges and special 
funds in Swiss cantons 
 
Maxime Clémenceau 
Lausanne 
May 2013 
 
 
 1 
 
Questions related to the additional depreciation charges 
1. To the best of your knowledge, why do Swiss cantons resort to additional depreciation 
charges? 
 
2. Have there been any changes over time in the use of additional depreciation charges by 
Swiss cantons? 
 
3. In your point of view, do Swiss cantons differ in their use of additional depreciation charges? 
 
4. Does the use of additional depreciation charges differ depending on whether it is a 
financially good or bad year? 
 
5. In some cantons we have noticed that the amounts forecasted as additional depreciation 
charges differ substantially from those finally recorded when the books are closed. Have you 
already come across this phenomenon? Why do Swiss cantons would resort to such a 
practice? 
 
6. Is there a rule defining how Swiss cantons should use additional depreciation charges? 
 
7. Some cantons that do not use additional depreciation charges tend to underestimate the 
amounts budgeted as ordinary depreciation charges. To the best of your knowledge, can 
there be an economic reality behind such a practice? Or would it be only an account 
manipulation?  
 2 
 
Questions related to the special funds 
1. In your point of view, what is the use of special funds by Swiss cantons? 
 
2. Have there been any changes over time in the use of special funds by Swiss cantons? 
 
3. In your point of view, do Swiss cantons differ in their use of special funds? 
 
4. In your point of view, does the use of special funds differ depending on whether it is a 
financially good or bad year? 
 
5. In some cantons we have noticed that the amounts forecasted as allocation to special funds 
differ substantially from those finally recorded when the books are closed. Have you already 
come across this phenomenon? Why do Swiss cantons would resort to such a practice? 
 
6. It is indicated in the HAM1 that special funds should be based on a legal basis, which 
determines the amounts to be allocated and withdrawed. However, this does not seem to be 
the case in reality. Thus, which are in your point of view the criteria determining the amounts 
allocated and withdrawed from special funds? 
  
 3 
 
Questions related to fiscal balance 
1. In your point of view, do these accruals have an effective impact on the cantonal financial 
situation? Do they change the level of surpluses and deficits? In short-term or long-run? 
Divers questions 
1. Swiss cantons seem to use additional depreciation charges and special funds randomly. In 
the end, are there any particular reasons that influence the preference of a canton to one 
means rather than another? 
 
2. What could be the reasons having determined the introduction of the HAM1 in 1980? 
 
3. To you knowledge, when does the finance minister intervene as regards the recognition of 
the additional depreciation charges and special funds? 
 1 
 
 
Questions à l’attention du canton du Valais 
 
Utilisation des amortissements 
supplémentaires et des 
financements spéciaux 
 
Maxime Clémenceau 
Lausanne 
Mai 2013 
 2 
 
Questions relatives aux amortissements ordinaires 
 
1. Quelle est la méthode d’amortissement utilisée par le canton du Valais ? 
 
2. Le graphique ci-dessous montre parfois de grandes différences (positives ou négatives) entre 
les montants prévus au budget et ceux comptabilisés. Quelles peuvent en être les raisons ? 
 
 
 
Source : Comptes cantonaux et propres calculs. 
Les montants en francs sont exprimés en termes réels par habitant. 
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3 
 
Questions relatives aux amortissements supplémentaires 
 
1. A quoi servent les amortissements supplémentaires dans le canton du Valais ? Pour quelle(s) 
raison(s) sont-ils comptabilisés? 
 
2. Y a-t-il des critères déterminant les montants devant être comptabilisés en tant 
qu’amortissements supplémentaires ? Si oui, lesquels ? 
 
3. Comment se fait-il que les amortissements supplémentaires n’aient pas été utilisés avant 
2003 ? Y a-t-il eu un changement dans la pratique de ces écritures comptables au fil du 
temps ? 
 
4. Comment se fait-il que les amortissements supplémentaires comptabilisés ne soient pas 
toujours prévus au budget ou qu’ils soient supérieurs au montant prévu au budget ? Les 
montants inscrits au compte sont d’ailleurs largement supérieurs au budget entre 2007 et 
2010. 
 
 
Source : Comptes cantonaux et propres calculs. 
Les montants en francs sont exprimés en termes réels par habitant. 
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4 
 
Questions relatives aux financements spéciaux 
 
1. A quoi servent les financements spéciaux dans le canton du Valais ? Pour quelle(s) raison(s) 
sont-ils comptabilisés? 
 
2. Il est indiqué dans le MCH1 que les financements spéciaux reposent sur une base légale qui 
fixe les attributions et les prélèvements selon des critères clairs, identiques pour le budget et 
les comptes. Y a-t-il, à votre connaissance, une règle dans le canton du Valais régissant 
l’utilisation des financements spéciaux ? Par exemple, quand doivent-ils être utilisés ? 
Comment sont déterminés les montants devant être comptabilisés en tant qu’attributions 
aux financements spéciaux ? 
 
3. Les montants attribués aux financements spéciaux sont, à l’exception de 1986, chaque année 
supérieurs aux montants budgétés. Pourquoi ? Cette différence est particulièrement 
importante et représente parfois plus dizaines de millions de francs. En 2008 et 2009, cette 
différence est respectivement de 82.9 et 75.3 millions. Sauriez-vous nous dire ce qu’il s’est 
passé ces années-là ? 
 
4. Le graphique ci-dessous indique que les montants alloués aux financements spéciaux varient 
fortement d’une année à l’autre. Ils augmentent d’ailleurs fortement dès 2000. Quelles 
peuvent en être les raisons ? Y a-t-il une réalité économique derrière ce phénomène ? 
 
 
Source : Comptes cantonaux et propres calculs. 
Les montants en francs sont exprimés en termes réels par habitant. 
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5 
 
Question relative aux soldes publics 
 
1. A votre connaissance, il y a-t-il une relation entre l’utilisation des amortissements 
supplémentaires (des financements spéciaux) et le niveau des soldes publics ? En d’autres 
termes, selon vous, est-ce que l’utilisation des amortissements supplémentaires (des 
financements spéciaux) varie selon que le canton se trouve dans une bonne ou une mauvaise 
situation financière ? 
 
2. A quel moment le Directeur des finances (Conseiller d’Etat en charges des finances) 
intervient s’agissant de la mise au budget des amortissements supplémentaires ou des 
opérations sur financements spéciaux. 
 
3. L’utilisation des amortissements supplémentaires et des opérations sur financements 
spéciaux a-t-elle eu un impact sur la situation financière de votre canton ? Si oui, cet impact 
a-t-il été positif ou négatif ? 
P - Quantitative impact of creative accounting on the governments’ financial
performance
Endogenous covariates
Table 31: Covariance between the potentially endogenous covariates and the instruments
Variables Error Referendum Initiative Rule
Instrument Error(D1) Referendum(-2) Initiative(-2) Rule(-2)
Covariance 0.5353 0.9116 0.9527 0.8665
(-2) denotes the second lag value of the variable whereas (D1) refers to the first difference of the variable
Table 32: Validity of the instruments (2SLS First stage F-stat)
Variables Error Referendum Initiative Rule
Instrument Error(D1) Referendum(-2) Initiative(-2) Rule(-2)
F-stat 98.82 154.83 116.19 208.93
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-2) denotes the second lag value of the variable whereas (D1) refers to the first difference of the variable.
F-stat higher than 16.85 reveals a valid instrument (Stock and Yogo 2005)
Heteroskedasticity
Table 33: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Chi2 P-value
Balance 125.430 0.000
Revenue 291.440 0.000
Expense 625.790 0.000
H0: No heteroskedasticity
Autocorrelation
Table 34: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation of order one
F-stat p-value
Balance 19.890 0.000
Revenue 13.277 0.001
Expense 4.665 0.041
H0: No autocorrelation of order one
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Table 35: Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of order one and two
AR(1) AR(2)
F-stat p-value z-stat p-value
Balance -1.660 0.097 0.510 0.612
Revenue 3.150 0.002 2.280 0.023
Expense 3.470 0.001 1.310 0.191
AR(1) refers to autocorrelation of order one whereas AR(2) denotes autocorrelation of order two. H0: No
autocorrelation
Fixed effects
Table 36: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
Chi2 p-value
Balance 0.290 0.591
Revenue 13.860 0.000
Expense 6.500 0.011
H0: RE not necessarily appropriate
Table 37: Hausman test for random versus fixed effects
Chi2 p-value
Balance 20.440 0.117
Revenue 30.780 0.004
Expense 52.410 0.000
H0: Difference in coefficients not systematic
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Multicolinearity
Table 38: Variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regressors
FE without FE
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
Initiative 38.81 0.025765 1.89 0.528224
Referendum 8.75 0.114334 1.86 0.538263
Elderly 5.51 0.181346 1.13 0.886855
Coalition 4.83 0.207053 1.25 0.79742
Rule 4.05 0.247036 1.19 0.842708
Departments 3.56 0.280534 1.37 0.72993
Government 2.62 0.380958 1.29 0.774099
Unemployment 2.20 0.455558 1.64 0.608975
Creative * Rule 1.61 0.622351 1.50 0.665712
SF(-1) 1.60 0.625877 1.48 0.677398
Balance(-1) 1.58 0.631569 1.40 0.713486
Concordance 1.50 0.668767 1.19 0.843851
ADC(-1) 1.47 0.681252 1.18 0.847579
Error 1.29 0.774596 1.12 0.889085
Growth 1.12 0.894043 1.10 0.911504
Election 1.05 0.956822 1.03 0.973645
Mean VIF 4.68 1.35
Multicolinearity may be an issue when the VIF is equal or higher than 10.
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Robustness checks
Table 39: Results of the single equation model in cases of surpluses and deficits with Tobit estimation
Surplus Deficit
ADC(-1) 0.304*** 0.290**
(0.066) (0.134)
SF(-1) 0.059 0.117
(0.056) (0.203)
Surplus(-1) 0.474***
(0.046)
Deficit(-1) 0.288***
(0..072)
Error -0.436*** -0.296***
(0.069) (0.112)
Growth 14.149 41.546***
(9.611) (12.772)
Unemployment 4.149 -0.158
(15.490) (11.281)
Elderly 1.929 -25.481
(7.562) (16.656)
Government -87.505** -65.026
(37.908) (44.709)
Coalition 39.818** -70.172*
(18.741) (40.383)
Concordance 22.748 184.586
(104.264) (232.767)
Departments 0.978 7.295
(8.252) (11.512)
Election 26.195 -15.265
(35.255) (35.828)
Initiative 46.143** 62.492
(20.056) (43.052)
Referendum 6.367 -9.846
(17.743) (33.417)
Rules 7.816 7.508
(20.170) (37.417)
Creative * Rules 0.031 -0.119
(0.041) (0.110)
Constant 112.408 224.054
(264.247) (462.052)
Cantonal fixed effects NO NO
Log Likelihood -2679.945 -1161.919
Joint 393.730 60.590
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 377 170
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Table 40: Results of the simultaneous equations model with variables of interest in "Expense"
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) -0.256***
(0.068)
SF(-1) 0.011
(0.071)
Revenue(-1) 0.442***
(0.037)
Expense(-1) 0.548***
(0.056)
Revenue 0.335***
(0.063)
Expense 0.533***
(0.047)
Error -0.483***
(0.139)
Growth 29.310*** -16.621*
(9.239) (9.839)
Unemployment -13.824 64.140***
(13.684) (13.622)
Elderly 6.081 62.752***
(18.466) (18.971)
Government -137.664*** 112.388**
(45.114) (47.683)
Coalition 31.589 55.551
(35.200) (37.064)
Concordance -24.773 -247.543*
(123.639) (129.713)
Departments -0.630 1.816
(12.274) (12.854)
Election -8.866 10.571
(32.298) (33.734)
Initiative 89.814 -146.107
(144.414) (149.972)
Referendum -15.094 55.430
(60.581) (63.442)
Rule 23.734 37.353
(47.148) (50.470)
Creative * Rule 0.075* -0.060
(0.041) (0.051)
Constant 477.401 -337.159
(646.084) (674.905)
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 98.670 98.610
F-stat / Chi2 54381.360 50493.880
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 703 703
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 41: Results of the simultaneous equations model with variables of interest in "Revenue"
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.208***
(0.066)
SF(-1) 0.112*
(0.063)
Revenue(-1) 0.380***
(0.040)
Expense(-1) 0.582***
(0.053)
Revenue 0.298***
(0.059)
Expense 0.610***
(0.050)
Error -0.531***
(0.138)
Growth 27.930*** -18.329*
(9.082) (10.158)
Unemployment -25.021* 61.497***
(13.703) (13.998)
Elderly -3.701 62.346***
(18.285) (19.571)
Government -147.281*** 109.931**
(44.338) (49.119)
Coalition 21.090 48.673
(34.806) (38.026)
Concordance 13.473 -228.509*
(122.028) (133.453)
Departments 0.845 1.799
(12.056) (13.273)
Election -11.404 10.424
(31.709) (34.849)
Initiative 96.455 -160.569
(141.791) (154.574)
Referendum -7.931 63.997
(59.625) (65.028)
Rule 35.551 48.037
(47.027) (50.602)
Creative * Rule 0.014 -0.088
(0.047) (0.044)
Constant 510.691 -251.087
(634.558) (695.946)
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 98.720 95.820
F-stat / Chi2 56537.300 47264.170
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 703 703
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 42: Results of the single equation model without the variable “Error”
OLS REGAR PCSE 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.331*** 0.333*** 0.364*** 0.325*** 0.368***
(0081) (0.075) (0.083) (0.075) (0.078)
SF(-1) 0.082 0.095 0.034 0.060 0.081
(0.115) (0.076) (0.116) (0.118) (0.072)
Balance(-1) 0.395*** 0.296*** 0.381*** 0.407*** 0.453
(0.096) (0.039) (0.079) (0.094) (0.089)
Error
Growth 30.656*** 28.537*** 27.384* 30.156*** 30.412***
(10.140) (10.786) (14.690) (9.910) (9.427)
Unemployment -36.037** -44.038*** -41.264** -34.747** -33.439***
(13.571) (15.121) (17.096) (14.014) (10.713)
Elderly -11.975 -8.312 -3.902 -2.899 -4.568
(15.172) (20.199) (17.371) (17.183) (7.834)
Government -169.095*** -180.469*** -110.669** -190.811*** -105.811**
(46.931) (54.367) (49.752) (48.106) ( 43.945)
Coalition 19.505 16.214 38.016 19.228 31.839*
(32.157) (41.602) (24.474) (36.263) (16.310)
Concordance 19.140 15.087 65.526 33.274 86.140
(80.830) (143.709) (122.478) (73.705) (100.465)
Departments -5.493 -3.432 -4.213 -12.161* -3.437
(6.052) (14.462) (7.817) (6.264) (5.352)
Election -8.936 -6.935 -3.902 -8.788 -5.583
(36.797) (35.947) (17.371) (36.251) (35.118)
Initiative 120.281* 142.113 68.878** -4.012 61.288***
(67.608) (96.052) (27.787) (134.169) (19.706)
Referendum -32.156 -36.446 -16.676 -54.926 -14.470
(22.709) (43.657) (20.025) (38.435) (14.244)
Rule 55.069 72.204* 3.816 12.494 7.777
(49.770) (41.379) (22.459) (54.469) (25.244)
Creative * Rule 0.029 0.024 0.057 0.057 0.013
(0.054) (0.055) (0.082) (0.057) (0.022)
Constant 695.585* 522.736 350.868 1391.367* 325.290
(361.373) (552.215) (320.986) (841.356) (247.247)
Cantonal FE YES YES NO YES YES
R-Squared 38.480 35.770 33.640 30.360 -
F-stat / Chi2 31.380 13.180 237.810 412.900 1315.790
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 712 686 712 712 686
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 43: Results of the simultaneous equations model without the variable “Error”
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.013 -0.300***
(0.187) (0.085)
SF(-1) 0.007 -0.040
(0.161) (0.085)
Revenue(-1) 0.756***
(0.149)
Expense(-1) 0.323***
(0.040)
Revenue 0.413***
(0.062)
Expense -0.219
(0.267)
Error
Growth -4.349 -26.191**
(21.615) (11.987)
Unemployment 169.044*** 126.610***
(63.190) (16.130)
Elderly 249.964*** 146.909***
(73.680) (26.290)
Government -86.647 112.190*
(112.028) (59.787)
Coalition 213.735** 107.864**
(104.402) (48.176)
Concordance -826.062** -516.794***
(370.748) (169.899)
Departments -20.525 -7.865
(29.334) (16.408)
Election 78.330 45.713
(77.742) (42.124)
Initiative 16.030 -123.601
(393.418) (223.439)
Referendum -87.201 1.326
(172.024) (91.443)
Rule 207.178* 101.610
(111.777) (62.308)
Creative * Rule -0.092 -0.085
(0.113) (0.064)
Constant 643.109 -228.845
(1676.339) (925.929)
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 93.440 97.930
F-stat / Chi2 10118.010 31823.420
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 712 712
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 44: Results of the single equation model without insignificant explanatory variables
OLS REGAR PCSE 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.327*** 0.328*** 0.394*** 0.324*** 0.380***
(0.090) (0.071) (0.077) (0.089) (0.071)
SF(-1) 0.110 0.123** 0.074 0.115 0.056
(0.072) (0.062) (0.104) (0.072) (0.080)
Balance(-1) 0.379*** 0.284*** 0.345*** 0.386*** 0.441***
(0.071) (0.037) (0.078) (0.070) (0.070)
Error -0.483*** -0.506*** -0.491*** -0.410** -0.478***
(0.102) (0.074) (0.133) (0.184) (0.070)
Growth 23.326** 19.913* 15.931 25.360*** 19.733**
(9.747) (10.423) (14.090) (8.177) (9.810)
Unemployment -19.386 -25.332* -45.719*** -20.714* -37.386***
(11.488) (14.001) (13.708) (12.490) (9.268)
Elderly
Government -170.818*** -184.364*** -73.941* -175.784*** -69.742***
(43.213) (49.746) (41.770) (47.273) (31.706)
Coalition
Concordance
Departments
Election
Initiative
Referendum
Rule
Creative * Rule
Constant 949.707*** 847.726*** 483.048* 983.657*** 425.098**
(267.393) (255.356) (249.221) (261.658) (204.907)
Cantonal FE YES YES NO YES YES
R-Squared 0.348 0.399 0.347 34.940 -
F-stat / Chi2 60.280 34.930 193.620 400.900 374.640
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 712 686 712 703 703
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 45: Results of the simultaneous equations model without insignificant explanatory variables
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.264*** -0.262***
(0.065) (0.070)
SF(-1) 0.120** -0.052
(0.056) (0.063)
Revenue(-1) 0.398***
(0.037)
Expense(-1) 0.620***
(0.060)
Revenue 0.329***
(0.064)
Expense 0.592***
(0.041)
Error -0.510***
(0.151)
Growth
Unemployment
Elderly
Government -161.576*** 110.060***
(41.153) (45.796)
Coalition
Concordance
Departments
Election
Initiative
Referendum
Rule
Creative * Rule
Constant
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 98.650 98.470
F-stat / Chi2 54218.040 46258.000
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 703 703
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 46: Results of the single equation model without UR
OLS REGAR PCSE 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.326*** 0.336*** 0.383*** 0.312*** 0.389***
(0.117) (0.089) (0.102) (0.112) (0.106)
SF(-1) 0.095 0.114 0.061 0.081 0.093
(0.102) (0.074) (0.116) (0.107) (0.066)
Balance(-1) 0.358*** 0.275*** 0.312*** 0.372*** 0.400***
(0.080) (0.038) (0.084) (0.079) (0.075)
Error -0.471*** -0.494*** -0.503*** -0.389*** -0.500***
(0.107) (0.075) (0.133) (0.176) (0.071)
Growth 20.051** 17.820* 14.157 22.335*** 18.288*
(10.073) (10.701) (13.949) (8.491) (9.931)
Unemployment -26.218* -31.540** -37.662*** -26.999** -28.838***
(13.704) (14.625) (15.427) (14.779) (10.331)
Elderly -13.704 -13.093 -9.105 -7.437 -10.761
(18.022) (19.460) (17.919) (19.594) (6.549)
Government -142.731*** -147.695*** -71.920 -156.786*** -63.239**
(42.155) (52.105) (49.740) (48.383) (32.539)
Coalition 17.725 18.439 19.311 21.250 12.175
(30.718) (39.977) (23.933) (32.985) (15.421)
Concordance 20.636 24.655 91.006 29.982 131.058
(77.653) (138.040) (118.433) (71.106) (106.881)
Departments -8.617 -7.022 -9.827 -9.125 -8.738*
(6.975) (13.889) (8.366) (5.852) (5.043)
Election -9.354 -9.476 -0.841 -10.904 -8.535
(39.292) (35.606) (41.381) (37.146) (37.035)
Initiative 57.704 81.138 62.562** 65.931 56.959***
(62.726) (93.029) (26.914) (88.393) (16.531)
Referendum -32.903 -39.835 -10.913 -62.074* -10.610
(28.150) (41.668) (20.231) (34.032) (10.902)
Rule 55.572 71.464* 19.830 10.552 21.932
(49.908) (39.426) (21.955) (51.952) (24.883)
Creative * Rule 0.027 0.018 0.042 0.051 0.011
(0.049) (0.054) (0.085) (0.053) (0.019)
Constant 842.535** 652.554 266.217 912.548 213.859
(367.529) (536.024) (325.562) (739.922) (224.540)
Cantonal FE YES YES NO YES YES
R-Squared 33.790 28.010 34.030 33.670 -
F-stat / Chi2 63.900 15.030 205.050 398.100 1082.640
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 684 659 684 675 659
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 47: Results of the simultaneous equations model without UR
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.309*** -0.293***
(0.080) (0.086)
SF(-1) 0.120* -0.016
(0.065) (0.073)
Revenue(-1) 0.351***
(0.041)
Expense(-1) 0.500***
(0.059)
Revenue 0.384***
(0.066)
Expense 0.649***
(0.051)
Error -0.536***
(0.141)
Growth 24.876*** -18.468*
(9.167) (10.101)
Unemployment -31.695** 69.202***
(13.693) (13.673)
Elderly -4.832 60.069***
(18.340) (19.498)
Government -149.807*** 123.608***
(43.932) (48.014)
Coalition 9.397 55.004
(34.572) (37.318)
Concordance 43.663 -244.621*
(121.209) (131.068)
Departments -0.643 2.069
(12.161) (13.193)
Election -13.552 22.632
(31.955) (34.550)
Initiative 66.800 -142.883
(143.720) (154.979)
Referendum -5.925 55.281
(58.817) (63.786)
Rule 36.010 31.176
(46.542) (50.870)
Creative * Rule 0.005 -0.050
(0.048) (0.052)
Constant 619.827 -400.547
(632.902) (685.720)
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 98.790 98.650
F-stat / Chi2 57821.080 49856.110
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 675 675
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 48: Results of the single equation model without GE
OLS REGAR PCSE 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.347*** 0.353*** 0.413*** 0.335*** 0.407***
(0.088) (0.075) (0.080) (0.084) (0.078)
SF(-1) 0.117 0.130* 0.077 0.105 0.105
(0.097) (0.072) (0.112) (0.100) (0.065)
Balance(-1) 0.324*** 0.274*** 0.287*** 0.335*** 0.379***
(0.073) (0.039) (0.086) (0.071) (0.073)
Error -0.417*** -0.439*** -0.475*** -0.450*** -0.475***
(0.135) (0.086) (0.169) (0.223) (0.089)
Growth 20.673** 18.703* 15.915 20.907** 18.795*
(9.945) (10.467) (13.700) (8.453) (9.940)
Unemployment -32.168*** -37.086** -35.041*** -30.093** -27.612***
(12.434) (14.628) (14.717) (14.814) (10.407)
Elderly -18.168 -18.591 -12.079 -12.930 -13.921***
(18.093) (18.474) (16.384) (19.888) (5.413)
Government -132.973*** -133.469*** -72.756 -148.710*** -62.355*
(46.674) (53.660) (51.523) (50.949) (33.673)
Coalition 8.706 8.962 24.356 11.049 18.428
(28.774) (38.982) (23.462) (32.340) (14.763)
Concordance -1.624 1.328 25.985 18.508 40.821
(73.092) (132.446) (124.805) (66.936) (63.275)
Departments -6.234 -5.272 -5.028 -8.274 -4.899
(6.788) (13.267) (8.723) (5.593) (5.400)
Election -5.070 -7.797 0.126 -5.931 -8.148
(38.800) (35.480) (38.229) (37.871) (37.081)
Initiative 101.547 110.889 59.328** 66.592 48.433***
(66.307) (89.003) (26.497) (94.067) (15.452)
Referendum -38.470 -42.984 -10.214 -52.236 -8.544
(28.198) (40.034) (22.274) (39.348) (10.692)
Rule 65.408 78.117 13.075 25.470 13.935
(51.652) (38.175) (22.272) (53.457) (25.118)
Creative * Rule 0.017 0.012 0.035 0.039 0.016
(0.047) (0.052) (0.082) (0.050) (0.017)
Constant 733.727** 644.428 338.788 959.929 327.445
(367.702) (547.410) (296.019) (758.001) (205.735)
Cantonal FE YES YES NO YES YES
R-Squared 30.220 27.160 32.310 30.240 -
F-stat / Chi2 49.360 14.450 270.850 393.200 2593.630
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 686 661 686 677 661
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 49: Results of the simultaneous equations model without GE
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.314*** -0.320***
(0.070) (0.071)
SF(-1) 0.148** -0.046
(0.064) (0.071)
Revenue(-1) 0.305***
(0.043)
Expense(-1) 0.462***
(0.061)
Revenue 0.428***
(0.071)
Expense 0.690***
(0.052)
Error -0.610***
(0.157)
Growth 25.071*** -17.093*
(9.076) (9.659)
Unemployment -35.919*** 81.252***
(14.086) (13.851)
Elderly -9.431 57.043***
(17.975) (18.469)
Government -117.161*** 138.873***
(47.758) (49.479)
Coalition -1.975 69.005*
(34.850) (37.026)
Concordance -13.660 -199.039
(122.323) (129.036)
Departments 1.987 0.347
(11.986) (12.570)
Election -8.729 10.722
(31.725) (33.216)
Initiative 146.389 -179.260
(142.308) (146.720)
Referendum -26.413 62.664
(59.494) (61.710)
Rule 56.328 15.917
(47.450) (50.583)
Creative * Rule -0.003 -0.039
(0.047) (0.050)
Constant 386.243 -498.934
(640.518) (670.120)
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 98.520 98.370
F-stat / Chi2 45610.890 40665.110
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 677 677
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 50: Results of the single equation model without JU
OLS REGAR PCSE 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.312*** 0.314*** 0.366*** 0.304*** 0.373***
(0.086) (0.074) (0.081) (0.081) (0.077)
SF(-1) 0.085 0.108 0.037 0.077 0.078
(0.103) (0.075) (0.115) (0.149) (0.066)
Balance(-1) 0.382*** 0.260*** 0.342*** 0.390*** 0.410***
(0.078) (0.039) (0.081) (0.063) (0.075)
Error -0.476*** -0.497*** -0.476*** -0.405*** -0.472***
(0.105) (0.077) (0.130) (0.172) (0.070)
Growth 22.142** 18.535* 17.127 24.777*** 20.727**
(10.397) (11.021) (14.291) (8.195) (10.017)
Unemployment -21.454 -31.695** -35.780** -24.024* -29.243***
(13.868) (15.991) (15.757) (12.814) (10.603)
Elderly -15.693 -13.746 -7.964 -12.745 -9.814*
(18.856) (21.234) (16.949) (24.043) (5.918)
Government -149.300*** -159.284*** -101.196** -162.558*** -90.878***
(44.106) (56.219) (49.796) (53.804) (29.990)
Coalition 12.374 16.359 17.724 20.672 12.150
(32.540) (44.125) (22.532) (36.572) (14.454)
Concordance 55.082 33.732 134.733 49.027 149.494
(77.578) (147.186) (117.853) (172.920) (105.912)
Departments -7.260 -5.332 -10.701 -8.291 -10.543**
(6.847) (14.713) (7.754) (10.712) (5.307)
Election -3.457 -3.589 1.909 -7.030 -4.609
(40.638) (35.996) (41.141) (35.577) (38.028)
Initiative 62.030 93.387 74.462** 75.898 67.307***
(60.393) (97.462) (29.265) (164.828) (15.966)
Referendum -32.304 -40.015 -21.267 -55.637 -20.149**
(27.172) (43.990) (21.735) (54.390) (8.578)
Rule 58.960 79.763* 11.017 11.588 15.307
(51.059) (42.395) (21.092) (63.989) (24.529)
Creative * Rule 0.031 0.020 0.048 0.053 0.006
(0.050) (0.054) (0.082) (0.068) (0.019)
Constant 864.438** 618.855 381.122 938.403 354.112
(359.923) (552.727) (315.787) (834.276) (225.099)
Cantonal FE YES YES NO YES YES
R-Squared 42.960 41.270 37.890 43.550 -
F-stat / Chi2 50.690 14.130 281.930 587.570 1554.500
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 679 654 679 671 654
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 51: Results of the simultaneous equations model without JU
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.269*** -0.307***
(0.068) (0.069)
SF(-1) 0.111* -0.011
(0.065) (0.072)
Revenue(-1) 0.373***
(0.041)
Expense(-1) 0.499***
(0.056)
Revenue 0.365***
(0.063)
Expense 0.627***
(0.053)
Error -0.528***
(0.137)
Growth 28.704*** -17.655*
(9.363) (10.143)
Unemployment -28.871** 70.354***
(14.342) (14.215)
Elderly -6.835 56.782***
(18.450) (19.175)
Government -154.222*** 142.266***
(45.938) (49.145)
Coalition 9.580 97.958***
(38.608) (40.703)
Concordance 57.614 -303.623**
(126.987) (134.070)
Departments 0.528 -3.535
(12.204) (13.007)
Election -11.611 9.530
(32.748) (34.855)
Initiative 66.511 -133.462
(135.263) (142.877)
Referendum 1.586 43.879
(58.262) (62.250)
Rule 42.463 21.420
(47.190) (50.776)
Creative * Rule 0.007 -0.041
(0.048) (0.052)
Constant 617.467 -373.341
(633.364) (673.762)
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 98.730 98.620
F-stat / Chi2 54671.270 48645.420
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 671 671
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 52: Results of the single equation model without AG
OLS REGAR PCSE 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.306*** 0.304*** 0.364*** 0.296*** 0.366***
(0.081) (0.069) (0.076) (0.093) (0.075)
SF(-1) 0.134* 0.164** 0.107 0.134 0.116
(0.077) (0.073) (0.117) (0.103) (0.070)
Balance(-1) 0.394*** 0.290*** 0.376*** 0.405*** 0.438***
(0.078) (0.037) (0.079) (0.075) (0.076)
Error -0.489*** -0.513*** -0.496*** -0.445*** -0.496***
(0.105) (0.071) (0.129) (0.185) (0.065)
Growth 25.156*** 22.246** 20.292 26.444*** 21.563**
(9.572) (10.058) (13.508) (7.313) (9.596)
Unemployment -18.669 -25.688* -30.810** -17.987 -24.517***
(12.350) (14.163) (14.385) (12.619) (9.537)
Elderly -21.050 -18.721 -9.890 -16.741 -10.827*
(15.730) (18.797) (16.702) (22.107) (6.043)
Government -125.206*** -133.276*** -72.390 -136.821*** -63.021**
(37.471) (50.867) (46.434) (42.341) (31.284)
Coalition 20.751 21.610 11.194 19.636 5.380
(28.073) (38.534) (20.917) (33.434) (12.018)
Concordance 7.572 4.119 111.281 26.023 140.235
(76.196) (133.661) (102.311) (147.783) (107.169)
Departments -8.480 -7.049 -7.703 -10.081 -7.826
(6.475) (13.393) (7.839) (11.266) (5.219)
Election 6.096 8.375 12.439 5.304 7.817
(37.819) (33.026) (38.623) (30.134) (36.318)
Initiative 109.219* 139.966 58.004** 78.798 52.183***
(56.239) (89.213) (24.545) (111.964) (15.570)
Referendum -38.362 -45.718 -8.825 -38.630 -8.233
(25.564 (40.313) (19.990) (57.787) (9.655)
Rule 6.111 14.687 -0.196 -23.047 3.885
(24.653) (40.224) (18.346) (52.489) (18.822)
Creative * Rule 0.014 0.014 0.025 0.038 0.002
(0.053) (0.060) (0.053) (0.094) (0.031)
Constant 635.362** 432.704 265.047 787.064 221.734
(296.239) (502.949) (306.928) (600.543) (220.555)
Cantonal FE YES YES NO YES YES
R-Squared 46.750 44.860 42.550 47.110 -
F-stat / Chi2 65.230 17.130 317.880 710.170 1621.420
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 695 670 695 686 670
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 53: Results of the simultaneous equations model without AG
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.260*** -0.286***
(0.065) (0.070)
SF(-1) 0.131** -0.049
(0.065) (0.075)
Revenue(-1) 0.381***
(0.039)
Expense(-1) 0.558***
(0.059)
Revenue 0.317***
(0.065)
Expense 0.615***
(0.048)
Error -0.477***
(0.141)
Growth 30.759*** -17.300*
(8.777) (9.992)
Unemployment -22.948* 63.012***
(13.193) (13.749)
Elderly -10.655 70.088***
(17.810) (19.201)
Government -128.376*** 95.258**
(42.848) (48.380)
Coalition 12.661 60.697
(33.440) (37.230)
Concordance 15.581 -255.364**
(117.371) (131.178)
Departments -0.388 3.148
(11.548) (12.930)
Election -3.632 3.208
(30.729) (34.329)
Initiative 116.479 -157.371
(137.033) (151.968)
Referendum -7.567 49.671
(56.993) (63.605)
Rule 1.869 68.882
(48.428) (53.838)
Creative * Rule 0.012 -0.047
(0.055) (0.062)
Constant 411.270 -244.359
(611.692) (682.929)
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 98.840 98.660
F-stat / Chi2 61402.020 49731.860
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 686 686
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 54: Results of the single equation model with cantonal and time fixed effects
OLS PCSE 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.269*** 0.266*** 0.253*** 0.318***
(0.074) (0.086) (0.084) (0.082)
SF(-1) 0.027 0.031 0.003 0.031
(0.070) (0.118) (0.092) (0.058)
Balance(-1) 0.338*** 0.284*** 0.342*** 0.409***
(0.037) (0.092) (0.060) (0.069)
Error -0.431*** -0.437*** -0.412*** -0.457***
(0.073) (0.136) (0.160) (0.068)
Growth
Unemployment
Elderly -46.349** -48.359* -56.454*** -21.714***
(21.403) (25.612) (16.909) (7.032)
Government -174.396*** -182.312*** -185.295*** -67.716**
(47.238) (57.375) (48.384) (34.420)
Coalition -25.334 -28.318 -29.348 -12.157
(37.043) (42.092) (30.350) (10.822)
Concordance 120.418 121.567 163.685* 215.507**
(134.017) (117.334) (96.825) (106.366)
Departments -10.428 -11.125 -6.676 -1.267
(12.975) (11.763) (6.212) (5.532)
Election 0.218 2.565 -0.197 2.173
(34.765) (37.988) (35.255) (34.923)
Initiative 50.823 52.533 141.035 65.029***
(81.949) (85.459) (91.455) (18.876)
Referendum -33.986 -34.863 -49.061 -5.065
(37.528) (35.911) (34.775) (13.689)
Rule 6.087 10.385 -87.080 -8.294
(38.326) (50.066) (54.374) ( 29.349)
Creative * Rule 0.045 0.043 0.071 0.007
(0.051) (0.081) (0.058) (0.034)
Constant 1669.359*** 1755.472*** 1544.313** 312.620
(578.049) (616.944) (816.003) (208.743)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 41.490 48.510 41.230 -
F-stat / Chi2 9.860 6.450 381.000 901.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 712 712 703 686
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 55: Results of the simultaneous equations model with cantonal and time fixed effects
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.256*** -0.254***
(0.068) (0.071)
SF(-1) 0.066 0.069
(0.063) (.072)
Revenue(-1) 0.317***
(0.039)
Expense(-1) 0.482***
(0.060)
Revenue 0.313***
(0.077)
Expense 0.662***
(0.056)
Error -0.535***
(0.146)
Growth
Unemployment
Elderly -39.569** 53.275***
(19.893) (21.240)
Government -183.044*** 126.222***
(44.172) (48.953)
Coalition -30.014 53.707
(34.159) (36.647)
Concordance 98.789 -214.642
(124.249) (132.784)
Departments 0.701 30.625**
(13.105) (13.927)
Election -5.471 14.389
(30.803) (33.189)
Initiative 84.159 -88.301
(137.616) (149.792)
Referendum -10.896 75.335
(58.462) (63.078)
Rule -19.316 62.112
(48.604) (52.750)
Creative * Rule 0.029 -0.059
(0.046) (0.050)
Constant 1498.028** -694.256
(679.364) (740.579)
Cantonal FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
R-Squared 98.850 98.740
F-stat / Chi2 62188.700 54045.190
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 703 703
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 56: Results of the single equation model with short time series (1997-2012)
OLS REGAR PCSE 2SLS GMM
ADC(-1) 0.319*** 0.293*** 0.353*** 0.323*** 0.375***
(0.109) (0.103) (0.099) (0.114) (0.106)
SF(-1) 0.085 0.101 0.058 0.077 0.098
(0.106) (0.098) (0.118) (0.138) (0.064)
Balance(-1) 0.320*** 0.201*** 0.263*** 0.329 0.353***
(0.076) (0.053) (0.098) (0.073) (0.077)
Error -0.493*** -0.482*** -0.491*** -0.348* -0.478***
(0.103) (0.110) (0.153) (0.205) (0.067)
Growth 9.346 4.259 3.220 14.013 12.774
(19.943) (17.989) (20.655) (17.992) (18.577)
Unemployment -39.707* -28.481 -65.283*** -53.100* -56.962***
(22.663) (44.617) (24.992) (28.806) (13.579)
Elderly 21.820 20.657 -11.524 44.440 -12.323*
(42.864) (51.083) (27.279) (51.514) (6.671)
Government -163.47** -155.099 -66.600 -184.576** -63.388*
(82.727) (100.010) (66.314) (92.730) (33.088)
Coalition 82.727 23.464 64.596* 20.193 53.940**
(65.885) (77.138) (38.222) (79.276) (23.089)
Concordance 40.137 -20.160 44.633 -1.419 42.016
(133.874) (267.871) (149.935) (395.466) (94.286)
Departments -20.032 -20.311 -9.615 -10.912 -13.686
(20.869) (42.759) (14.699) (33.302) (8.319)
Election -12.024 3.085 -1.439 -12.937 -7.666
(62.049) (58.342) (52.864) (65.326) (51.887)
Initiative -93.129 -109.410 60.739* -147.105 49.580***
(187.480) (229.357) (36.743) (395.079) (17.172)
Referendum -28.418 -25.518 -15.934 -219.553 -15.793
(68.500) (120.375) (30.299) (173.991) (16.188)
Rule 61.511 84.350 15.610 7.725 15.311
(90.597) (71.616) (25.080) (148.017) (25.556)
Creative * Rule 0.040 0.032 0.067 0.052 0.025
(0.057) (0.070) (0.085) (0.077) (0.020)
Constant 1221.052 974.191 301.739 1987.648 361.793
(907.897) (1251.13) (462.052) (1938.783) (225.255)
Cantonal FE YES YES NO YES YES
R-Squared 21.450 12.730 27.810 7.910 -
F-stat / Chi2 41.370 4.600 121.910 266.510 684.420
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 415 389 415 415 413
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 57: Results of the simultaneous equations model with short time series (1997-2012)
Revenue Expense
ADC(-1) 0.289*** -0.236***
(0.089) (0.096)
SF(-1) 0.095 0.085
(0.081) (0.095)
Revenue(-1) 0.296***
(0.049)
Expense(-1) 0.439***
(0.084)
Revenue 0.251**
(0.111)
Expense 0.724***
(0.085)
Error -0.610***
(0.205)
Growth 21.254 -36.259**
(14.924) (17.587)
Unemployment -37.343 67.397**
(27.753) (30.654)
Elderly 47.888 151.774***
(47.145) (52.896)
Government -201.901*** 116.830
(78.476) (87.790)
Coalition -34.843 -12.076
(58.764) (64.402)
Concordance 117.452 20.843
(197.505) (213.841)
Departments -4.954 0.217
(30.964) (33.571)
Election -18.703 12.557
(50.432) (54.158)
Initiative 35.386 174.868
(330.869) (340.548)
Referendum 3.687 181.556
(196.876) (224.048)
Rule -37.138 105.297
(100.691) (108.267)
Creative * Rule 0.031 -0.088
(0.061) (0.066)
Constant 252.908 -1812.212
(1746.992) (1812.912)
Cantonal FE YES YES
R-Squared 98.430 98.240
F-stat / Chi2 26767.860 22618.290
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 415 415
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The
R-Squared is the coefficient of determination. and Joint is the test of joint significance (F-test or Chi2). Results
were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Q - Quantitative impact of finance ministers’ personal characteristics in the use
of creative accounting
Potential endogenous covariates
The Hausman Test is used to determine whether or not one of the independent variables in
a regression suffers from endogeneity (omitted variable biased, measurement error, or reverse
causality). In our case, the Hausmann test is used in order to detect the presence of a reverse
causal effect between the variables “Balance” and “ADC”. To do so, the test is implemented
through three steps that are as follows:
The first step (Step 1) consist in running the structural equation, which is expressed as:
ADCijt = α+ βBalancejt + δIdeologyijt + ϑExperienceijt + γEducationijt + µWijt + ϕZjt + θj + τt + ijt
where the variable “Balance” is the suspected endogenous covariate.
Then, the second step (Step 2) aims at finding an appropriate instrumental variable for
the potential endogenous regressor. Since our data do not reveal the presence of second order
autocorrelation (as shown in Table 62 below), the second lag value of the variable “Balance”
is used as an instrument. Table 58below reports the covariance between the potentially
endogenous covariate and its instrument.
Table 58: Covariance between the potentially endogenous covariates and the instruments
Variables Balance
Instrument Balance(-2)
Covariance 0.4310
(-2) denotes the second lag value of the variable whereas (D1) refers to the first difference of the variable
Then, by running a reduced form regression we determine whether “Balance(-2) is a strong
instrument. The reduced form regression consists in considering the potentially endogenous
covariate (“Balance”) as the dependent variable and to regress it on all exogenous variables
of the structural equation and on its instrument (“Balance(-2)”). The reduced form model is
therefore as follows:
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Balanceijt = α+ ζBalance(−2)jt + δIdeologyijt + ϑExperienceijt + γEducationijt + µWijt + ϕZjt + θj + τt + νijt
The Wald test then provides evidence that the instrumental variable (“Balance(-2)”) is
statisitcally significant in determining the variable “Balance”. “Balance(-2) must therefore be
considered as a good instrument.
Table 59: Wald test for the statistical significance
Variable Balance(-2)
F-test 23.31
p-value 0.0000
H0: Variable not statistically significantly different from 0.
The third and final step (Step 3) consists in interpretating the Hausmann test and thus
allows to determine whether “Balance” must be consider as endogenous. To do so, we have
take the residuals of the reduced form equation (“ν”) and those residuals back into the
structural equation. Finally, it is the statistical significance of these residuals that reveal
whether the variable “Balance” is endogeneous according to the following hypothesis:
• H0: ν = 0 =⇒ “Balance” is exogenous
• H1: ν 6= 0 =⇒ “Balance” is endogenous
The structural equation is now expressed as:
ADCijt = α+ ρνijt + βBalancejt + δIdeologyijt + ϑExperienceijt + γEducationijt + µWijt + ϕZjt + θj + τt + ijt
and the results show that ν is not statistically signicant as demonstrated in the Table
below. H0 is therefore accepted, i.e. the variable “Balance” is effectively exogenous.
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Table 60: OLS regression for the structural equation
OLS
Residuals -0.0345
(0.093)
Error 0.007
(0.056)
Rule 12.204
(25.023)
Election -4.084
(14.951)
Coalition 31.115
(19.164)
Concordance -0.521
(0.771)
Age 3.607
(2.690)
Gender 20.129
(41.687)
Balance 0.121
(0.099)
Ideology 10.989
(12.058)
Experience -0.231
(0.282)
Apprenticeship -9.220
(32.796)
Economics 142.777***
(51.000)
Law 22.846
(31.122)
Politics 15.047
(82.979)
Constant -274.590
(209.158)
Cantonal FE YES
Time FE YES
R-Squared 23.59
F-test 3.10
p-value 0.0000
N 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Heteroskedasticity
Table 61: Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Chi2 1466.94
P-value 0.0000
H0: No heteroskedasticity
Autocorrelation
Table 62: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation of order one & Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation
of order one and two
AR(1) AR(2)
F-stat p-value z-stat p-value
Wooldridge 2.609 0.1188
Arellano-Bond -1.780 0.0751 0.950 0.3397
H0: No autocorrelation
Fixed effects
Table 63: Hausman test for random versus fixed effects
Chi2 25.78
p-value 0.0182
H0: Difference in coefficients not systematic
Table 64: Wald test for time fixed effects
Chi2 8.00
p-value 0.0000
H0: Time fixed effects are not jointly significant
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Multicolinearity
Table 65: Variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regressors
cantonal and time FE FE and Trends without FE
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
Trend - - 9.47 0.105567 - -
Coalition 5.53 0.180875 5.53 0.180875 1.13 0.887733
Rule 4.64 0.215715 4.64 0.215715 1.1 0.906303
Law 4.25 0.235551 4.25 0.235551 2.93 0.341051
Apprenticeship 3.84 0.260336 3.84 0.260336 2.79 0.358424
Economics 3.33 0.300528 3.33 0.300528 2.34 0.427451
Age 2.79 0.358086 2.79 0.358086 1.44 0.694866
Ideology 2.18 0.458366 2.18 0.458366 1.15 0.86782
Experience 1.92 0.520191 1.92 0.520191 1.5 0.666824
Balance 1.76 0.567698 1.76 0.567698 1.22 0.822603
Politics 1.71 0.586265 1.71 0.586265 1.23 0.810314
Gender 1.64 0.610082 1.64 0.610082 1.14 0.87929
Concordance 1.64 0.610494 1.64 0.610494 1.08 0.92915
Error 1.59 0.629298 1.59 0.629298 1.25 0.799497
Election 1.05 0.951912 1.05 0.951912 1.01 0.986042
Mean VIF 3.23 2.6 1.52
Multicolinearity may be an issue when the VIF is equal or higher than 10.
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Robustness checks
Table 66: Results of the linear regressions model - OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.000 -0.056 -0.057 -0.050 -0.009
(0.033) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.033)
Rule -1.480 3.729 5.860 20.052 15.540
(24.430) (24.400) (24.180) (22.909) (23.137)
Election -3.650 -4.032 -2.417 -6.404 -4.580
(14.786) (14.528) (15.107) (14.58) (15.170)
Coalition 28.468 30.395 30.009 28.876 30.860
(18.668) (20.622) (20.022) (19.204) (18.906)
Concordance -0.680 -0.627 -0.630 -0.241 -0.355
(0.962) (1.025) (0.991) (0.827) (0.759)
Age 1.655 1.828 3.126 2.456 3.427
(2.089) (2.401) (3.088) (2.029) (2.513)
Gender 14.374 -10.880 -12.140 -7.910 11.426
(52.319) (57.696) (57.466) (49.593) (46.826)
Balance 0.104*** 0.091***
(0.0367) (0.031)
Ideology -0.848 9.757
(8.869) (10.385)
Experience -0.267 -0.220
(0.289) (0.250)
Apprenticeship -11.117 -4.722
(31.861) (32.044)
Economics 162.329*** 151.036***
(50.753) (47.782)
Law 19.708 29.527
(30.692) (31.116)
Politics -11.825 19.782
(66.864) (71.728)
Constant -102.989 -115.890 -159.691 -193.781 -278.911
(175.097) (231.600) (220.166) (179.474) (199.580)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 19.06 15.36 15.55 20.27 23.08
F-stat /Chi2 1.84 1.85 2.24 2.00 2.31
p-value 0.0071 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 67: Results of the linear regressions model - PCSE estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error -0.011 -0.048 -0.050 -0.047 -0.020
(0.043) (0.042) (0 .041) (0.042) (0.043)
Rule -1.436 3.559 6.691 18.052 15.364
(37.797) (39.528) (38.336) (37.847) (35.110)
Election -7.816 -8.277 -6.172 -10.673 -8.631
(15.288) (14.787) (15.078) (14.101) (14.865)
Coalition 26.891 27.246 27.632 24.126 26.536
(23.182) (23.131) (23.625) (24.578) (23.641)
Concordance -0.562 -0.531 -0.543 -0.178 -0.246
(0 .893) (0.938) (0.925) (0.938) (0.886)
Age 1.683 1.793 3.796 2.326 3.774
(2.166) (2.265) (2.733) (2.287) (2.781)
Gender 3.810 -12.012 -14.294 -10.653 0.267
( 62.594) (67.388) (67.202) (66.661) (62.457)
Balance 0.080*** 0.067***
(0.024) (0.022)
Ideology -2.565 6.951
(10.341) (10.299)
Experience -0.371 -0.277
(0.298) (0.320)
Apprenticeship -12.556 -4.943
(42.452) (41.098)
Economics 148.192*** 144.224***
(51.447) (48.902)
Law 0.496 14.285
(44.962) (44.743)
Politics -20.791 -4.331
(135.664) (135.294)
Constant -246.433 -248.784 -348.571 -301.737 -410.235
(232.632) (237.295) (256.893) (250.092) (257.193)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 30.71 27.78 28.00 29.65 28.03
F-stat 5.08 9.80 1.98 4.74 1.48
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 68: Results of the linear regressions model - REGAR estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error -0.013 -0.054 -0.055 -0.054 -0.023
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042)
Rule -0.065 5.166 7.478 22.338 17.898
(22.821) (24.059) (24.135) (23.126) (22.320)
Election -7.083 -7.077 -5.251 -7.783 -6.715
(17.458) (17.344) (17.365) (17.259) (17.447)
Coalition 23.746 22.588 22.468 21.054 25.012
(22.512) (23.731) (23.634) (22.809) (22.127)
Concordance -0.515 -0.425 -0.453 -0.077 -0.216
(0.802) (0.846) (0.846) (0.801) (0.770)
Age 1.543 1.644 3.480 2.341 3.376
(1.847) (1.935) (2.382) (1.850) (2.237)
Gender 2.773 -14.669 -16.647 -10.734 2.511
(35.662) (37.111) (37.076) (35.258) ( 34.330)
Balance 0.082*** 0.073***
(0.020) (0.020)
Ideology -1.424 9.032
(10.180) (9.742)
Experience -0.349 -0.215
(0.268) (0.260)
Apprenticeship -11.578 -6.048
(39.379) (38.293)
Economics 165.478*** 156.755***
(42.890) (41.804)
Law 10.027 21.277
(38.183) (37.351)
Politics -21.232 3.368
(75.077) (75.946)
Constant -84.214 -29.702 -99.893 -175.230 -275.811
(120.723) (131.208) (124.033) (125.749) (147.903)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 17.10 14.89 15.11 19.01 21.03
F-stat 3.37 2.86 2.91 3.55 3.74
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 703 703 703 703 703
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 69: Results of the logistic regressions model - Tobit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.103 -0.171 -0.175 -0.137 0.080
(0.124) (0.105) (0.103) (0.119) (0.114)
Rule 25.504 52.953 50.827 46.585 21.818
(59.848) (69.897) (67.899) (50.652) (48.078)
Election -12.872 -9.596 -4.160 -9.587 -8.168
(30.822) (29.620) (30.859) (29.460) (31.107)
Coalition 0.045 26.502 17.422 1.469 -20.480
(41.561) (43.333) (39.270) (41.213) (47.519)
Concordance -0.626 -0.833 -0.637 0.641 0.541
(3.254) (2.398) (2.242) (2.201) (2.750)
Age 3.227 3.303 6.722 4.300 7.180
(6.099) (7.488) (8.367) (5.917) (7.067)
Gender 28.419 -65.208 -72.787 -16.302 43.866
(131.782) (159.153) (154.089) (126.818) (117.662)
Balance 0.306*** 0.266***
(0.104) (0.076)
Ideology -6.870 19.849
(42.165) (44.002)
Experience -0.800 -0.755
(0.561) (0.651)
Apprenticeship 22.591 43.376
(95.770) (96.822)
Economics 342.852** 264.580*
(161.332) (141.879)
Law 14.686 21.005
(80.356) (87.433)
Politics -22.828 87.302
(111.643) (140.349)
Constant -340.078 -366.670 -509.312 -569.633 -701.642
(397.957) (668.150) (527.616) (423.229) (571.051)
Cantonal FE NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO
Log Likelihood (4th iteration) -2534.827 -2560.855 -2559.275 -2538.446 -2519.340
Wald chi2 1.610 0.570 0.780 1.200 3.080
Prob > chi2 0.172 0.792 0.624 0.335 0.007
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 70: Results of the logistic regressions model - Logit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rule 0.128 0.238 0.235 0.255 0.141
(0.262) (0.280) (0.270) (0.251) (0.251)
Election 0.036 0.025 0.050 0.009 0.045
(0.098) (0.099) (0.104) (0.107) (0.111)
Coalition -0.206 -0.124 -0.160 -0.158 -0.269
(0.173) (0.171) (0.173) (0.184) (0.188)
Concordance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Age 0.008 0.009 0.027 0.011 0.026
(0.027) (0.029) (0.036) (0.027) (0.032)
Gender -0.049 -0.255 -0.328 -0.206 -0.003
(0.400) (0.366) (0.344) (0.309) (0.368)
Balance 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Ideology -0.121 -0.037
(0.106) (0.124)
Experience -0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Apprenticeship 0.233 0.314
(0.323) (0.349)
Economics 1.012*** 0.631
(0.386) (0.415)
Law 0.109 0.101
(0.368) (0.395)
Politics 0.729 0.913
(0.580) (0.738)
Constant -0.293 0.294 1.096 -1.025 -0.991
(1.731) (2.179) (2.193) (1.856) (2.175)
Cantonal FE NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO
Log Likelihood (4th iteration) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald chi2 16.730 5.700 7.100 13.120 44.740
Prob > chi2 0.033 0.681 0.526 0.286 0.000
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 71: Results of the logistic regressions model - Probit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rule 0.095 0.146 0.143 0.157 0.103
(0.164) (0.174) (0.168) (0.156) (0.157)
Election 0.017 0.015 0.030 0.004 0.023
(0.061) (0.062) (0.064) (0.066) (0.069)
Coalition -0.137 -0.077 -0.097 -0.102 -0.174
(0.106) (0.105) (0.107) (0.114) (0.117)
Concordance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 0.005 0.005 0.017 0.006 0.016
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019)
Gender -0.028 -0.153 -0.200 -0.124 -0.007
(0.240) (0.224) (0.210) (0.190) (0.223)
Balance 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Ideology -0.074 -0.022
(0.065) (0.077)
Experience -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Apprenticeship 0.143 0.184
(0.195) (0.209)
Economics 0.627*** 0.408
(0.235) (0.251)
Law 0.064 0.067
(0.223) (0.238)
Politics 0.447 0.554
(0.360) (0.453)
Constant -0.173 0.179 -0.654 -0.598 -0.600
(1.078) (1.355) (1.352) (1.132) (1.329)
Cantonal FE NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO
Log Likelihood (4th iteration) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald chi2 17.020 5.770 7.350 13.52 44.150
Prob > chi2 0.030 0.673 0.499 0.261 0.000
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 72: Results of the linear regressions model - OLS estimation without the canton of Uri
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error -0.003 -0.038 -0.039 -0.038 -0.008
(0.030) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.031)
Rule -12.093 -9.861 -7.617 -0.129 -1.260
(22.040) (21.718) (21.735) (19.601) (20.570)
Election -0.900 -1.070 1.171 -2.981 -0.507
(14.336) (14.050) (14.151) (13.757) (14.204)
Coalition 23.079 23.599 24.184 26.501 28.105*
(15.446) (16.601) (16.510) (16.582) (16.630)
Concordance -1.040 -1.037 -1.044 -0.758 -0.820
(0.909) (0.953) (0.898) (0.789) (0.727)
Age 0.857 0.816 2.705 1.410 3.111
(1.730) (1.864) (2.455) (1.655) (2.158)
Gender 60.136* 46.979 43.637 42.208 52.607
(35.373) (33.264) (33.010) (32.540) (33.612)
Balance 0.070*** 0.067***
(0.025) (0.024)
Ideology -2.200 5.527
(7.810) (9.007)
Experience -0.379* -0.342*
(0.207) (0.195)
Apprenticeship -24.987 -16.116
(29.726) (30.367)
Economics 92.974** 87.068**
(39.478) (39.099)
Law 22.715 32.579
(21.941) (23.918)
Politics -0.999 10.330
(54.236) (61.683)
Constant -22.078 -9.075 -82.678 -90.366 -180.979
(127.679) (161.267) (159.069) (139.192) (165.267)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.179 0.156 0.161 0.182 0.205
F-stat 2.210 2.130 2.130 2.020 2.190
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
N 700 700 700 700 700
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 73: Results of the linear regressions model - PCSE estimation without the canton of Uri
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error -0.021 -0.045 -0.044 -0.045 -0.027
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038)
Rule -10.425 -7.302 -5.501 0.358 -0.853
(32.157) (33.025) (33.027) (30.166) (29.406)
Election -3.668 -3.762 -2.080 -5.363 -3.689
(12.986) (12.598) (12.812) (12.132) (12.738)
Coalition 22.603 23.186 23.755 23.805 26.208
(20.724) (21.059) (21.463) (22.140) (21.236)
Concordance -0.865 -0.853 -0.859 -0.613 -0.659
(0.934) (0.964) (0.960) (0.970) (0.929)
Age 0.760 0.774 2.504 1.220 2.772
(1.988) (2.074) (2.437) (2.071) (2.273)
Gender 59.882 53.936 51.115 50.546 53.068
(52.544) (54.378) (55.179) (55.421) (53.075)
Balance 0.049** 0.046**
(0.021) (0.020)
Ideology 0.362 6.118
(9.419) (8.424)
Experience -0.318 -0.271
(0.296) (0.293)
Apprenticeship -24.940 -18.296
(38.097) (37.738)
Economics 75.726* 76.335*
(45.042) (43.257)
Law 10.044 20.342
(36.442) (36.787)
Politics -8.710 0.934
(136.364) (130.109)
Constant -147.248 -159.553 -230.006 -199.043 -311.387
(197.466) (207.880) (204.060) (219.176) (216.938)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.235 0.216 0.218 0.223 0.243
Chi2 4.680 1.760 2.660 2.320 1.040
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 700 700 700 700 700
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 74: Results of the linear regressions model - REGAR estimation without the canton of Uri
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error -0.022 -0.049 -0.047 -0.048 -0.027
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Rule -10.772 -7.940 -6.783 0.791 -1.123
(19.956) (20.594) (20.471) (20.424) (19.863)
Election -3.715 -3.495 -1.836 -4.806 -3.556
(14.951) (14.882) (14.937) (14.925) (15.086)
Coalition 18.453 17.989 18.408 20.046 23.207
(19.813) (20.448) (20.261) (20.101) (19.680)
Concordance -0.832 -0.797 -0.829 -0.564 -0.659
(0.705) (0.727) (0.723) (0.709) (0.688)
Age 0.630 0.620 2.342 1.240 2.714
(1.630) (1.675) (2.077) (1.645) (2.026)
Gender 58.670* 51.362 48.476 47.045 51.708
(32.007) (32.790) (32.623) (31.980) (31.367)
Balance 0.052*** 0.051***
(0.017) (0.017)
Ideology 0.329 6.453
(8.725) (8.650)
Experience -0.324 -0.277
(0.234) (0.236)
Apprenticeship -26.541 -20.042
(34.764) (34.070)
Economics 89.623** 86.120**
(89.949) (86.120)
Law 17.388 26.671
(33.894) (33.368)
Politics -8.042 3.139
(65.133) (66.455)
Constant 26.892 -5.844 -63.565 -35.633 -140.182
(105.631) (112.795) (108.688) (110.789) (128.794)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.156 0.143 0.142 0.162 0.178
F-stat 2.890 2.610 2.670 2.810 2.910
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 675 675 675 675 675
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 75: Results of the linear regressions model - OLS estimation without fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.026 -0.066* -0.057 -0.035 0.011
(0.046) (0.038) (0.043) (0.051) (0.039)
Rule -9.139 4.478 3.676 3.857 -6.308
(17.213) (19.077) (18.536) (14.048) (14.016)
Election -7.199 -8.129 -6.555 -9.696 -8.296
(15.243) (14.112) (14.899) (14.270) (15.858)
Coalition 0.640 17.304 15.058 4.053 -4.910
(11.547) (13.941) (12.664) (11.722) (12.156)
Concordance -0.296 -0.458 -0.402 0.302 0.311
(0.878) (0.859) (0.822) (0.934) (0.900)
Age 1.132 1.637 2.642 1.738 1.890
(1.915) (2.349) (2.603) (1.953) (2.239)
Gender 13.763 -26.240 -26.430 -13.424 5.741
(55.519) (68.895) (68.151) (58.952) (52.358)
Balance 0.113*** 0.093***
(0.048) (0.034)
Ideology 7.246 18.078
(8.925) (11.495)
Experience -0.251 -0.105
(0.254) (0.281)
Apprenticeship -8.465 -5.076
(29.467) (29.421)
Economics 154.512** 141.23**
(77.419) (76.225)
Law 2.051 5.647
(21.900) (26.897)
Politics -36.596 22.135
(33.022) (44.931)
Constant 60.142 -50.466 -36.495 -53.663 -136.695
(114.016) (186.770) (149.526) (133.905) (166.160)
Cantonal FE NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO
R-Squared 0.100 0.000 0.001 0.062 0.151
Chi2 8.980 5.190 4.770 11.650 25.390
p-value 0.344 0.737 0.782 0.390 0.031
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 76: Results of the linear regressions model - PCSE estimation without fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error -0.007 -0.058 -0.049 -0.043 -0.024
(0.053) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.052)
Rule -18.158 -13.665 -16.504 -9.092 -12.822
(13.988) (15.553) (16.004) (15.696) (14.856)
Election -13.153 -13.374 -11.142 -14.812 -13.915
(15.378) (14.296) (14.504) (13.963) (14.828)
Coalition -14.735 -12.445 -13.272 -16.321 -20.563
(19.382) (22.088) (21.244) (20.912) (18.737)
Concordance 0.718 0.757 0.870 1.319 1.219
(0.889) (1.069) (1.053) (1.083) (0.946)
Age 1.681 2.089 3.831 1.952 2.059
(2.142) (2.448) (3.345) (2.395) (2.959)
Gender 6.157 -16.463 -13.590 -9.525 -9.812
(83.147) (90.069) (89.581) (88.311) (82.432)
Balance 0.075** 0.061**
(0.031) (0.029)
Ideology 13.116 21.217*
(11.349) (11.328)
Experience -0.361 -0.083
(0.411) (0.400)
Apprenticeship -8.233 -4.282
(51.484) (47.313)
Economics 138.524** 144.816**
(68.737) (62.140)
Law -34.243 -19.981
(50.769) (47.832)
Politics -25.752 18.882
(177.481) (175.489)
Constant 8.438 -97.568 -87.470 -56.609 -171.612
(151.795) (162.990) (201.093) (191.750) (182.953)
Cantonal FE NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO
R-Squared 0.025 0.007 0.007 0.031 0.055
Chi2 11.600 6.150 5.580 15.650 29.670
p-value 0.170 0.630 0.695 0.155 0.009
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 77: Results of the linear regressions model - REGAR estimation without fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.003 -0.062 -0.053 -0.038 -0.003
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040)
Rule -7.663 0.513 -0.568 0.961 -7.202
(15.513) (16.757) (16.883) (15.877) (14.699)
Election -11.499 -11.938 -10.131 -12.937 -11.631
(17.753) (17.622) (17.666) (17.601) (17.812)
Coalition 1.970 10.091 8.323 -0.697 -8.015
(15.771) (17.122) (17.298) (16.414) (15.008)
Concordance -0.170 -0.223 -0.157 0.461 0.485
(0.725) (0.758) (0.761) (0.734) (0.709)
Age 1.440 1.814 3.120 1.816 2.066
(1.706) (1.783) (2.137) (1.711) (1.974)
Gender 3.270 -22.664 -23.067 -11.944 0.418
(33.859) (35.107) (35.078) (33.549) (32.935)
Balance 0.089*** 0.079***
(0.018) (0.019)
Ideology 8.601 18.758**
(9.383) (8.832)
Experience -0.299 -0.106
(0.254) (0.247)
Apprenticeship -7.909 -4.544
(37.686) (36.622)
Economics 148.520*** 141.539***
(39.686) (39.101)
Law -7.986 -1.686
(36.325) (35.360)
Politics -35.427 16.889
(73.949) (74.135)
Constant 30.698 -59.517 -51.971 -48.014 -148.795
(122.409) (143.532) (135.773) (129.594) (141.213)
Cantonal FE NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO
R-Squared 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.150
Chi2 25.650 4.900 5.540 36.490 60.960
p-value 0.002 0.843 0.785 0.000 0.000
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 78: Results of the linear regressions model - OLS estimation with a trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.000 -0.056 -0.057 -0.050 -0.009
(0.033) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.033)
Rule -1.480 3.729 5.860 20.052 15.540
(24.430) (24.400) (24.180) (22.909) (23.137)
Election -3.650 -4.032 -2.417 -6.404 -4.580
(14.786) (14.528) (15.107) (14.580) (15.170)
Coalition 28.468 30.395 30.009 28.876 30.860
(18.668) (20.622) (20.022) (19.2049 (18.906)
Concordance -0.680 -0.627 -0.630 -0.241 -0.355
(0.962) (1.025) (0.991) (0.827) (0.759)
Age 1.655 1.828 3.126 2.456 3.427
(2.089) (2.401) (3.088) (2.029) (2.513)
Gender 14.374 -10.880 -12.140 -7.910 11.426
(52.319) (57.696) (57.466) (49.593) (46.826)
Balance 0.104*** 0.091***
(0.036) (0.031)
Ideology -0.848 9.757
(8.869) (10.385)
Experience -0.267 -0.220
(0.289) (0.250)
Apprenticeship -11.117 -4.722
(31.861) (32.044)
Economics 162.329*** 151.036***
(50.753) (47.782)
Law 19.708 29.527
(30.692) (31.116)
Politics -11.825 19.782
(66.864) (71.728)
Trend -0.103 -0.033 -0.363 -1.770 -2.114
(1.653) (1.951) (1.908) (1.967) (1.795)
Constant -102.885 -115.857 -159.327 -192.011 -276.797
(175.697) (232.062) (220.678) (180.066) (199.606)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.196 0.077 0.074 0.121 0.189
F-stat 1.840 1.850 2.240 2.000 2.310
p-value 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.000
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 79: Results of the linear regressions model - PCSE estimation with a trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error -0.011 -0.048 -0.050 -0.047 -0.020
(0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043)
Rule -1.436 3.559 6.691 18.052 15.364
(37.797) (39.528) (38.336) (37.847) (35.110)
Election -7.816 -8.277 -6.172 -10.673 -8.631
(15.288) (14.787) (15.078) (14.101) (14.865)
Coalition 26.891 27.246 27.632 24.126 26.536
(23.182) (23.131) (23.625) (24.578) (23.641)
Concordance -0.562 -0.531 -0.543 -0.178 -0.246
(0.893) (0.938) (0.925) (0.938) (0.886)
Age 1.683 1.793 3.796 2.326 3.774
(2.166) (2.265) (2.733) (2.287) (2.781)
Gender 3.810 -12.012 -14.294 -10.653 0.267
(62.594) (67.388) (67.202) (66.661) (62.457)
Balance 0.080*** 0.067***
(0.024) (0.022)
Ideology -2.565 6.951
(10.341) (10.299)
Experience -0.371 -0.277
(0.298) (0.320)
Apprenticeship -12.556 -4.943
(42.452) (41.098)
Economics 148.192*** 144.224***
(51.447) (48.902)
Law 0.496 14.285
(44.962) (44.743)
Politics -20.791 -4.331
(135.664) (135.294)
Trend 0.120 0.160 -0.332 -1.328 -1.737
(2.629) (2.662) (2.599) (2.879) (2.822)
Constant -246.554 -248.945 -348.239 -300.408 -408.497
(234.069 (238.595) (258.179) (251.348) (258.201)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.307 0.278 0.280 0.297 0.322
Chi2 5.080 9.800 1.980 4.740 1.370
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 729 729 729 729 729
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 80: Results of the linear regressions model - REGAR estimation with a trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error -0.013 -0.054 -0.055 -0.054 -0.023
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042)
Rule -0.065 5.166 7.478 22.338 17.898
(22.821) (24.059) (24.135) (23.126) (22.320)
Election -7.083 -7.077 -5.251 -7.783 -6.715
(17.458) (17.344) (17.365) (17.259) (17.447)
Coalition 23.746 22.588 22.468 21.054 25.012
(22.512) (23.731) (23.634) (22.809) (22.127)
Concordance -0.515 -0.425 -0.453 -0.077 -0.216
(0.802) (0.846) (0.846) (0.801) (0.770)
Age 1.543 1.644 3.480 2.341 3.376
(1.847) (1.935) (2.382) (1.850) (2.237)
Gender 2.773 -14.669 -16.647 -10.734 2.511
(35.662) (37.111) (37.076) (35.258) (34.330)
Balance 0.082*** 0.073***
(0.020) (0.020)
Ideology -1.424 9.032
(10.180) (9.742)
Experience -0.349 -0.215
(0.268) (0.260)
Apprenticeship -11.578 -6.048
(39.379) (38.293)
Economics 165.478*** 156.755***
(42.890) (41.804)
Law 10.027 21.277
(38.183) (37.351)
Politics -21.232 3.368
(75.077) (75.946)
Trend -11.436 -16.958 -14.937 -9.817 -3.215
(54.241) (53.954) (53.824) (53.624) (54.066)
Constant 285.121 469.699 323.533 96.456 -220.887
(1452.449) (1371.605) (1362.951) (1427.879) (1508.97)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.171 0.083 0.079 0.135 0.192
F-stat 3.370 2.860 2.910 3.550 3.740
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 703 703 703 703 703
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 81: Results of the linear regressions model - OLS estimation with short time period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.020 -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 0.003
(0.037) 0.041 (0.042) (0.042) (0.036)
Rule -1.416 2.116 4.877 10.165 11.713
(26.312) (25.827) (24.695) (24.525) (26.844)
Election 4.713 3.293 5.704 4.268 6.016
(23.098) (22.492) (22.856) (23.135) (23.506)
Coalition 21.853 17.839 14.520 24.132 31.121
(26.038) (26.677) (26.747) (26.174) (26.340)
Concordance -1.267 -1.147 -1.266 -0.865 -1.125
(1.328) (1.329) (1.285) (1.097) (1.089)
Age -0.051 0.130 2.506 0.117 1.071
(2.760) (2.955) (4.168) (2.526) (3.482)
Gender 58.542 44.402 41.533 32.608 37.635
(48.730) (42.851) (47.494) (47.442) (44.690)
Balance 0.067** 0.064**
(0.027) (0.027)
Ideology 2.178 12.650
(15.488) (14.866)
Experience -0.528 -0.257
(0.446) (0.384)
Apprenticeship -36.246 -36.074
(39.349) (43.430)
Economics 155.014*** 147.225***
(57.239) (53.920)
Law 22.929 35.964
(32.620) (34.160)
Politics 15.451 39.206
(89.698) (81.681)
Constant 96.497 69.959 22.597 26.768 -82.100
(189.859) (226.154) (235.158) (188.662) (231.907)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.176 0.137 0.140 0.145 0.166
F-stat 1.900 1.850 1.900 2.120 2.310
p-value 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.006 0.002
N 416 416 416 416 416
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 82: Results of the linear regressions model - PCSE estimation with short time period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 0.000
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Rule -2.083 0.794 4.690 10.791 11.321
(38.912) (38.921) (38.124) (34.134) (33.970)
Election 1.723 0.646 3.462 1.447 3.368
(16.875) (16.543) (17.023) (15.412) (16.123)
Coalition 19.588 16.042 13.344 19.967 25.816
(25.426) (24.612) (24.274) (26.314) (26.135)
Concordance -1.039 -0.902 -1.040 -0.570 -0.854
(1.264) (1.305) (1.264) (1.258) (1.185)
Age 0.071 0.235 3.070 0.135 1.332
(3.071) (3.199) (3.753) (3.307) (3.866)
Gender 49.444 38.435 33.544 23.515 28.835
(63.878) (67.239) (69.235) (69.129) (62.018)
Balance 0.056** 0.053**
(0.025) (0.023)
Ideology 0.085 9.808
(13.062) (11.961)
Experience -0.614* -0.289
(0.370) (0.429)
Apprenticeship -29.779 -29.250
(60.123) (55.849)
Economics 155.717** 147.785**
(77.512) (75.114)
Law 7.862 24.050
(55.436) (50.225)
Politics 14.411 29.892
(170.856) (167.359)
Constant - - -73.532 -59.097 -
- - (300.325) (300.252) -
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.288 0.272 0.277 0.291 0.309
Chi2 604.850 1152.440 693.460 998.310 875.590
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 416 416 416 416 416
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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Table 83: Results of the linear regressions model - REGAR estimation with short time period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error 0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 0.001
(0.056) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057)
Rule 2.807 5.678 8.789 12.250 12.752
(31.355) (33.073) (32.517) (31.942) (31.780)
Election 3.458 2.809 5.096 5.734 6.220
(29.186) (29.199) (29.120) (29.044) (29.255)
Coalition 24.614 22.208 19.106 26.971 32.370
(33.230) (34.341) (34.260) (34.248) (33.789)
Concordance -1.280 -1.151 -1.287 -0.833 -1.040
(1.216) (1.257) (1.259) (1.224) (1.210)
Age 0.538 0.859 3.203 0.779 0.966
(2.873) (2.965) (3.502) (2.873) (3.484)
Gender 52.078 35.317 32.329 22.699 32.974
(45.418) (47.306) (46.439) (45.700) (46.051)
Balance 0.062** 0.060**
(0.026) (0.026)
Ideology 1.257 9.811
(15.439) (15.163)
Experience -0.505 -0.119
(0.407) (0.447)
Apprenticeship -29.253 -33.606
(61.044) (61.159)
Economics 160.702** 153.037**
(67.271) (66.389)
Law 15.942 27.262
(59.720) (60.982)
Politics 35.368 53.113
(115.654) (115.422)
Constant -12.053 -32.150 -94.479 -119.059 -184.796
(210.153) (228.153) (215.591) (222.673) (253.600)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.007 0.118 0.007 0.148 0.167
F-stat 3.800 3.280 3.520 3.530 3.420
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 390 390 390 390 390
Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the level of
significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The R2
is the coefficient of determination. Results were computed with Stata 11 SE.
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